FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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BALANCE SHEET ON DISARMAMENT

By John J. McCloy

FROM time immemorial man's search for peace has been offset by his desire and instinct for conquest and defense. For just as long, probably, the concept of disarmament, meaning the destruction and elimination of weapons or their conversion to peaceful uses, has recurred in men's minds as a hopeful means of attaining peace. Today we are approaching—if we have not already reached—the era of ultimate weapons. That is to say, we live now in a period in which weapons have become so destructive in their power that they can or could encompass the end of mankind itself. If it is said that even more destructive weapons lie ahead, and that we have yet to reach the ultimate, one can safely repeat that we are at a stage of weapons development where destruction is possible on so "grand" a scale that the direct and indirect consequences of their use would be incalculable and totally beyond all standards of previous comparison.

If we do not find a reliable alternative to the settlement of international disputes by war and threats of war, there is a strong probability that it is merely a question of time before the world will find itself engaged in a cataclysmic conflict from which it would require decades, if not centuries, to recover. Possibly the continuance of a nice balance of terrible deterrents can hold off such a catastrophe indefinitely. Arms races have sometimes petered out in the past; most of them, however, seem to have ended in wars. Whatever the balance of probabilities in this respect, the situation today is such that mankind must face up to the necessity of eliminating war as an acceptable arbitrament of international disputes.

At the forefront of the ways and means discussed for the elimi-

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nation of war is again the proposal that all nations should disarm themselves. It remains the most seriously pressed proposal for the achievement of peace.

There are those who contend that disarmament is more than a means to assist in the elimination of war. They are disposed to equate it with peace itself. It seems to me more realistic, however, to view disarmament as a concomitant of peace or an inducement to peace rather than as a synonym for peace. Indeed, there have been many occasions in history where disarmament or an imbalance in arms has induced war rather than prevented it. As long as man has the capacity to convert ploughshares into swords, or indeed as long as he possesses his present instincts and has his present physical, mental and moral attributes, the temptation to use force in international disputes will persist. It will be moderated only as there emerges a sensible and dependable means of settling such disputes by methods other than war. It is war itself which constitutes the problem and it is the relationship of disarmament to the elimination of war which must be constantly borne in mind in attacking the problem of disarmament. It is in the sense of this relationship that we must weigh the present prospects for disarmament.

The perennial search for peace and the relationship of disarmament to it take their most concrete form today in the effort to find a basis for agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States by which the existing tensions between them, including the arms race, can be moderated and, hopefully, eliminated. It is to the vital interest of these two nations and their peoples, as well as to all other nations and peoples, that progress be made in this field. There has been much fencing for position; ill-conceived and inadequately prepared proposals have been advanced; propaganda purposes have frequently been in the minds of the participants rather than a serious intent to disarm. But an impressive amount of sincere effort and thought has also been brought to bear, with the result that there has been a growing knowledge of the scope and complexity of the difficulties involved.

Unfortunately the fact remains that to date, in terms of actual disarmament, no appreciable progress has been made. I will not attempt to list or even to summarize the content of the disarmament and arms-control conferences, meetings and negotiations in which the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union, either alone or together with the representatives of other

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nations, have engaged since the last war. But as a new round of negotiations begins, it may be useful to set down at least some of the salient affirmative and negative factors involved, and then try to form a judgment as to the chances of constructive action in the measurable future.[1]

II

There was undoubtedly an accumulation of factors during the past year and at the beginning of the current year which must be classed as negative. Most of these relate to the test-ban negotiations. Indeed, the most discouraging setback was the Soviet Union's abrupt resumption of testing of nuclear and thermonuclear devices on a massive scale at a time when the United States was earnestly striving for an agreement. The persistent determination shown by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan to find an acceptable basis at Geneva for a ban on testing created an atmosphere in which an agreement seemed possible of accomplishment. Prior to the reconvening of negotiations at Geneva in March of 1961, I believed that the Soviet Union, in spite of its almost pathological abhorrence of any system of thorough inspection—or, perhaps better stated, its traditional attachment to secrecy and its distrust of our motives—did sincerely wish to reach an agreement, even though this involved a substantial system of controls. That belief was sharply modified when the Soviets introduced the "troika" concept into the negotiations, since that would have made the inspection provisions subject to a Soviet veto and thus completely illusory. The belief was further impaired during the summer when Mr. Arthur Dean, the United States representative, made a series of substantive proposals studiously designed to meet many of the stated Soviet objections, only to have them rejected out of hand. And it was practically destroyed on September 2, 1961, the date of the resumption of Soviet testing. As one looks back, it appears that the radical reversals of Soviet positions during the course of these negotiations were induced by the insistent pressure of the United States and Great Britain for the conclusion of a treaty.

It will be recalled that the test-ban issue was originally a part of general disarmament discussions. In 1958, however, the Soviet

[1] A prudent appraisal should probably be prefaced by a cautious set of assumptions and a definition of terms. In this article, however, beyond pointing out that the term "disarmament" is meant to include arms limitation and control as well as the reduction and elimination of armaments, no attempt at definitions and assumptions will be made.

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Union took the position that negotiations for a test ban must be separated from those general discussions. Following a pattern to be adopted by the United States on a number of later occasions, the American and British negotiators, in an effort to be constructive, acceded to the Soviet demand, with the result that separate negotiations on the test ban itself were commenced on a tripartite basis at Geneva later in 1958. Considerable progress seemed to have been made in reaching a basis for a treaty by the time the conference reconvened on March 21, 1961.

Perhaps even more significant than the introduction of the "troika" was the Soviet insistence later in the summer that the test-ban negotiations be again joined with those on general disarmament. The American and British representatives vigorously opposed this, largely on the ground that such a reversal of procedure would delay agreement and involve extending an unenforced agreement not to test. Then the Soviet tests took place. In the belief that further opposition was fruitless if any negotiations on the test ban were to continue, the Allies did agree, when the conference convened once more on January 16, 1962, to return to the original procedure. Thereupon the Soviet representative at Geneva switched back to a demand for a separation of the test-ban negotiations, but on a basis which would exclude any international inspection or control. Obviously this was unacceptable and the conference broke up; yet still another shift on February 22 suggested further manœuvring for position.

In view of the real potentialities inherent in a test-ban agreement as well as the symbolic effect such an agreement could have had on the larger problems, the failure at Geneva was a serious setback to the cause of disarmament.[2]

Some latitude in the alteration of positions is understandable;

[2] On a number of occasions the charge has been made by Soviet representatives that, while the negotiations were in progress, the United States was clandestinely preparing to conduct tests in Nevada and that, therefore, the United States representative at Geneva was not acting in good faith. I made an informal proposal to deal with this false charge during the course of my exchanges with Soviet officials in the summer of 1961 and prior to the Soviet resumption of tests. The proposal provided that the United States would permit a team of Soviet or neutral experts to examine the site of our proving grounds to determine for themselves the extent, if any, of our preparations, provided the Soviet Union would permit a team of Allied or neutral experts to do the same thing on the proving grounds of the Soviet Union. An agreement on this proposal, it was argued, would go far toward removing suspicion and mistrust on both sides, and we could get on with the conclusion of a treaty. In each case I was told that this proposal was impractical. Why it was impractical from the Soviet point of view became apparent on and after September 2, 1961, when the Soviet Union undertook its ambitious program of testing; for this program must have been readily discernible during the summer of 1961 had an inspection of Soviet proving grounds then been made.

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and all the changes of position have not been on the Soviet side. Much has been made of the fact, for example, that in 1960 the Allied representatives altered the position on controls which they had previously proposed. The reason, of course, was that underground tests conducted in Nevada in 1959 had disclosed, contrary to the opinion contained in the expert report of 1958, that there was a threshold below which explosions could be conducted without detection by the methods then existing.

The test-ban negotiations in themselves cannot be taken as decisive, perhaps, of the sincerity or lack of sincerity of over-all Soviet disarmament policy. However, the manner in which the Soviet Union constantly reversed the field during those negotiations raises doubts and introduces an undeniable note of pessimism in regard to future disarmament talks.

III

In appraising the possibilities of obtaining constructive disarmament results, we must record another set of negative occurrences which took place mainly in 1961. I refer to the various events out of which came a realization of the general ineffectiveness of so-called neutral or non-aligned opinion in the world as regards the test-ban negotiations. For some time much emphasis had been placed upon the existence of a moral opinion among the smaller nations that could be brought to bear, and thus restrain, the main protagonists in the struggle between the Communists and the free world. Many who were aware of the difficulties inherent in the conduct of bilateral negotiations on the disarmament issue hoped that nations not immediately aligned on one side or the other might prove helpful. All through 1960 and 1961 movements were developing in many parts of the world against any resumption of nuclear or thermonuclear testing, and some of them were couched in rather high moral tones. These pressures were mainly directed against the United States. It appeared that one reason for this was to counteract the mounting criticism within the United States against continuing a self-imposed and unpoliced moratorium on testing. Yet when the Soviet Union suddenly resumed tests on an extensive scale, and coupled this action with threats of 100-megaton bombs, the reactions among the neutral or non-aligned countries at Belgrade and again, to some extent, at the General Assembly of the United Nations, were so mild as to be wholly inconsequential. As a result, their

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position as "guardians" of the world's conscience was greatly weakened.

The tendency of these nations seems to have been to moderate their criticism against those whom they fear and to direct their main blasts against those whom they do not fear; or at best to seek to equate differences in action between the powers rather than to judge them. This, too, has substantially compromised the force of neutral and non-aligned opinion as a helpful factor in the solution of the disarmament problem. The Goa incident did not help. A leading neutral's cynical attitude in respect to the use of force, and the tacit acceptance of the dangerous doctrine of good wars and bad wars, put still more in doubt whether a strong moral opinion in fact exists among the neutrals and whether even where it does exist it counts for very much. It may have been a delusion from the beginning to suppose that the newer independent nations would, in a pinch, act otherwise than in what seemed to them, however shortsightedly, their own self-interest. At any rate, some rather elaborate pretensions were shattered and what had been a hope for helpful objectivity has been weakened.

There is another factor which may have a negative influence on the prospects for disarmament. By the time this article appears, the Soviet resumption of tests may well have induced other nations to undertake a further series of tests in the atmosphere, though so far as the United States specifically is concerned this is pure conjecture on my part.[3] The Soviet tests have placed emphasis on the anti-missile-missile field of nuclear development, on the potentialities of increased megatonage, and certain other possible developments. As a result, the pressure on others to test is certainly much greater than it has been for several years. If the meeting on general disarmament scheduled for March assembles to the accompaniment of perhaps unprecedented nuclear tests, the effects on the negotiations will be considerable, though precisely what they may be is difficult to say. Some claim that the resumption of tests may stimulate rather than deter constructive work on disarmament. But the perspective is certainly not optimistic.

Another factor not related directly to the test-ban talks may also affect the prospects for disarmament. The situation in Berlin has increased tensions and caused the international situation to

[3] With the passage of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act on September 26, 1961, I ceased to be the President's Advisor on Disarmament.

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deteriorate. Disarmament cannot proceed very far if we continue to glare at each other over the Wall. There has been a tendency to feel that the dangers inherent in the Berlin situation have lessened, but I have not seen or heard of any development to indicate that they are not still there. The erection of a concrete wall with its barbed wire, tank traps, *chevaux-de-frise,* watchtowers and machine guns has certainly not improved the situation. The sooner such a sinister symbol of repression is removed, the better will be the prospects for a sensible adjustment of the German problem and, with that, the better will be the atmosphere for fruitful discussions on disarmament. Until constructive progress is made on the Berlin problem, we cannot hope, if we are realistic, for far-reaching progress in disarmament; and from my talks last summer with Soviet leaders I have the distinct impression that this is their view as well.

IV

Before discussing more underlying factors on which the prospects for success in disarmament can be judged, we must make a diversion at this point to give the status of the present negotiations. A new set of general disarmament negotiations was scheduled to begin in Geneva on March 14, to be preceded, according to a proposal by the United States and Great Britain, by a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the participating countries—namely, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, France, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Rumania, Sweden, the United Arab Republic, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. The meeting was called to attempt to achieve agreement on a program to ensure (a) that disarmament shall be general and complete and war shall no longer be an instrument for settling international problems, and (b) that such disarmament shall be accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and by effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. This goal was set for the Disarmament Committee by a joint statement of the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States made September 20, 1961, which was welcomed by a resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted December 20, 1961.

The convening of the Disarmament Committee is the result of

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a series of diplomatic activities extending throughout 1961. At the beginning of that year, general disarmament negotiations were at a standstill. The last such negotiations had been at the 10-Nation Disarmament Conference, unceremoniously broken off by the Soviet Union in June 1960. An attempt to reach agreement with the Soviets on the fundamental problem of the composition of a new disarmament negotiating body, as well as certain elementary principles applicable to the conduct and objectives of disarmament negotiations, had been initiated early in 1961 by the United States, represented by Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, in informal contacts with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at the United Nations. They led to a decision that there should be further explorations of the problem during the summer, and these were held at intervals in Washington, Moscow and New York. Mr. Valerian A. Zorin represented the U.S.S.R. and I had the honor to represent the United States.

As a result of these discussions, agreement was finally reached on September 20, 1961, on certain accepted principles for disarmament negotiations, referred to as the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles. This was not a disarmament plan in itself, or an agreement as to specific measures. It did, however, attempt to outline a realistic approach to the problem of general disarmament and thus constituted a real step forward. Both sides recognized certain fundamental concepts without which attempts to achieve general and complete disarmament are not realistic.

In preparation for the renewal of negotiations, President Kennedy, shortly after taking office, directed that there should be an exhaustive review of American disarmament policy. This effort went on in parallel with the informal discussions we were holding with the Soviet Union on the establishment of a forum and a frame of reference for disarmament negotiations; it was completed in September 1961. The final product, entitled "The United States Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World," represented not only the combined efforts of all interested elements in the Government, but also took into account the recommendations and advice of more than 60 consultants both within and outside the Government, as well as the views of certain of our Allies. The Program was formally presented at the United Nations by the President early in the Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly and received substantial approbation both in the United States and abroad.

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The adoption of a Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, the subsequent agreement on a forum for disarmament negotiations, and the existence of a United States proposal which can be developed in these negotiations indicate that important and necessary preliminary steps have been taken. But they are only preliminary steps. In order to gauge the real prospects for general disarmament we must look a great deal deeper. We must analyze the areas of disarmament in which the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union coincide and the areas in which they diverge.

V

I have discussed some discouraging prospects for disarmament, referring to recent events which appear as immediate obstacles to fruitful discussion at the March meeting. But we should not dwell exclusively on the discouraging factors; there are basic fields of mutual interest which must also be examined and appraised. One can reasonably assume that both the leaders and the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States are convinced of the necessity of avoiding a nuclear war. Despite loose statements and conjectures on both sides, the leaders of each country have facts available to them which bear conclusive evidence that "victory" in a serious thermonuclear exchange is a highly questionable concept.

Thus the fundamental common interest is the elimination of this threat of destruction. Some Soviet leaders continue to contend that if an all-out nuclear war should occur, capitalism would be destroyed while the Soviet Union would merely be damaged. Apart from purely ideological reasoning, they have made some attempt to base this conclusion on concrete military grounds, placing emphasis on such factors as the distribution of population in the Soviet Union, its lesser reliance on communications, and similar matters. Others in the Soviet Union have been more realistic in assessing the possibility of mutual destruction. If the responsible Soviet leadership were frank with itself and the Russian people, it would acknowledge destruction on an unacceptable scale as a certainty rather than a possibility.

It may be argued that the tone of some Soviet predictions about the outcome of an all-out nuclear war might mean that the Soviet Union has not abandoned the possibility of embarking on such a war as an instrument of policy, feeling that perhaps out of the ashes it might construct a Communist world. Though my belief

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in the sincere desire of the Soviet leaders for disarmament was shaken by the manner in which the Soviet Union conducted the test-ban negotiations, and by its resumption of tests, I do not share that view. I believe the Soviet leaders who hold the chief positions of responsibility recognize the true facts. A thermonuclear exchange would involve complete destruction of the Soviet standard of living, built up so painfully since 1917. If the leaders are well informed, and I believe they are, they know that conjecture as to which would survive better, capitalism or Communism, is simply silly. What would be left after such a war would not be recognizable either as Communism or capitalism. Such survivors as there were would have to find a new name for the primitive system by which they would conduct their struggle to recover. Another consideration which must be in the minds of the Soviet leaders is the horrifying thought of a Soviet Union, terribly crippled, living next to a relatively undamaged China with a population of about 700,000,000.

Granted that the Soviet Union may be willing to accept a higher level of risk of war than is the United States, nevertheless, in my judgment, the facts greatly favor the view that, in so far as they understand the risks in any particular step they may be contemplating, and in so far as they can control the situation, the Soviet leaders wish to avoid general nuclear war, if only for selfish reasons.

A second area of mutual interest which arises from the common desire to avoid a nuclear war must be the prevention of any such war by accident, miscalculation or failure of communication. Soviet discussions of this problem have at times tended to be heavily tinged with propaganda aimed at the West's defense arrangements; thus they have often discussed the problems solely in terms of a possible Western mistake or accident. Moreover, the conceptual approach to this problem which they adopt publicly—namely, that measures short of radical or complete disarmament are of marginal or temporary value in meeting the dangers confronting mankind—has been pushed to the extreme. It has appeared to inhibit their discussion of the more immediate measures aimed at reducing these dangers. Finally, they are most sensitive about the possibilities—as they see them—that measures to reduce the chances of war by accident or miscalculation might seriously infringe upon the secrecy surrounding their military establishment, which they cling to as an alleged strategic asset.

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Nevertheless, there does seem to be an increasing recognition on their part, as there has been on the part of the United States, of the increased danger involved in the growth of nuclear stockpiles and more particularly in the growth of complex and extensive systems for the delivery of nuclear weapons. They seem aware, too, of the resulting heavier responsibility imposed upon the principal nuclear powers, pending the adoption of a disarmament agreement, to minimize the dangers either by unilateral action or by multilateral agreement.

The revolution in weapons development has resulted in the creation of delivery systems with fantastic rates of speed. Certain missiles that might be used in case of war have a speed of around 16,000 miles per hour, which would mean a delivery time of only about one-half hour between the Soviet Union and the United States; and missile-launching submarines will provide almost no warning time at all. As a counter, defensive systems are being developed with such quick reaction times as to give real meaning to the term "war by accident, miscalculation or failure of communication." Indeed, it is questionable whether the human mind can encompass all the problems involved in controlling these devices even without a war. It is not inconceivable that we could blow ourselves up without help from the Russians; and vice versa. Thus, the arms race has an impressive way of building its own tensions. The Government of the United States is aware of these dangers and is spending a very great amount of time, effort and money in attempting to devise ways to reduce them. It is to be hoped devoutly that there is a similar effort in the U.S.S.R.

Another common desire is to prevent any third country from provoking a nuclear war. In concrete terms, this expresses itself principally in the Soviet Union's concern about the acquisition of an independent nuclear capability by Germany and (judging the situation objectively) by Communist China. For then both these powers would have the ability to involve the United States and the Soviet Union—Germany through its alliance with the United States, Red China through an attack upon some vital American interest which would call forth an American reaction, which, in turn, would require Soviet assistance to Communist China (at least in the present state of the alliance). The Soviets could reasonably conclude that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by West Germany and by Communist China, or indeed by anyone else, would substantially take out of their control the decision

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of whether or not to go to war. In somewhat different degree, the same danger exists for us.

From such information as we possess, Communist China intends to become a nuclear power and there are strong indications that its leaders will not be bound by any commitments the Soviet Union may make to others in regard to disarmament. The true attitude of Communist China may be "a mystery wrapped in an enigma," but the auguries for its good will in international affairs at the moment hardly seem propitious. For one thing, the Red Chinese leaders may not share the same sober feelings that many of the Soviet leaders have about the effects of a nuclear war. Certainly no far-reaching agreements on disarmament can be undertaken without having in mind the position of Red China. If we question the willingness of the Soviet Union to submit disputes in which it has an interest to determination by an international institution, our reservations must be even greater about Red China's willingness to do so in similar situations.

Whenever Red China was brought up in the course of our discussions on the test ban, the usual Soviet retort was, "What about France?" That France is presumably a long way from an ability to make and deliver a significant number of bombs did not deflect the question. The fact remains, however, that although France's desire to become a nuclear power has quite different implications than does Red China's, the French position has not been helpful to the general cause of disarmament. It has contributed to a plurality of nuclear power which involves the danger that the employment of nuclear weapons may be irresponsible. But Red China's possession of the bomb is clearly a greater threat—a view with which, I have the impression, Moscow would agree.

The Soviet interest in avoiding an extension of nuclear weapons to additional countries coincides to a substantial degree with our own. The United States policy, as expressed in our national legislation, is directed against a proliferation of nuclear weapons. The United States Program of September 25, 1961, includes as one of its important measures a provision that states owning nuclear weapons would not relinquish control of them to any nation not already owning them nor transmit to any such nation information or material necessary for their manufacture.

The similarity of American and Soviet interests in this regard should not be overestimated. The geographic and political relationship between the United States and the other members of

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NATO is quite different from the geographic relationship between the U.S.S.R. and the other Warsaw Pact nations. The President of the United States indicated in Ottawa that our relationship with our Allies would have to be taken into account in determining the physical disposition and political control of nuclear weapons that are available for the area covered by the NATO treaty. In this connection, there is substantially more security to be derived from having nuclear weapons under the control of NATO than independent of its control. If the U.S.S.R. is seriously concerned to see that these weapons are disposed and controlled so as to eliminate the danger that any nation at present without them could one day start a war which would engulf the world, then a real mutuality of interest exists.

The fourth area of mutual interest is economic. It would be advantageous to the Soviet Union, one would think, to be free of the economic burden of the arms race and thus be able to devote all its economic resources to fulfilling its long-range plans for internal improvement. According to the best estimates, it is at present spending considerably more than 10 percent of its gross national product for defense purposes.

In the United States we devote just under 10 percent of our gross national product (which is about twice as large as the Soviet G.N.P.) to defense. Furthermore, in the United States a smaller proportion of the working population is dependent upon defense for employment than is the case in the Soviet Union. However, statistics do not fully reflect the great concentration of capital, energy, thought and skills which are devoted directly or indirectly to armaments in the United States. Admittedly, this concentration has a deep impact on our economy and it is not going to be a simple matter to switch the human and physical resources involved to purely peacetime pursuits. Advance planning will be required at all levels of government and on the part of business and labor if we are to make appropriate provision for the maintenance and growth of aggregate demand and if we are to master the structural problems which would be involved in the process of conversion.

In the United States serious studies have already been instituted in this field. Like other nations, we have many unmet needs, public and private, and with imagination and determination they can be translated into economic demand once we are free to turn our backs on the production of weapons of destruction. It is

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enough to think simply of the unsatisfied needs in the fields of education, natural resources, urban renewal, transportation and social welfare to realize what a vast economic interest we really have in disarmament. And beyond these domestic needs are the almost inexhaustible requirements of the underdeveloped countries of the world.

In the past, moreover, this country has moved successfully from mobilization to demobilization more rapidly and completely than any other country of comparable size. Going back to the time of the Rush-Bagehot Agreements, which initiated the demilitarization of the Canadian-United States border, down to the demobilization and disarmament after both World Wars, the record of the United States in actually carrying out disarmament compares most favorably with that of any other country. Under present circumstances the problems may be more complicated, but there is no basis for Soviet contentions that the United States does not genuinely seek disarmament because of its concern for economic consequences. If anti-capitalistic propaganda is not swallowed in this respect, the over-all economic benefits of disarmament are seen as a definite field of common interest between ourselves and the Soviet Union. Indeed, it is to be hoped that the Soviet leaders are as clear on this point as our own leaders are.

VI

Just as there are underlying points of mutual interest, so there are underlying points of divergence, and if we are to be realistic some of these must be identified here, even though most of them are only too well known.

For some years the stated policy of the United States has been to maintain a decisive military superiority over the U.S.S.R. and our responsible government officials have made it quite clear that we do have a substantial superiority in nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them. In the last few years the Soviet Union has taken the position that it possesses a military superiority. It has based this contention mainly upon its superiority in propulsion, as evidenced by its larger satellites, though other items have also been stressed. Clearly, a situation in which each of the two most powerful nations in the world is committed to the proposition that it must retain a decisive military superiority over the other does not create a climate conducive to the negotiation of a far-reaching disarmament agreement.

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A second underlying obstacle, already mentioned, is created by the Soviet attitude toward inspection and controls. The Joint Statement of Agreed Principles included an agreement upon the need for a control system capable of assuring all parties that obligations undertaken as part of a disarmament agreement are being faithfully fulfilled. The Soviet Union, however, refused to accept what the United States believes to be an inherent and essential element in this concept, namely, that whenever an agreement stipulates that only certain levels of forces and armaments are to be retained, the control organization shall have the authority to verify that these levels are not exceeded. That is, verification of compliance must consist not only in assurance that specified units have been demobilized and specified weapons destroyed, but also that what remains is not in excess of agreed limits. Therefore, the control organization must have the right of free access to search for clandestine facilities.

In the discussions on this point, the Soviet representatives usually stated the Soviet position in purely semantic terms. They insisted that the Soviet Union could agree only to inspection and control over disarmament, not control over armament; therefore, they said, the inspector could verify only the dismantling of arms. The difference, of course, goes much deeper than semantics, indicating a fundamental difference in attitude. This was sharply brought out in the letters exchanged between Mr. Zorin and myself on September 20 and 21, 1961.

The United States is a free society, and within certain well-defined limits it has very little to hide from an international inspector. This is not to say that it does not have important installations and devices to guard, or that it would enjoy having a burdensome system of inspections imposed upon it. The fact remains that an effective inspectorate would be tolerable and would be accepted provided there was a reciprocal means of determining what was going on in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is a closed society. Its claim that the American insistence on inspection and control is designed merely to create a cover for espionage is nonsense. It is a fact, however, that an international inspectorate, operating freely within the Soviet territory, would run counter to the concept of Soviet secrecy as a military and political asset. It must be ascertained to what degree the Soviet leadership can be persuaded that secrecy, far from being a military asset, can constitute a real

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military danger. Secrecy breeds suspicion and distrust. Since we do not know the facts and since we receive repeated intimations of fantastic new Soviet weapons we naturally seek to arm more intensively than ever, perhaps even to a degree which is unnecessary. The disposition is to credit fearsome rumors and to redouble our own efforts to improve our weapons.[4] It would be immeasurably healthier for both of us if this secrecy were to be diluted.

In the view of the Soviet leaders, an international inspector may also represent a threat to the insularity and secrecy which form part of the Soviet and Russian way of life. The Russian aversion to foreign intrusion is traditional, at least in certain parts of the country and in certain strata of society; it far antedates 1917. It has been diminished somewhat in the past few years, but it still plays a role as part of the control which the Party exercises over the people. Vast areas of government operations are simply not known to the masses of the Soviet people or to the peoples of the world. Any external inspection might be considered as endangering the government's control.

The American and Soviet approaches diverge again in the attitude of the U.S.S.R. and other Communist countries toward the use of threats of force, indirect aggression and subversion as means of overthrowing free societies. We have felt bound to set up counter forces to meet this form of aggression, but we would be quick to abandon them if the threat were removed. If significant progress is to be made toward disarmament, the dangerous distinction between just and unjust wars must certainly be abandoned. We cannot be asked to disband the means of self-defense, while the Communists seek to exempt certain kinds of conflict from the process of international settlement. The same is true of attempts from abroad to bring about changes within a free country by force of arms. It is hard to see how we can reach the goal of a secure world in which there no longer is need for national armed forces and armaments so long as the Communist leadership sets the destruction of free governments as a basic aim, in achieving which it feels justified in using any method, including force.

Nor is it easy to be trustful of a nation whose leaders insist that our American society is about to crumble away and who say

[4] An example of this was the increased effort to produce I.C.B.M.s in the United States as the result of what now seems to have been an exaggerated estimate in 1959 of the number of such operational missiles which the Soviets would shortly possess.

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openly that they will do all in their power to accelerate the process.This is not our concept of peaceful coexistence. For example, Mr. Khrushchev's speech of January 6, 1961, to the Communist leaders assembled in Moscow, does not create confidence among those societies whose collapse he declared to be the chief objective of Soviet policy, and who are called upon, at the same time, to agree to wide areas of disarmament.

There is, finally, another respect in which the attitude of the U.S.S.R., and to some degree of the United States as well, must undergo a change if disarmament negotiations in Geneva or elsewhere are to succeed. The Joint Statement of September 20, 1961, is quite clear that progress toward general and complete disarmament is closely linked with improvement in the international machinery for peaceful settlement of disputes. One side of the coin cannot be dealt with successfully without the other.

In recent years many disarmament negotiations have proceeded on the assumption that a system of inspection which gave promise of detecting violations would be sufficient by itself to assure compliance with whatever agreement might be reached. On this assumption, the only penalty for violating a disarmament agreement would be the cancellation of the agreement, with the consequent threat of the resumption of the arms race and perhaps the condemnation of public opinion throughout the world.

This assumption may be valid for some first steps in the disarmament process, particularly if, as proposed in the Statement of Principles, disarmament proceeds through stages subject to balanced, phased and safeguarded measures. There will come a point, however, where a control system which merely reports a violation is not adequate. Precisely when this point will be reached cannot be stated with certainty in the absence of actual experience with institutions for control; but clearly it will not be long deferred. Indeed, the greater the degree of disarmament achieved, the greater might be the temptations for a potential violator to transgress the agreement and the greater the risks presented to all those who were complying with it in good faith. It would not, for example, take many hidden megaton bombs to constitute a most formidable threat against any nation or group of nations which had already disposed of its own weapons. In the kingdom of the blind, the one-eyed man is king. Nations cannot be expected to pass this point in disarming, to give up the means of defending themselves against aggression, unless they can be

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assured that there exists the machinery to guard against illegal accumulations of arms.

But, as indicated earlier, the necessity for effective control machinery is only one reason why international institutions must be strengthened as steps are taken toward total and universal disarmament. They must not merely be able to enforce disarmament agreements; they must be strengthened to the point where they are capable of bringing about just settlements of international disputes, including adjustments which are necessary and appropriate in a changing world. This poses fundamental questions for both the Soviet Union and the United States, indeed for all countries, Communist and non-Communist alike; and they must be faced and dealt with if we are to advance far on the disarmament road.

It was not intended by the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles merely to introduce meaningless words and generalities into the future disarmament discussions in referring to the need of improved machinery for the adjudication of international disputes and the maintenance of peace. In due course, specific proposals implementing these principles will have to be made. This will require the application of the best minds and statesmanship. It will demand common effort and thought on the part of all the nations, for the interests of all are involved. The hope of reaching the objective of general and complete disarmament is dependent upon having specific plans for improved methods of keeping the peace which will keep pace with specific plans for general disarmament.

All this having been said, however, the exigency of the situation in which the world finds itself is such, the danger of nuclear war by miscalculation, accident or design is so great, that we cannot wait until all obstacles have been eliminated before taking steps to reduce tensions and control the armaments which in themselves generate tensions. These steps must be taken whether they be classed as disarmament measures, test bans, arms control, arms limitation or the improvement of means for settling international disputes. The immediate need is to deflect downward the intensity of the present arms race. Each step that increases confidence will not only permit us to edge out from under the danger now hanging over us but to move toward a condition of mutual trust on which far broader measures may be based.

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VII

And now what is the over-all balance between these positive and negative factors? President Kennedy said in his address to Congress on January 11: "World order will be secured only when the whole world has laid down these weapons which seem to offer present security but threaten our future survival. That Armistice Day seems very far away." However, he also went on to say: "But the world was not meant to be a prison in which man awaits his execution. Nor has mankind survived the tests and trials of thousands of years to surrender everything—including his existence."

It does indeed seem true that before the world lays down its arms in reliance on a secure international order many years may have passed. Nevertheless, the positive elements in the present world situation which have been pointed out here do give hope that progress can be made toward the goal. Statesmen should not find the obstacles in the way insuperable. To say this does not imply that threats of inevitable destruction will stampede either side into taking reckless risks with disarmament. Yet the very obstacles—the tensions, the diverse ideologies, the fears, the suspicions—act as a stimulant to action. Were not the dangers so real and the obstacles to their removal so great we would not be concentrating so much attention on disarmament.

Even the resumption of large-scale testing of which the Soviet Union was guilty, like the actual or threatened resumption of large-scale testing by others in retaliation, may finally impel both sides, at long last, to agree on an effective test ban. In the same way, the heavy tensions of the Berlin crisis, induced on the one hand by the Soviet Union's threat of unilateral action and on the other by the realization that the West will certainly resist by force the impairment of its rights in Berlin, produce a powerful urge to action.

The United States now has a plan for the achievement of general and complete disarmament which is realistic and balanced. The Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, to which the Soviet Union subscribed, envisages the intermediate measures to be implemented on the way to the ultimate goal. It commits both countries to continue their efforts until the total program has been achieved. The Soviet Union is committed, to the same degree as is the United States, to a program by which war shall no longer be an instrument for settling international problems and in which the twin requisites—reliable procedures for the peaceful settle-

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ment of disputes and effective measures for maintaining peace—go hand in hand with disarmament.

True, the issue of inspection and control remains unsettled; but the McCloy-Zorin exchanges brought into the open for the first time the essential difference between the Soviet and Allied concepts of inspection and control, and as a result it should be possible now to attack the realities rather than the semantics of the problem.

While the United States need not feel at all on the defensive in respect to its past record on the disarmament issue, it should now be still better equipped to develop and support well-thought-out positions. With the establishment of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, we now have a statutory organization, responsible both to the executive and legislative branches of the Government, which is prepared to do the work necessary for effective representation at disarmament meetings. The problems of disarmament are connected with some of the deepest interests of our national life; they also involve difficult and puzzling technicalities. In the postwar period, the United States has frequently given the appearance of having been ill-prepared to deal with them, or uncertain of its attitude, or too technical in its approach. I believe this appearance has not been due to any lack of sincerity on the part of American representatives but rather to the perverse complexity of the subject and their desire to examine deeply the practical results of any proposal. I have the impression, also, that the Soviet Union has not done as much homework on the practical aspects of disarmament as has the United States. It seems to have placed much more emphasis on catch phrases or ultimate goals rather than on developing practical and reliable means of getting there. The time has come to face and attack the obstacles in common, to forego striving for propaganda effects, and to discard, let us hope, forever, the tongue-in-cheek manœuvring which marked the Soviet position at the test-ban talks last summer.

A word may be in order as to the role of other countries, whether they participate in these negotiations or express their views from the outside. Unfortunately, very few of them have done or are prepared to do the work which is involved in making a real contribution to the subject. Very few have even one man, much less an adequate staff, whose whole time and preoccupation are applied to the problem. Such a highly technical and frequently abstruse

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subject demands knowledge, thought and considerable research. Those who sit on the sidelines and merely chant "general and complete disarmament" without putting their minds to mastering the difficulties of the problem neither make much of a contribution nor are they apt to influence those whose efforts are more serious.

It would be a real mistake for these nations to assume that their only role is to press others to take action or merely to line up with one side or the other. In addition to doing the independent homework needed for making a real contribution, they can in a number of cases, by their own concrete example, indicate the affirmative steps which they believe the international community must take. Such action would be much more persuasive than an exhortation to others to take risks they are not prepared to take themselves. The situation of Pakistan and India is only one of many cases which come to mind.

The full disarmament process will take a long time to complete. Let us then not ask too much of the early phases of the resumed negotiations. Let us bear in mind also that the negotiations cannot produce worthwhile results if they proceed in isolation; other efforts must be made simultaneously to relieve the underlying tensions. It is my view, further, that increased trade and cultural exchanges must take place as we go along in order to develop and maintain a proper atmosphere for success. The hope must be that the experience of past negotiations will induce all the parties concerned to understand better that they are tackling one of the most complex problems imaginable and that their endeavor must be to unify all efforts toward its solution. The time indeed is short within which to make real progress; it is not so short as to compel the final solution during the course of any one meeting.

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THE END OF THE MONOLITH

World Communism in 1962

By Walter Z. Laqueur

FOR world Communism 1961 was the year of the great schism. "Polycentrism," a term apparently first used by Palmiero Togliatti in June 1956, is not yet in the dictionaries, but it has become a most important fact in world politics. In 1948, when Tito broke with Stalin, it was no more than a small cloud on the horizon; in 1956, after the Polish "October" and the Hungarian revolution, it had become a full-size specter in Communist demonology. Five more years sufficed to turn what was, at least outwardly, a united Communist camp into a battlefield for ideological supremacy and political leadership between two major and several minor centers. It even is no longer certain whether this struggle will not break the existing polycentric framework and move on to a lasting, irreparable rupture. Even if the Sino-Soviet conflict were somehow to be resolved (a most unlikely eventuality indeed), world Communism will never be the same again, for meanwhile other Communist parties in both Eastern and Western Europe have staked out their claims to independence and self-determination, and the national Communists in Asia and Africa have gone even further. Communist ideologists had spent much time developing their theories about the emergence of Communism as a world system, a social, political and economic community of free and sovereign peoples united by close bonds of international proletarian solidarity, by common interests and objectives. Their mutual relations were to be based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism. The argument rested on the denial of any objective reasons in the nature of the Communist commonwealth for conflicts between the states and parties belonging to it —very much in contrast to the conflicts between nations and states outside the Communist world.

In 1962 all of this sounds like bitter mockery. Whether or not there are "objective" reasons for discord may be a subject for unending scholastic disputations. Meanwhile, relations between Moscow and Tirana, in so far as they still exist, are not exactly based on proletarian solidarity, nor can Sino-Soviet relations be defined by any stretch of the imagination as either close or

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friendly; Italian and French Communists have engaged in ideological controversy that reflects disagreement on basic tenets of belief, and M. Sékou Touré, guided presumably by the principles of complete equality, mutual advantage and comradely assistance (to quote the 1960 declaration of Communist parties), gave the Soviet ambassador just 48 hours to leave Guinea. It is a list that could be prolonged (Jugoslavia, for one, has not been mentioned), and it shows clearly that an entire era in world Communism has come to an end. Since about one-third of mankind lives under Communist régimes, any such dispute was bound to have the most far-reaching political repercussions on the world situation in general. It had begun as a family quarrel—as so many of the most bitter disputes do; for an understanding of the mechanism of fatal family quarrels one must turn not to Marx, but to one of the favorite authors of the father of scientific socialism, the one who wrote "Hamlet," "Macbeth" and "King Lear." There is a touch of Shakespearean drama in the present turmoil in the Communist world.[1]

II

Both Communists and non-Communists now seek an explanation for the disarray in what was once the Communist bloc. The Marxists-Leninists have gone on record with a number of most un-Marxist explanations; instead of analyzing the political, social and economic roots of the conflict, they prefer to stress the deficiencies in the character of individual leaders or their intellectual incapacity to interpret correctly Marxist-Leninist theory. According to this analysis, everything is reduced to subjective factors—the ill-will or the stupidity of individuals; similarly, most Communists have been unable or unwilling to discuss Stalinism in anything but the most superficial terms. Their doctrine prevents them from probing any deeper; Stalinism, they are told, was not a cancer in the body politic of Soviet society, but a non-malignant growth that could easily (and painlessly) be removed; they have been promised that it will not, indeed cannot, reappear. Polycentrism, likewise, is officially regarded in the Soviet Union as a temporary aberration by well-meaning but confused foreign Communists.

[1] ". . . those were difficult, dramatic moments. It was not for nothing that Chisinevschi received the nickname of Iago, the prototype of the intriguer." (*Scanteia*, December 12, 1961. Speech by Petru Borila to the Central Committee of the Rumanian Communist Party on the activities of the local "anti-party" group.)

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In theory, Communists have always admitted the existence of national differences and have made allowances for them in their tactics. In practice, however, this never amounted to much more than lip service; substantial differences in approach were actively discouraged if not roundly condemned. All this has been done in the name of the principles of Marxism-Leninism; but Marxism is essentially a nineteenth-century doctrine and even the writings of V. I. Lenin provide little authoritative guidance on such contemporary issues as whether the Chinese communes are preferable to the Soviet kolkhozes, or the Sovkhozes to the Jugoslav agricultural coöperatives.

The Communist "revisionists" alone have made a more serious attempt to analyze and understand the tensions between the Communist parties and states—the Italians and the Poles in 1956, and again, with renewed vigor, after the 22nd Party Congress. According to Togliatti, the polycentric system corresponds most closely to the new situation in the international Communist movement, to the development in its doctrine and its changing structure. Jugoslav observers, who have had more time than the rest to ponder these questions, have stated in their theoretical writings that Communism is not a magic formula which will do away with conflicts and contradictions overnight. Edvard Kardelj has drawn attention to a point first made many years before by the social-democratic critics of Bolshevism—that the starting point of each country on its road to socialism was of paramount importance for its subsequent development. If the starting point was very low, it was more than likely that political backwardness would be perpetuated and perhaps even canonized as part of the great heritage of the past. Such heretical comments, needless to say, provoked the sharpest criticism in both Moscow and Peking.

There was no unanimity in the West with regard to the emergence of several autonomous centers in the Communist world. One school of thought was convinced that it was all a question of productive forces, and interpreted Russia's development from Stalin to Khrushchev and beyond mainly in terms of improving living standards that would, more or less automatically, lead toward a freer society; they now argue that recent disputes merely reflect the great disparity in the economic development of the different Communist countries. There is a grain of truth in this argument; the fact that the Chinese have their supporters in the more backward areas of the world, and Albania as their only

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European bastion, can hardly be quite accidental. Unfortunately, while backwardness breeds tyranny, it has yet to be proved that a rise in the standard of living leads in itself toward democracy. Czechoslovakia, economically the most prosperous Eastern bloc country, is politically among the most reactionary, and the economic progress achieved in East Germany over the past six or seven years has found no reflection in the political character of the Ulbricht régime. The "economic determinists" apart, expert opinion in the West has ranged from the prophets of an inevitable clash to those who deny the very possibility of conflict. Among those who foresaw Sino-Soviet tension at a very early stage was the late Wilhelm Starlinger, a German physician who wrote in 1951 that geopolitical factors beyond their own control would soon set the Soviet against the Chinese Communists. He reached a correct conclusion on the basis of a wrong assumption (for the struggle for mastery in Siberia and Outer Mongolia is not at present the main bone of contention between the two Communist super-powers), whereas the late Franz Borkenau, at about the same time, developed the more sophisticated theory that a conflict between Moscow and Peking was inevitable because totalitarian régimes were bound to establish their absolute control as far as they could; the unity of the Communist camp could be based only on domination, not on equality, and was thus bound to create discord. To this could have been added yet another apparent law of totalitarian societies—that there is no room at the top for more than one man or group of men.

At the other extreme it was contended until quite recently that a basic conflict between two or more Communist powers was impossible because, since all Communists agreed on essentials, any dispute among them could be of a tactical nature only. Some went even further and asserted that ostensible conflicts might be deliberately staged in order to mislead the West. This exaggerated view of the potency and validity of Marxist-Leninist doctrine led its proponents as far astray from realities as did the views of those who denied the importance of ideological motives altogether.

It has been suggested that we learn from a comparison between the centrifugal forces in world Communism today and those in the history of the papacy, especially in its very early days and again in the later Middle Ages. Some of these parallels seem attractive, especially at a distance; upon closer inspection they prove to be largely irrelevant if not actually misleading. For each his-

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torical situation is unique; Khrushchev and Mao bear no resemblance to Arius and Athanasius; the present age of crisis in the Communist camp and the era of the triple schism could not be more dissimilar. As a non-Marxist Russian writer correctly observed, each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.

III

Historical parallels, then, will not take us very far in the search for the causes of the split in the Communist camp. Two questions above all remain to be answered: one concerns the deeper reasons for the crisis; the other, Khrushchev's role in all this. What induced him to start it off? Could he not have prevented it by displaying a more conciliatory attitude?

A convincing case could perhaps be made to show that the strife in the Communist camp was originally caused, not by ideological disagreements, but mainly by what the Communists call "national peculiarities." The Russians and the Chinese, in other words, quarrel not over the correct ideological interpretation of Marx and Lenin, but because they are Russian and Chinese, dissimilar in national character, heirs to a markedly different cultural and social heritage, because their present political and economic interests diverge, despite all their internationalist professions. Even if Peking and Moscow had seen eye to eye with regard to, say, the Stalin cult, peaceful coexistence and the organization of agriculture, other bones of contention would in all probability have appeared. The fact that Peking now claims to be closer to Leninist orthodoxy is of no great significance. Only five years ago the Chinese leaders took a more "liberal" view on some issues than their Soviet comrades; five years hence they may criticize Moscow from yet another angle. When Tito and his colleagues quarreled with Stalin in 1948, they were to the "left" of the world Communist movement, more militant and aggressive; today they are definitely to its right. The ideological orientation has changed; what remains is the insistence on their right to autonomy.

Doctrinal considerations play an important part in all this, but not a decisive one. The conflict in the Communist camp is caused by the clash between unifying and centrifugal trends. The latter are now proving the stronger—since membership in the camp is on a national basis, and since the differences between the various Communist states are much more important than most Marxists-Leninists imagined. These countries set out on their road to Com-

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munism at various times and from different starting points, and yet it is doubtful whether the conflicts could have been prevented if they had all started at the same time and from the same point.

Why did Khrushchev deliberately provoke a fight that many think might otherwise have been delayed, if not perhaps indefinitely postponed? Communist societies are not exempt from the effects of crises and shocks; they only manifest themselves in a different way. Stalin had ruled his own country and the rest of the Communist world (with two notable exceptions) with an iron fist. Gradually his régime had become a hindrance to progress; it impeded the growth of the Soviet economy and imperiled the physical safety of its ruling stratum. Stalinism had to be done away with—but it could not be disavowed without destroying at the same time the dogma of the infallibility of the Soviet Communist Party leadership. It was precisely this dogma on which the "unshakeable unity" of the camp was founded; once it disappears, the most the Soviet leaders can hope for is to keep their leading role on the basis of their experience, and their economic and military power. There is a world of difference, however, between following the omniscient and omnipotent head of the only true faith and adherence to a worldly alliance, necessarily much looser in character, in which the members pick and choose when to follow the leader and when their own ways: an alliance in which leadership is no longer undisputed.

This transformation could at best have been only partially successful; the crisis, in any case, was of Stalin's making, not Khrushchev's. If Stalin, who was in so many ways in a stronger position, could not break Tito in 1948–49, Khrushchev cannot hope to coerce a foreign party boss in 1962, short of applying military pressure. Khrushchev did not provoke the crisis but merely brought it into the open. The Communist states had ceased to be a united camp long before, and the Russians had apparently decided to make an end to what must have appeared to them as the harmful, perhaps intolerable, pretense of unity where no real unity existed. Khrushchev's outburst against Hoxha, and "Hoxha's supporters," was neither spontaneous nor unprovoked. It was comparable, perhaps, to the behavior of the head of a supposedly happy and united family who has been driven beyond endurance by some of its members, who has had to support, cover up and bear the cost of all their escapades and misdeeds, without having any real control over them. Some of the Com-

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munist parties and countries had apparently got accustomed to doing what they liked, taking Soviet support for granted. Mr. Khrushchev may have felt as President Kennedy must occasionally feel, as he studies the dispatches from Paris, London, Bonn or NATO headquarters.

IV

Sino-Soviet relations since the 22nd Congress have been marked by the desire of both sides to prevent an open break and by an equally pronounced inability to coöperate. An open break would be a major disaster and would cause irreparable harm to the prospects of Communism as a world movement; it would dwarf into insignificance all previous such disputes. But how can it be prevented except by an agreed division into spheres of interest that would be both unworkable and in utter contradiction to the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism?

Until fairly recently it had been argued in Peking that the "bloc" needed a leader, and that such leadership could be provided only by the Soviet Union. But Mao always thought in terms of a special Chinese mission in East and Southeast Asia. Such ambitions have undoubtedly grown in the same measure as China's industry and military strength. In a long-term perspective Mao undoubtedly always assumed that "bloc" leadership would pass to China not only because China is the most populous country in the world but also because he believed his own interpretation and application of Marxism-Leninism to be much more orthodox, less afflicted by distortions and deviations, than the Soviet brand. A Chinese co-prosperity sphere in Asia is unworkable because most of China's neighbors are distrustful of Peking's territorial designs, and some of the neighboring Communist parties (such as the Indian and Mongolian) are openly hostile and would never voluntarily accept Chinese tutelage. China's friends are found further afield, and this makes a geographical division impossible. Any attempt to create agreed blocs on ideological lines seems equally impractical; it would raise more problems than it would solve, for the pro-Chinese elements within the Soviet sphere of influence would undoubtedly continue to look for guidance and support to Peking, and the pro-Soviet militants in the Chinese sphere would likewise maintain their allegiance to Moscow.

If no solution is in sight for the conflict of the two Communist

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super-powers, the situation in Eastern Europe is somewhat less complicated, though reactions have by no means been uniform. The liberals have become more liberal, the diehards have become, if possible, even more hostile to liberalization. The Soviet leaders feared the possible repercussions of the 22nd Congress, and almost immediately after it they launched a concentrated propaganda campaign to "keep the ideological offensive." Men like Georgiu Dej, Ulbricht and Novotny have been even more afraid of possible consequences than their Soviet comrades, as shown by the unwillingness of their press to publish in full the revelations about Stalin and Stalinism made at the 22nd Congress.

These leaders have all accepted the Khrushchev line and have sharply denounced Tirana and Peking on the one hand and the advocates of polycentric Communism on the other. But such support for Khrushchev is strictly limited to inter-bloc relations. In their own countries they now follow a path different from the Soviet road, deviating from the Soviet pattern as much as Gomulka or Togliatti.

In Czechoslovakia, the liquidation of the cult of the individual has been restricted in the main to the decision to move the 6,000-ton Stalin statue and to "cartographic destalinization" (a term actually coined in Eastern Europe). The Prague leaders have also engaged in Bolshevik self-criticism in a performance worthy of the good soldier Schweik. They were all misled by Slansky, Taussigova, Svab and the other victims of the 1952 trials, who are now accused of having been at one and the same time enemies and supporters of Stalin, foes and friends of Tito. Other Czech leaders, such as Gottwald and Zapotocki, have also come in for some criticism; fortunately, they are dead. As for the living, they never saw, heard or spoke evil. The Rumanian leaders, who were the last to react, were equally unwilling to commit political suicide by admitting their past "mistakes"; their local Stalinists (such as Pauker, Luca, Chisinevschi) were, it appears, purged long ago. But what about Georgiu Dej, the Party secretary-general—now, as under Stalin? Well, he could not do much, we learn now, since his telephone was tapped by the Paukers and Lucas. The Bulgars behaved in a slightly more dignified way and decided to oust a man who had been in partial disgrace for some years past, Vilko Chervenkov, one-time supreme Party boss. The Bulgarians also used the opportunity to rehabilitate fully Traicho Kostov, one of the chief victims of the régime, who had been partially rehabilitated

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in 1956. If Novotny delivered a 20,000-word report, and the Bulgarian Zhivkov needed 30,000, Ulbricht of East Germany was the most long-winded (35,000 words) and said less than anybody else. He gave the order to change the names of some cities, streets and factories, brought new accusations against some of his foes eliminated from the Party leadership long ago, and defended himself against allegations of having engaged in the cult of the individual. Being in the very front line of "imperialist attack," he had apparently persuaded Moscow that it would be unwise to weaken himself and his régime by misplaced self-criticism at this time. Kadar of Hungary, whose speech was the shortest, said, not without some justification, that the whole commotion did not really concern his country, since the leading Stalinists had been chased out of Budapest back in 1956. There was some relaxation in the cultural field in Hungary following the 22nd Congress, though less than in Poland. Gomulka had to dissociate himself from the open advocates of polycentrism, but he did so halfheartedly, declaring at the same time that there was no longer a "center" that could prescribe the policy to be followed by him, his Party and government. Jugoslavia and Albania, the old foes, found themselves outside the "camp"; the Albanians did not even wait for the end of the 22nd Congress to counterattack, whereas the Jugoslavs, the trail-blazers of polycentrism, could for once afford to watch the storm around them with a measure of equanimity.

V

Western European Communists, free of the burden and responsibilities of state power, diverged even more widely in their reactions. The ideological dispute was highlighted by the polemics between the Italian and French Communists, which go back to the year 1956 when Paris denounced Togliatti for his polycentric heresies. When the polemics were now resumed, the French predictably argued that unity was a precondition for the victory of Communism, that polycentrism would open the door to factionalism in the world movement. But the real quarrel was not about polycentrism, which is now an established fact, but about the use made of their new autonomy by the various Communist Parties. Togliatti, and even more the younger leaders of the Party, want to submit the Stalin era to a searching critique and to draw from it far-reaching conclusions for the present.

Why is it that the French Communists have opted for a policy

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that, but for the support for Khrushchev against Albania and China, is neo-Stalinist in character, whereas the Italians have now joined the extreme revisionist wing of the world Communist movement? This can undoubtedly be traced to the composition of the two Parties; both have strong mass support among industrial workers, but the French Party has always been far more Stalinist in character. At one time it attracted many intellectuals, but gradually antagonized most of them. Its top leadership has been subjected to many purges over the last decade. The Party has become ossified, though French domestic conditions apparently have a galvanizing effect even on fossils. The French Party is therefore little influenced by international affairs, whereas the Italian Party, being far more alive and sensitive, at once registered the shock. Its leadership is far superior to the French in political and general intelligence. Most of the other European Communist parties are somewhere in between these extremes of neo-Stalinism and "revisionism." For the time being the Italians are more or less in isolation. But there are signs that the tide is running in favor of Togliatti's views. The North African Communist parties, for instance, who had been for a long time under the guardianship of the French, have come to regard Rome as the place to turn for help and guidance in recent years.

The problems besetting European Communism appear strange and probably somewhat fanciful to the sister parties in other parts of the world. Most Communist Parties outside Europe have not expressed any strong views about destalinization and polycentrism. They were established as parties only in the last decade, and the whole Stalin period belongs for them to prehistory. While Frenchmen and Italians quarrel about whether Trotsky should be rehabilitated, the Ceylonese Communists have already entered an alliance with the local Trotskyites; the leadership of the Indian Communist Party has likewise engaged in highly unorthodox activities. These Parties have had a comparatively large measure of autonomy for several years. In part it was conceded to them for tactical reasons, in part they simply took it in the absence of a central institution exercising control over the activities of the various branches of world Communism.

In recent years the formerly clear dividing line between Communists, National Communists and sundry friends of the movement has been partly obliterated. In 1960, countries such as Cuba, Mali, Ghana and Guinea were elevated to the status of "National

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Democracies"—in contrast to other independent countries such as India, Indonesia and Egypt, still under the sway of the "national bourgeoisie." At the 22nd Soviet Party Congress, representatives of the Convention People's Party of Ghana, of the Guinea Democratic Party and the Union Soudanaise of Mali were treated as full-fledged comrades and were invited to address the Congress, a privilege bestowed only on Parties accepting all the changing articles of faith. Such practices, scheduled to create a reservoir of good will in the *tiers monde,* in fact contributed to the general confusion; only a month later, following the December 1961 "plot of the students and teachers," Sékou Touré had expelled the Soviet ambassador and accused Soviet and other foreign and local Communists of plotting against his rule. Mali is as unpredictable as Guinea from the Soviet point of view, and Ghana with its new official ideology of Nkrumahism looks an even less likely candidate for membership in the "camp." Dr. Castro is Russia's safest bet in this class; believing himself under strong pressure from "American imperialism," he is unlikely to bolt. But in a wider perspective he may not merit absolute confidence; he came to power, after all, without Soviet help. The men in Moscow know from bitter experience that such self-made revolutionaries are prone to cause difficulties later on.

The Cuban leaders want the whole of Latin America to follow their example; and it would appear that only such a brand of National Communism stands any chance of making headway in this hemisphere. But this in its turn would contribute to the emergence of yet another regional "center," and thus contribute to the spread of polycentric Communism. It is perhaps somewhat ironical that any progress by world Communism can now be achieved only by strengthening the centrifugal trends and thus weakening the movement from within. However ardent their feelings of friendship and admiration, there is no room for Russia and China in the blueprints of most non-European Communists for the future of their continents. To hamper Soviet activities even more, Chinese Communist propaganda in these parts is less than coöperative, and the disruptive theories of the Jugoslavs, those first secessionists, have gained wide currency in many of these capitals.

The very success of Communism in the underdeveloped countries has been its undoing. It has been adulterated and yields a strange harvest: under a veneer of Marxist-Leninist ideology, of anti-imperialist slogans and state capitalism, influences and inter-

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ests are at work which have nothing to do with Marxism-Leninism and sometimes nothing to do with any European doctrine whatever. Communism is Africanized and Asianized even faster and more thoroughly than Christianity, because it is a secular movement and therefore in greater need of adaptation. The outcome is a mixture of Communist elements and components alien to it. Political scientists undertaking some form of qualitative analysis will have a hard job to establish the exact composition of the mixture and the character of each régime, and whether it belongs to the bloc or not. As the bloc is transformed into a polycentric system, and that system itself endangered by sudden shifts of political allegiance, it will be exceedingly difficult to determine who belongs where, especially as those most directly concerned may not always know the answer themselves.

VI

Will Communist countries and Parties be able to coexist with each other? Their internal differences are in some ways more intractable than West-East tensions, precisely because each believes itself to be the sole possessor of the means of grace, because they are more dynamic, because their sense of mission is so much more acute. In these circumstances the heretic must appear as a traitor and hence a worse enemy than the open foe. Stalin could enter into a working alliance with Hitler but never with "Judas" Trotsky. But have there not been changes in the Soviet world in recent years? Has Soviet policy not become much more elastic? Isn't there still a large measure of common ground and interest which may prevail over all the disagreements? Were there not similar "national deviations" in the very early days of the Comintern which were successfully overcome? There are essential differences between the "National Communism" of the early twenties (in Germany, Turkey and some other countries) and present-day trends, just as the "revisionism" of 60 years ago is radically different in character from the contemporary trend of the same name. One was prehistoric, so to speak, the other is post-Communist, based on a confrontation with Communism in action. The earlier variety of National Bolshevism was an attempt from outside to water down Communism; present-day National Communism is a disruptive trend within the camp and hence infinitely more dangerous.

To an outsider, the dispute between Khrushchev and Mao, be-

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tween Tito and Hoxha, between Togliatti and Thorez, may seem negligible; a contemporary Hindu may have reached similar conclusions with regard to the quarrel between Luther and Leo X. Communists may coexist; a final and lasting break may be prevented if they find a modus vivendi on the basis of mutual tolerance. But toleration is a state of mind notably absent from missionary movements, and from their point of view the Communists may rightly fear it; a slackening of the dynamism of the world movement, of its revolutionary zest and fervor, would have incalculable consequences. If factions are officially recognized on the international level, it would not be long before similar factions were established in each Communist Party. The monolithic unity would be broken, party democracy would be restored, and the Communist Parties would gradually become the same as other parties; for obviously there can be no iron discipline at home if there is anarchy within the world movement. It would be the end of Communism as we have known it in our time: the Communist Parties might remain radical, even revolutionary in character, but they would cease to be totalitarian.

Such prospects may seem almost unthinkable today, but what are the alternatives? An open break, followed by a struggle in which all means short of war would be used. Looking to the more distant future, toward a China stronger in industrial power and self-confidence and foolishly unafraid of an atomic holocaust, even the possibility of war between the Communist super-powers cannot be entirely ruled out. Most likely, at least for the foreseeable future, is a state of "neither war nor peace," an uneasy coexistence based not on toleration of the rival but on the impossibility of overthrowing him. Thaws will alternate with freezes, attempts to iron out existing differences and resume closer contacts will give way to the fiercest political and propaganda warfare; in short, it will be a state of cold war.

There seems to be no short cut leading the Communists out of the predicament now facing them. A greater measure of organizational unity between them is now impossible. If even Stalin did not contemplate merging the East European countries with Russia into one Communist superstate, such a development is utterly impossible in other continents among the newly independent countries where nationalist passions play an even more important role. The degree of cohesion of the world Communist movement is reflected in the history of its international organization. The

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Comintern exercised a fairly close control over all its members; the Cominform (in the words of Togliatti) did only two things: it published a weekly newspaper and condemned Tito. Since the dissolution of the Cominform, an even looser form of coördination has prevailed: yearly meetings, not unlike the Councils of the Catholic Church in past centuries, convoked to publish lengthy manifestos. In the past, these meetings were apparently preceded by private discussions between the Soviet and Chinese leaders, agreeing as best they could and then bringing the resulting compromise before the assembly of the 80-odd Communist Parties. This practice too has now broken down. Instead, a tug-of-war ensued and a jockeying for positions in which small Parties, temporarily at any rate, have assumed an importance out of proportion to their real strength. It is a situation somewhat reminiscent of the United Nations General Assembly, and the big powers are showing signs of impatience.

What should Western policy be vis-à-vis these tensions in the Communist world? In a short-range perspective, Communist pressure on the West will certainly not lessen; it may even increase temporarily since the Parties concerned may have to prove their undiminished militancy and fervor. But in a more distant view the lines dividing the two present power blocs may well become more blurred—a prospect that need not necessarily dismay the West. The West should follow with cautious sympathy, as it has done, the endeavor of some Communist parties and states to shed the heritage of tyranny and totalitarianism; it should keep a line open to all the sides irrespective of their orientation at this moment, but make no effort to intervene at any point. World politics are moving toward a new stage which may be full of surprises and in which manœuvrability will be an important asset.

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THOUGHTS FOR TOMORROW

By Henry M. Wriston

IN foreign affairs today, both policy and performance require more subtlety and sophistication than heretofore. The need arises from no significant change in human relations, for the basic factors in man's relationship to himself and to other men have not altered radically. When we speak of "a new world," "a new age" or employ one of the other current expressions, it brings more confusion than clarity to thought. During my own lifetime I have known the steel age, the air age, the age of science, the age of technology, the atomic age, the space age, or, on different levels, the age of democracy, the age of totalitarianism, the age of capitalism, the age of Communism, the age of peace and the age of war. When ages shoot by at so rapid a clip the concept is worthless, and confusing.

It is indubitable that many physical changes in the world deeply affect our foreign relations. On the other hand, there are equally vital elements of continuity—things which change not at all or very slowly. Science and technology have altered much of our environment, but they have not remade the human mind or spirit.

The charter of UNESCO declares that wars begin in the minds of men. The statement is suggestive, but inaccurate. Many of the things for which men have fought lie deep beneath thought processes; they are not rational at all. A more perceptive statement would have been that wars begin in the hearts of men, using "hearts" in the old-fashioned sense, meaning the passions, the will, the drives, the subconscious, the unconscious—all those forces of which psychoanalysis has made so much and for which it has devised so many terms. The word heart is so employed in the Scriptures over 500 times; again and again it is referred to as the secret hiding place of the decisive impulses that move men. The specific things that men have feared and hated most ardently have changed from time to time and place to place, but of the continuing reality and power of the basic drives, now as before, there can be no question.

The first step—and it is a long one—toward a more sophisticated approach to the world we live in and will live in tomorrow is to recognize these hidden intangibles as continuing and often decisive factors in international relations. We have no Geiger

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counters with which to measure their intensity; no one has yet discovered a reliable test of the human will; we have no gauge to reveal at what point courage will falter. Each, from his own experience, knows that these traits are not fixed in either quantity or quality but vary with a multitude of moods and circumstances. Anyone who candidly examines why a single individual chooses to do one thing instead of another finds himself in a vast complex of interests and motives. Only with difficulty—and with a wide margin of error—do psychoanalysts discover them in individuals even when aided by willing coöperation.

With nations, the difficulty of finding simple explanations is raised to the nth power, since no couch is large enough for a whole people, no questions are adequately perceptive, and willing coöperation is conspicuously absent. Simple explanations of the behavior of nations should be treated not merely with skepticism, but outright disbelief. Naïve assumptions regarding such matters can throw policy fatally out of proper direction.

II

Forecasting the future has been one of man's favorite preoccupations. Almost from the beginning of recorded history seers and prophets, kings and potentates, have proclaimed new eras in the history of mankind. In our own nation, even so seasoned a statesman as John Quincy Adams took for granted that our ultimate ownership of Cuba was inevitable. Many prominent statesmen used "manifest destiny" to predict the absorption of Canada and Mexico. The proclamations of Wilson—a war to end war, a world safe for democracy—were stirring as war slogans but proved wide of the mark as prophecy. So were those of Franklin Roosevelt—"Our industrial plant is built." Their forecasts followed an age-old tradition of similar errors.

Although each age is unlike those which preceded and those which followed, contemporaries almost never identified the dominant elements of their own time accurately. Things which seemed decisive to them proved in the long run to be transient or of relatively little significance. Changes which passed all but unnoticed by the men on the scene came, in the perspective of history, to be regarded as vital. If great leaders have proved unable to "discern the signs of the times," surely predictions based on alleged contemporary trends are unreliable.

In any event, dependence upon the persistence of trends in

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human affairs is based on a fallacy. It rests upon a false analogy with extrapolations that may be useful in statistics and engineering; and even those projections, though useful, are often fairly crude instruments. A scatter chart of data reveals clusters which appear to form a sort of pattern. A curve is drawn along the mean among the clustered data, neglecting those which deviate too far from the observed pattern. (I forbear to press the embarrassing and unanswerable question: how far is too far?) When the curve is drawn as far as the data in hand permit, it is projected forward upon the assumption that the pattern of the past supplies a probable pattern for the future.

When applied to questions of national policy, the extrapolation process breaks down at three points.

First, the scatter chart cannot be composed of the closely defined sort of data used by statisticians and engineers. The data are disparate, not to say heterogeneous; therefore they would be more scattered than an engineer's chart. The curve along the mean would be much less trustworthy as an indication of a past trend, and its reliability as prediction even more speculative. Further, it is impossible, even with modern computers, to put down all relevant facts, for they are in number as the sands of the seas. Some must be selected and others neglected. No two equally competent people would make the same selection of what to include and what to omit. Two scatter charts based on different sets of data would show quite different patterns.

Forecasting on the basis of trends involves using history as a reference. Now history has much to teach us, but if we are usefully to exploit what it tells, we must recognize its limitations. The startling fact is that there are vast stretches of history which have never been written. Much past experience of great relevance is unknown because we cannot know answers to questions that have never been asked. Each generation tends to write about what interests it, which may have been of great importance in our past but may not be for our future. Much accumulated history is irrelevant to current and emergent problems.

Furthermore, history has a built-in bias. It deals with what was done and what was said by those who did it. It gives short shrift to alternatives that were not acted upon; yet the side which prevailed often did so by a slender margin, and only bad luck may have prevented those who supported different ideas from succeeding. Since history pays so little heed to what did not occur, there

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is an illusion that what happened in the past not only was deliberate but possessed some element of inevitability. This creates the impression that our times are more uncertain than earlier ones, and have a greater confusion of tongues.

The factors involved in historical events are so numerous and so complex that any explanation, however detailed, is an oversimplification—often so great as to be seriously misleading. The Senate investigating committee that took its name from the late Senator Nye of North Dakota assigned armament makers a major responsibility for World War I. It was such an oversimplification as to constitute gross error. Yet for several years it had a marked influence upon public opinion and on actions of Congress.

In the second place, forecasts fail because of unforeseen physical changes. Students in college a half-century ago were taught that by 1950 coal would be virtually exhausted and oil, as a result of depletion, would have become a scarce commodity. They were threatened with a chilly old age for want of fuel, and a dark one also, for without fuel electricity could not be produced since waterpower was inadequate. Another accepted proposition was that the population of France was declining, that this drift would continue and that the same factors which led to the French shrinkage would operate to stabilize the population of the United States at 150,000,000 by mid-century—with a declining trend thereafter.

These and many other misleading "facts" about the future (which is now past) were fairly representative of the consensus among scholars of that day. They took form before Henry Ford made the automobile ubiquitous; just after the Wright brothers had lifted their frail powered kite off Kitty Hawk (to which, incidentally, contemporaries paid little heed); before oil and gas exploration had really become scientific; when atomic energy was no more than a fancy; before radio, television and all the rest of the technological explosion. It is easily assumed that techniques have been so improved that such gross errors cannot now occur. Yet we are offered rather precise figures regarding the population of Red China in the year 2000, though we cannot be sure within 100,000,000 what it is today. Recall, also, the statistical nonsense that we heard in the year of the "great leap forward" when every family in China was to make iron in the back yard. Now other statisticians have famine as a built-in characteristic of the régime.

The projection of trends into the future is more dangerous than helpful in a third decisive way. The human factors are so different

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from physical data that the assumption that events will follow a "normal curve" is incredible. So variable, so complex are the human factors that in deeply significant political matters the theory of probability breaks down. Who will be so bold as to foretell what will happen to the structure of French politics and government with the disappearance of de Gaulle? When so dominant a figure disappears all is at hazard. On what foundation can one predict the decade of the seventies for Mexico, Brazil, Argentina? What is the future of Red China?

A sophisticated approach to tomorrow's world, therefore, will give little heed to overconfident predictions. The late Carl Becker —an historian of rare perception—summed up the reality in a single sentence: "In human affairs nothing is predetermined until after it has occurred." The form of his statement is what used to be called an Irish bull, but it is a profound observation none the less.

III

A more subtle and sophisticated approach will end the habit of feeling sorry for ourselves because difficulties are great. Historically two sorts of people have always been—and still are—excessively vocal. One group looks to the past and laments a lost golden age; the other looks to the future and promises a brave new world. Both groups have always agreed upon one thing, that their own times were out of joint.

These traits are old. In the sixth chapter of Genesis, no less, is the phrase, "There were giants in the earth in those days." An Assyrian tablet, dating from the third millennium B.C., bewails that "the earth is degenerating in these latter days. There are signs that the world is speedily coming to an end. Bribery and corruption abound. Children no longer obey their parents." Four hundred years before the Christian era one of the Greek dramatists wrote of earlier times: "Fortunate were they who lived then with our ancestors." The Utopians have been just as vocal, just as persistent, and just as wrong.

The world has always had troubles. Most major problems are as old as the hills. The basic quest for peace is coterminous with human history. In a recent issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Senator Fulbright called for a concert of free nations. Cardinal Wolsey thought he had assured a concert of Europe for peace in the Treaty of 1518. The pressure of population distressed men long before Malthus. Taxes—how to pay the costs of government—

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have been the subject of bitter complaint for many centuries. The destructive power of new weapons has frightened successive generations. Famine and plague long seemed historically endemic. The list could be extended almost indefinitely. Failure to appreciate the antiquity of urgent issues is simply a measure of our ignorance of the past. Any era studied intensively would reveal periods of crisis, wars, hunger, pestilence, tyranny, slavery, poverty and a host of other ills, most of which are lost to memory.

Beyond ignorance of the past there are four other reasons why we are so acutely aware of current crisis. The first is that weapons have attained a deadliness and a pace of development so great as to make war, always terrible, and long since a poor instrument of policy, seem conceivable only as a last and desperate resort. Like many other new concepts, this conclusion is new principally in being more widely held. After the First World War, Winston Churchill wrote: "Victory was to be bought so dear as to be almost indistinguishable from defeat. It was not to give security even to the victors." His judgment was seconded by Aristide Briand who said, "In modern war there is no victor. Defeat reaches out its heavy hand to the uttermost corners of the earth, and lays its burdens on victor and vanquished alike."

The second reason for the heightened sense of crisis is that we have developed a greater sensitiveness to poverty, unemployment and ill health. Trespasses upon the individual personality to which the world was long callous now evoke a sense of outrage. The passing of colonialism is a manifestation of respect for the rights of man; domination of one group over another even " for its own good" involves an abuse that we no longer wish to tolerate.

The third reason why modern troubles seem acute is that the miracles of communication make us constantly aware of them. Every hour on the hour ills of the world of which our fathers remained blissfully ignorant are dinned into our ears and every morning are piled on our doorsteps.

Fourthly, we have had so many successes—from the conquest of tuberculosis, polio and many other diseases to the elimination of famine and the mitigation of poverty (for even our destitute are well-off compared with the poor of Asia)—that we feel frustrated when we cannot find a prompt remedy for every ill that man is heir to.

We should remember that as the scale of our difficulties has risen the resources available to meet them have also increased

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enormously. It is because we are rich and powerful, with world-wide interests, that the troubles of Southeast Asia or West Africa harass us. But who would revert to the days of our poverty and isolation in order to escape the cares that now concern us?

IV

For more than two centuries after the colonization of this continent we paid little attention to faraway lands and strange people. Subduing the wilderness was enough to occupy most of our energies. None the less, individuals ventured afar; whalers and traders made contacts. They expanded their activities for many years before the government took action in their support.

In 1832 a New Hampshire sea captain, familiar with the perils of American shipping in Asiatic waters, persuaded the State Department that we should have treaties of friendship and commerce so that crews of wrecked vessels, and other Americans who fell upon misfortune, should not be abused. He was furnished some passports, a sheaf of letters of credence and full powers to negotiate such treaties, at a stipend of six dollars a day. The names of the countries to which he was to go and the names and titles of their rulers were left blank; he was to fill them in himself. The reason was stated with refreshing candor: "the titles appertaining to their majesties are unknown here." Though the naïveté of such a proceeding brings a smile, it nevertheless was adequate for its day. Now, not only have our interests in those parts become immensely more important, but there is dramatic change in the sensitivity of the rulers. It will no longer suffice to confess an amiable ignorance; that would be taken as a deadly insult. A seasoned knowledge of every area is essential.

That prescription is easy to put in words; to put it in practice is a task of monumental proportions in many parts of the world. Language offers a convenient illustration of the difficulty. It is frequently urged that our diplomatic representatives should know the language of the country where they are assigned; but often there is no "language of the country." In one large and strategically significant nation there are said to be 200 languages, 20 "principal" ones. Even if the diplomat learns to converse with official circles, he is still cut off from the mass of the population.

There are many other difficulties that confront us when we seek to understand some of the newer nations with which we are called upon to deal today. In many cases linguistic barriers retard the

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development of true nationhood. In some advanced nations, such as Switzerland, that particular divisive force is overcome by other stronger forces of unity. But in the newer and undeveloped countries, where education has lagged, the countervailing forces are weak or non-existent. Thus many of the countries with which we must deal are not nations at all in the sense we understand the term. Though in the United Nations they may speak in tones of aggressive nationalism, domestically the government may have only titular control of large areas.

Cultural diversity intensifies the difficulty of attaining true nationhood. Even in mature countries, forces of separatism often have persisted. Our neighbor, Canada, despite its ardent national spirit, is compelled to pay careful deference to the reality of its two cultures. Scotland and Wales have shown a marked increase in self-consciousness which in its extreme forms amounts to nationalism. The deep cleavages between Flemings and Walloons in Belgium have been dangerously manifest in recent years. If such phenomena can be found in countries where the reality of nationhood is beyond challenge, how much more likely are they to be found in new ones. In some parts of Africa, for example, fidelity to the tribe is so much stronger than attachment to the state that the concept of nation has little meaning. Cultural diversities produce strains not only in Africa but in India, Ceylon, Indonesia, Malaya and several Latin American countries.

Cultural forces, moreover, are not governed by economic interests; indeed, they are virtually impervious to them. They may even be intensified when all the economic inducements call for unity. This is a significant limitation upon the leverage that can be exercised by money, through foreign aid or investment. Programs of assistance are not only made more difficult; there is always danger that they may exacerbate internal stresses already severe enough to imperil the integrity of the country.

On top of linguistic and cultural cleavages, there frequently is a sharp dichotomy in the national economic structure. Oil, minerals and other natural resources may produce great wealth side by side with rudimentary industry and primitive agricultural techniques. It would be logical that the wealth produced by one sector of the economy should be used to stimulate and improve the others. But since history is not a mirror of logic, the record is quite different.

To render changes in this situation even more difficult, eco-

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nomic divisions tend to coincide with and accentuate ethnic, linguistic and cultural divisions. In the same nation one may often find a highly cultivated level of society existing cheek by jowl with depths of ignorance and degradation. In developed countries there has gradually come about a kind of moral revolution, so that when such situations are found to exist, an acute sense of guilt develops and with it a demand for reform. But just as the industrial and agricultural revolutions passed the undeveloped nations by, so also did the moral—or social—revolution, with the result that in many of them there has never developed an indigenous urge or method for reform. Indeed, bitter resistance to the creation of a more nearly unified society appears both at the highest and the lowest levels; the reasons are different, but the reluctance to change persists.

These are some of the realities—many more could be mentioned—which we must understand when we seek to help these nations. For us to be useful we must be wise as well as well-intentioned. It is a far cry from Edmund Roberts' mission of treaty-making in Southeast Asia in 1832, when a rough knowledge based on rugged experience sufficed. Today in addition to detailed knowledge and learning we must have enough imagination to enable us to enter into the experience of people of different ethnic origin, cultural heritage and economic experience.

It is hard enough to grasp one culture, much less to become an expert in many. This does not mean, however, that we can turn matters over to an élite corps of experts, and relax. We must all come to appreciate that many things valid for us are not necessarily adapted to the needs, or the minds, of others. While some nations want desperately some things which we have, other things we hold in highest regard they do not want at all. And it is the quintessence of naïveté to expect that peoples with histories radically different from ours will necessarily accept our political, social, economic and ethical values.

Indeed, our maturity in international affairs can be measured by the patience with which we tolerate preachments, however galling, on the virtues of "non-commitment" and the vices of "imperialism." In the United Nations and in other forums the spokesmen of various nations often affect a moral elevation, not to say superiority, that ill accords with some of their domestic behavior and their attitudes toward neighboring (particularly weaker) countries. A sense of humor and a remembrance of his-

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tory will help. One can find many parallel statements by spokesmen of the United States in the days of our weakness; our politicians long delighted to "twist the Lion's tail" and had warm popular support in so doing.

Factors of prime importance make programs of foreign aid inevitable and far outweigh the difficulties mentioned. None the less, the difficulties do indicate that expectations of rapid and dramatic success will often prove unfounded. At best, setbacks are inevitable and must be accepted, if not with resignation, at least philosophically.

It will not do to cry "failure" when we see the military, often the only disciplined body of public servants existing in a new and inexperienced country, purge corrupt men from office and attack flagrant nepotism. Nor should we be astonished when opposition leaders are thrust into jail, or tried and executed. Social change that is both rapid and peaceful has been rare in history.

Attempts from the outside to prevent such upheavals are almost surely doomed to failure. Hoping to ward off catastrophic violence, President Wilson adopted the principle that we would not recognize new governments erected on the ruins of those overthrown by force. The policy was benevolent in intent but it was a failure; indeed, it did much to promote the principle of nonintervention in its most extreme form. Benevolent purpose proved no match for political realities. The reason is not far to seek; static and inflexible societies tend to fracture under pressure. Men who had lived in an inherited status no longer "knew their place" when that status was reformed.

The phase of violence which social change almost inevitably precipitates opens the way for extremists to attain influence. The demagogue knows how to exploit those who have lost their social and economic moorings. It requires the utmost subtlety and skill to ride out this storm, and to promote democratic solutions rather than dictatorship or oligarchy.

Land reform is one of the inevitable concomitants of the social change we seek to stimulate. It is a convenient slogan, but not a program. Every nation requires a different prescription, carefully compounded to meet its own needs, and even highly developed nations do not yet have an answer to their own problems, much less a generalized answer for all. West Germany, for example, has many small, uneconomic farms, cultivated by primitive means, subsidized by the state. The United States also has acute un-

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resolved problems of land utilization. If highly organized and vigorous economies have not found ways and means to meet their problems, an attempt from the outside to counsel or impose solutions in an underdeveloped country, bound tightly in tradition and without adequate political institutions, is vastly more difficult. Simple, "obvious" solutions may do more harm than good. Americans should remember the Civil War slogan "forty acres and a mule" as a cure for the after-effects of slavery. A man who is given the transient satisfactions of land ownership may thereafter suffer the ills of too small holdings and lack of capital for seed, fertilizer and machinery; he may be without the necessary training to be an independent operator and may have no ready market, or if one is available, may lack market experience.

In dispensing aid we must not be unduly shocked if corruption is a concomitant. The concept of public office as a public trust grows slowly, as our own record shows. When a relatively large amount of money is poured into a poverty-stricken country we would be naïve to expect that all of it will be wisely used. This is especially likely to occur where there is no corps of trained civil servants and no deeply rooted sense of public responsibility.

Necessary as aid is, the course to be steered between coöperation (the professed aim) and intervention (a hated word) is narrow and slippery in the extreme. The road can be negotiated, if at all, only if there is complete correspondence between profession and performance.

The great objective of the Alliance for Progress is to encourage the development of a continent where land and learning, opportunity and culture, property and power, are more widely and more fairly distributed. We hope to see formed the substance of democracy, not a sham façade for oligarchy or dictatorship. For that noble objective to be attained, social and economic reforms are required. In making reforms a *sine qua non* of aid, we often forget—it is never forgotten by the recipients—that the United States will judge their adequacy. The language of diplomacy should not conceal that this constitutes a form of intervention in the internal affairs of Latin America—beneficent in purpose, potentially useful in result, but intervention none the less.

This lays upon the United States two obligations. The first is to know the characteristics and needs of each country, not to lump them together as though the differences between them were not profound. That, alone, is an exacting requirement not as yet

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met. The second is to maintain the integrity of the project, to use it for its stated purpose and for no other, however desirable it appears at the moment. This is not a counsel of perfection so much as a severely practical necessity. Strict fidelity to the announced principles of the Marshall Plan was a principal ingredient of its brilliant success. At the Punta del Este meeting of Foreign Ministers, unhappily, members of the United States delegation intimated that lack of strong resolutions as desired in Washington might have an adverse effect upon the size of the appropriations which Congress might grant. The hint, or threat, constituted a use of the program not for its declared purpose of assisting domestic reform but to spur adoption of an international position desired by the United States. This tended to impair the integrity of the program by making it an instrument in the cold war. Surely this was a failure to understand the psychology of essential partners in the enterprise.

V

The history of our attitude to alliances is instructive today. At the outset of our struggle for independence we eagerly sought help abroad. It was one of the triumphs of Benjamin Franklin's diplomacy that he exploited France's troubles with England to obtain a treaty of alliance with France in 1778, the declared purpose of which was thus expressed: "The essential and direct end of the present defensive alliance is to maintain effectually the liberty, sovereignty, and independence absolute and unlimited, of the said United States, as well in matters of government as of commerce." What a modern sound it has! That alliance was a vital factor in the success of the Revolution.

After the war, the interests of the United States diverged from those of France, which wanted to continue to use the United States as a pawn in its power game with England. Before the end of Washington's first Administration, Vice President John Adams wrote: "America has been long enough involved with wars of Europe. She has been a football between contending nations from the beginning, and it is easy to foresee that France and England will both endeavor to involve us in their future wars. It is our interest and duty to avoid them as much as possible, and to be completely independent, and to have nothing to do with either of them, but in commerce."

Our declaration of neutrality was issued the next year, and in

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1796 came the classic statements in Washington's Farewell Address: It is "unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her (Europe's) politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities." And again: "It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world . . . we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies."

Circumstances were such that no further alliances were made by the men who shaped our government under the Constitution. With the passage of time, key words in Washington's statements were forgotten: he did not denounce all alliances, only permanent ones; he specifically endorsed temporary alliances. His qualifying expressions were overlooked; such subtleties were lost to memory. In the public mind all alliances became entangling.

The fact that we did not participate in other alliances kept us from appreciating that our unhappy experience with France after the immediate objective had been attained was more nearly normal than unusual. We never appreciated how brittle alliances have customarily been, how frequently nations have changed partners even in the midst of critical times.

The century and more of a hardening mood against any alliance under any circumstances whatever deprived the United States of an important element of flexibility in policy. The rigidity went so far that during the First World War Woodrow Wilson would not so much as use the word "ally" colloquially; he insisted upon referring to our "associates." Franklin Roosevelt spoke of alliances colloquially, but signed no treaties. In retrospect it seems almost incredible that because of the hard mold in which our mental processes had become fixed we should have failed to make terms for our participation in two world wars.

Since we lacked experience with alliances and had failed to learn at first hand what they could and could not do, we were in difficulties also when policy was reversed and alliances were made during President Truman's Administration. There then tended to be a complete reversal of mood also. Just as alliances had long seemed synonymous with evil, they now were identified with good; as before there had been extravagant fears of entanglement, there now were extravagant hopes of coöperation.

There is urgent need for fresh and perceptive analysis of what can reasonably be expected of alliances and what cannot. They arise less often from a real cohesion of common interests among

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nations fairly equal in power than from a common danger. Nearly all alliances are proclaimed as defensive; the most successful are usually those which are in fact defensive in the face of real and pressing dangers.

Alliances should not be sentimentalized. Washington's warnings against "permanent, inveterate antipathies" and "passionate attachment of one nation for another" are still valid. Our postwar relationships with Germany and Japan illustrate our ability to resist a temptation to permanent antipathies. We must not expect permanent attachments either; even our "special relationship" with Britain must never be taken for granted. Our war and postwar contacts with Russia never did involve a passionate attachment, but we must now beware of the permanent antipathy described by Washington lest it some day prevent us from taking advantage of possible, however unforeseen, changes in the Soviet character or position.

Alliances are sometimes called "marriages of convenience," but that is too sweeping a metaphor. They are better considered as limited partnerships for specific purposes for a relatively short time—as short as the attainment of the specific objective permits. The reason for this can be simply stated, though to operate within the limitations set may well be infinitely complicated. All significant international intercourse involves some surrender of freedom of action, and it is inevitably greater in the case of an alliance; for the outcome is shaped not only by what we do but also by what the other participant does. Though we act with the wisdom of serpents, if the other acts foolishly the consequence may be as disastrous for us as though we had been foolish too.

The difficulties and risks are compounded when responsibility is shared not merely bilaterally but multilaterally; then one nation, acting wrongheadedly or without adequate skill, may wreck the efforts of all the others. And the chances of error resulting in failure are multiplied not arithmetically but geometrically when responsibility is shared not over one but over several areas of interest. One power can wreck many aspects of the work of several nations. Moreover, the likelihood of internal strains within the alliance also advances geometrically. Even two nations never have a uniformity of interest. Thus despite our close connection with Britain, British views with regard to Red China (to take a single example) contrast sharply with ours. In a group alliance, the tensions among conflicting interests, real or imagined, mount

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rapidly. Not only the substance of policy, but the manner of approach grows in complexity. There is always danger that some nation's ideas will not be heard with enough attention to avoid wounding its *amour propre.* This difficulty is compounded when the alliance is between states of markedly unequal size and resources—the usual situation. The less powerful are acutely conscious that wisdom is not distributed in direct proportion to power. Successful participation in a multiple alliance thus requires self-discipline and patience beyond that demanded in ordinary international intercourse.

These considerations do not constitute an argument against alliances but they do suggest the unwisdom of extending alliances to more nations than is absolutely necessary. They also constitute an argument against the feeling that the way to strengthen an existing alliance is to load it with new and different functions. When an alliance has fulfilled its basic mission and rough relationships have been smoothed, there may be reason for adding to its responsibilities. But when objectives are still beyond present attainment and internal strains are evident it is not the best time to add new and more complex obligations.

VI

Many of these same considerations apply to our participation in international organizations. In the public mind, international organizations were long equated with alliances. The United States was a prime mover in the establishment of an international court, then abstained from participation in it for many years and finally joined with a reservation that made our commitment highly equivocal. The United States demanded and helped to shape the League of Nations, and then declined to participate; the halls of Congress rang with the word entanglement. We thereby lost the experience in international organization that participation in the League would have supplied. As a non-participant we found it easy to hold others responsible for the League's failure.

Lacking experience, we supposed that the United Nations would do better with our participation and under our leadership. Have not the events of the last 15 years shown that we entered it with higher expectations than could reasonably be fulfilled? In retrospect, it is painfully clear that a key premise was false: the structure of the organization rested upon a presumption of continued unity among the five great powers that had led the victo-

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rious coalition. Tensions during the war should have alerted us to the fragility of that hope.

As long as there was, in effect, an automatic majority for the Western position the difficulties arising from the failure of the great powers to coöperate were serious, but no more. With the admission of over 50 new nations (and more coming), many of them totally inexperienced, and with the growth of the attitude of non-commitment in all its various shades of definition, the complexities involved in utilizing the United Nations as a major instrument of policy begin to emerge. Already we have hedged by setting up organizations related to the United Nations but not immediately under it. It is now plain that our participation in this international forum calls for more perception and delicacy than we realized at the start, or even five years ago.

We encouraged another type of international organization without becoming affiliated; the Coal and Steel Community and the Common Market are two illustrations. After the war the economies of Europe were in physical ruin or in a state of demoralization. The Marshall Plan gave a great thrust to their recovery. As part of our effort to get Europe on its feet, the United States pressed for the reduction of barriers to international trade and the development of larger tariff-free markets. The Common Market advanced both aims. Today the rate of economic growth in Western Europe exceeds that of the United States and Britain. Whereas for years the world complained of a dollar gap, we now find the two principal trading currencies of the world—the dollar and the pound—under severe pressure. There is now a dollar deficiency, and it is possible that competition from the Common Market countries may well make the cure of this situation more difficult. The trading patterns of the world are shifting dramatically; old habits and ideas are no longer "conservative"; many are simply irrelevant.

The need for deeper understanding in this matter is great. The traditional way out of exchange difficulties is to resort to protectionism in one of its many forms. That was our approach in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the world of tomorrow such a course might give momentary relief to a few industries but would surely bring ultimate disaster. We have promoted the new organizations; they have thus far done better than all expectation; we must now find ways to work with them either as an active partner or an effective competitor. The British have elected

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to apply for admission to the Common Market as the least troublesome among several alternatives, all of them filled with difficulty. At the moment such a course of action is probably not appropriate for us. But tomorrow will require new policies, and it may be that radical actions will be the most genuinely conservative by preserving key values in drastically changed circumstances.

VII

The thesis that in our days policy in action must be increasingly subtle and sophisticated could have been illustrated in many ways beside the six selected. No matter how many were used, however, all would emphasize the central reality that subtlety and sophistication are human traits, not governed by the dramatic developments in the physical world. Startling changes in our temporal environment do dramatize the necessity for more profound learning, keener perception, heightened sensitivity and all the other ingredients of sophistication. But they likewise demonstrate that there has been no break in the continuity of history, of human experience.

No good purpose is served by fostering the illusion that we live in a "new age." Distinctive eras are identified and get their accepted names long after they are past, seldom or never from contemporaries. At best the concept of an age remains imprecise, and even when historians reach some agreement upon a name—say the Renaissance—the dates assigned by different scholars to its onset and its passing will vary a century or more at either end. Even when it has been named there will still be dispute as to which of its characteristics are the essential ones.

We must be on our guard, too, against seeing incidents, however catastrophic, as "decisive," against assigning permanent significance to events which are momentarily prominent but when seen in perspective are found to have been transient in effect. On one occasion Disraeli exclaimed: "Not a principle in the management of our foreign affairs, accepted by all statesmen for guidance up to six months ago, exists. . . . You have a new world. . . . The balance of power has been entirely destroyed." Today, only a professional historian would know what Disraeli was talking about, and he would also know that Disraeli was wrong. Disraeli had let a catastrophic event warp his judgment. This tendency to exaggerate the importance of current events is characteristic

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of all eras, but it is heightened in ours by the speed and dramatic impact provided by modern communications. "This, too, will pass away" is an ancient saying, but as true and as relevant as ever.

For humans who wrestle with events in the attempt to shape their own destiny any form of determinism should be incredible. It is also the deadly enemy of our political philosophy. The drives that activate men are fundamental and continuous, but their direction and intensity vary not only from age to age, but from moment to moment and from man to man. That is why we no longer hear the deterministic slogan "manifest destiny," though it was long a popular fetish; that is why Hitler's inevitable "wave of the future" is broken. Khrushchev appeals to "scientific history"—itself a contradiction in terms—as proof of the ultimate triumph of Communism. If it triumphs it will not be because it is "inevitable" but because our policy in action lacks subtlety and sophistication.

It may have been noticed that thus far no mention has been made of power in a time when the phrase "power politics" has become fashionable once again. Indeed, there is a plain inference in much current discussion that power is the principal ingredient in international affairs. Power obviously has its place, and in some phases of policy—such as dealing between equals—it is a major factor. But there are few equals among the nations of the world, and paradoxically our time is marked more by the baiting and bullying of the strong by the weak than by the control of small powers by the great ones. In the Russian orbit, of course, naked force is often used to maintain ascendancy, as witness Hungary and East Germany. But in the rest of the world the mere possession of power tends to put those who possess it on the defensive. It is not a lack of power on the part of the colonial powers that is precipitating the liquidation of their empires, but forces essentially quite different. In our own case, we find our relationship with the states of Latin America made infinitely more complicated because the disparity in physical power between them and us is so conspicuous. The giant of the north is feared just because it is so powerful, and fear easily slides into distrust and dislike.

In our day, as I have tried to show, all the elements entering into successful international policy and action require a more sophisticated understanding than ever before. For those who possess power, the manner in which they use it is perhaps the element requiring subtlety in the highest degree.

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THE ROLE OF DETERRENCE IN TOTAL DISARMAMENT

By Thomas C. Schelling

A SHARP distinction is often drawn between arms control and disarmament. The former seeks to reshape military incentives and capabilities; the latter, it is alleged, eliminates them. But the success of either depends on mutual deterrence. Short of universal brain surgery, nothing can erase the memory of weapons and how to build them. If "total disarmament" is to make war unlikely, it must reduce the incentives. It cannot eliminate the potential for destruction; the most primitive war can be modernized by rearmament as it goes along.

To determine whether and how disarmament might make war less likely we have to look at what the military opportunities, risks, dangers, fears and potential capabilities would be in a disarmed world. If nations now suspect each other of contemplating war, we have to suppose that they might suspect each other of contemplating rearmament. If nations are willing to risk war, or to threaten it, they certainly might risk rearming or threatening to rearm. Nations thought capable now of being panicked into war might be panicked into rearmament. To suppose the contrary is to assume away the problem that disarmament is intended to help solve.

An international military authority is commonly proposed as a part of plans for total disarmament. It does make a difference whether or not we assume the existence of such an authority to police the otherwise disarmed world. But for the visible future it is a little extreme to suppose that an international force could contain or deter the United States and the Soviet Union; more than that, the concept poses problems of deterrence not wholly unlike those that would confront the major powers in a fully disarmed world. So we shall first consider universal disarmament without any international security force. And we shall assume a world disarmed to the levels proposed by those who favor the most drastic "total disarmament."

There are good reasons why this phrase should be set off in quotation marks. An obvious one is that there can be no absolute assurance that some nuclear weapons have not been kept. But, cheating aside, war can be waged with even the most primitive

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weapons, especially with the help of commercial aircraft, ships, trucks, radios and the other paraphernalia of industrial society. More important, if war breaks out a nation can rearm unless its capacity is destroyed at the outset and kept destroyed. By the standards of 1944, the United States was fairly near to total disarmament when World War II broke out. Virtually all munitions later expended by United States forces were nonexistent in September 1939. "Disarmament" did not preclude U.S. participation; it just slowed it down.

As we eliminate weapons, warning systems, vehicles and bases, we change the criteria of military effectiveness. Airplanes are more important if missiles are banned; complex airplanes are needed less if complex defenses are banned. Since weapons themselves are the most urgent targets in war, to eliminate a weapon eliminates a target and changes the requirements for attack. At some stage in disarmament a donkey becomes a means of delivery, though we assume that "total" disarmament stops short of that.

The difficulty cannot be avoided by banning weapons of attack and keeping those of defense. If nations were large, self-sufficient islands, coast artillery might seem useless for aggression and valuable safeguards against war and the fear of war. But they are not; and in the present era, "defensive" weapons often embody equipment or technology that is superbly useful in attack and invasion. Moreover, a prerequisite of successful attack is some ability to defend against retaliation or counterattack. In a disarmed world, whatever lessens the scale of retaliation reduces the risk a nation runs in starting war. Defenses against retaliation thus are close substitutes for offensive power.

II. GENERAL WAR IN A DISARMED WORLD

Disarmament would not preclude the eruption of a crisis; war and rearmament could seem imminent. Even without possessing complex weapons, a nation might consider initiating war with whatever resources it had, on grounds that delay would allow an enemy to strike or mobilize first. If a nation believed its opponent might rush to rearm to achieve military preponderance, it might consider "preventive war" to forestall its opponent's dominance. Or, if confidence in the maintenance of disarmament were low and if war later under worse conditions seemed at all likely, there could be motives for "preventive ultimatums," or for winning a short war through coercion with illicitly retained nuclear weap-

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ons, or for using force to impose a more durable disarmament arrangement.

The decision to attack might be made reluctantly, motivated not by the prospective gains of victory but by the disadvantages of not seizing the initiative. Motives to undertake preventive or preëmptive war might be as powerful under disarmament as with today's weapons—perhaps more powerful.

In a disarmed world, as now, the objective would probably be to destroy the enemy's ability to bring war into one's homeland, and to "win" sufficiently to prevent his subsequent build-up as a military menace. The urgent targets would be the enemy's available weapons of mass destruction (if any), his means of delivery, his equipment that could be quickly converted for strategic use, and the components, stand-by facilities and cadres from which he could assemble a capability for strategic warfare.

Suppose both sides have violated the agreement and possess nuclear bombs at least in the scores or hundreds (or suppose the attacker has, and must anticipate that his opponent has). The attacker's first objective is to forestall the delivery of bombs in return. Compared with the present, the disarmed world would offer the attacker both advantages and disadvantages.

An advantage is that the time scale of attack may be more lenient. The victim may have a secret nuclear stockpile; but if he is unprepared it will take time to bring together, say, commercial aircraft, crews and the hidden nuclear weapons, and to improvise fueling arrangements and target plans. To do this in the hostile environment of even small-scale nuclear attack might be difficult. But the attacker would be coördinated rather than surprised and could make effective use of evacuation procedures or of any air defenses he could improvise.

If, instead, each side has plans for the contingency and maintains a "reserve force"—some part, say, of its commercial air fleet and crews—the victim of attack may react quickly. The attacker's own air defenses have been banned by agreement (and air defenses may be hard to conceal); in these conditions a retaliatory force of even low efficiency may be effective if it is large and dispersed.

If the aggressor has nuclear weapons and the victim does not, the latter's response will depend on how rapidly production can be resumed. Standby capacity may be available, or there may be nuclear facilities that can be converted to produce weapons. If

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these facilities have not been destroyed, the lag may be short, but a matter of days at least. Critically important would be the defenses, the dispersal or the secrecy of the facilities for producing nuclear materials or for assembling nuclear weapons. If the sites are few in number, of known location, above ground and without air defense, they would be destroyed before operations could be resumed. If the production facilities are in secret locations, we may as well assume that nuclear weapons also exist.

III. A WAR OF NUCLEAR MOBILIZATION

In the event that neither side had nuclear weapons, asymmetrical lead-times in nuclear rearmament could be decisive. Whether it took days or months, the side that believed it could be first to acquire a few dozen megatons through a crash rearmament program would expect to dominate its opponent. This advantage would be greatest if nuclear facilities themselves were vulnerable to nuclear bombardment: the first few weapons produced would be used to spoil the opponent's nuclear rearmament. Even if facilities are deep under the ground, well disguised or highly dispersed, a small difference in the time needed to acquire a few score megatons might make the war unendurable for the side that is behind. If one side appears likely to gain the decisive advantage, it might find "preventive rearmament" coupled with a surrender ultimatum an irresistibly attractive move.

It would not necessarily be essential to possess nuclear weapons in order to destroy nuclear facilities. High explosives, commandos or saboteurs could be effective. "Strategic warfare" might reach a purity not known in this century: like the king in chess, nuclear facilities would be the overriding objective. Their protection would have absolute claim on defense.

In such a war the object would be to preserve one's mobilization base and to destroy the enemy's. To win a war would not require overcoming the enemy's defenses—just winning the rearmament race. If commandos can bypass home defenses and paralyze the adversary's nuclear mobilization base, the jig is up—unless all participants can do this to each other. If they can, the prospect is for a bizarre kind of "broken-backed" war, bizarre because no back is broken, and the struggle to acquire nuclear weapons goes on—hopefully not too fast and too furiously to allow parallel negotiations for an agreed stalemate or a second try at "disarmament."

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Another kind of warfare may emerge—"nuclear coercion." If an attacker possesses illicit nuclear weapons that can be dropped on a country that is unable to retaliate promptly, it might force a surrender through the destruction of cities and the threat of destroying more. Or the coercive campaign could combine preclusive destruction of the mobilization base with the demoralizing effects of concurrent civil damage. The expectation would be that, if significant rearmament could be retarded, capitulation would be forthcoming.

Such a war might be less destructive than war under present conditions, not primarily because disarmament had reduced the attacker's capability but because, with the victim unable to respond, the attacker could adopt a more measured pace that allowed time to negotiate a cease-fire before he had reduced his victim to rubble. Victory, of course, might be achieved without violence. If one side appears to have an advantage so convincingly decisive as to make the outcome of the war seem inevitable, it could then deliver an ultimatum instead of weapons.[1]

Disarmament might also cause nuclear weapons to be a greater equalizer among nations than they are now. A future Castro might be in a better position to plague or coerce the great powers by secreting nuclear weapons on his territory. In a world in which such forms of nuclear mischief have replaced the space-age machinery of war and in which the push-button has given way to improvised aerial ferries, the military environment may become less predictable and possibly more unstable.

To sum up: a stable military environment will not result automatically from a ban on weapons and the facilities to make them. The timing of war and rearmament, and the role of speed and initiative, will remain critically important in a world in which the pace of war is initially slowed. War may become more calculable and less fearsome. And there would remain, even in the design of "total disarmament," the difficult choice between minimizing war's destructiveness and minimizing its likelihood. If disarmament is to discourage the initiation of war and to remove the incentives toward preëmptive and preventive war, it has to be *designed* to do that. Disarmament does not eliminate military potential; it changes it.

[1] Deterrence being largely a matter of credibility, it might not always be an advantage to have it believed that one is complying with the prohibition on nuclear weapons. At the slightest suspicion that others might be initiating preparations, a government might prefer to hint that it was already prepared. A small nuclear capability might be used to demonstrate a larger professed capability.

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IV. LIMITED WAR IN A DISARMED WORLD

While disarmament would eliminate the guns, it would not eliminate the trucks, aircraft, ships, communication equipment and canned food that are required for limited military campaigns. Nations could be expected to have plans for limited-war mobilization, including limited departures from the arms agreement itself.[2]

As important as the direct consequences that disarmament would have for limited war would be the indirect consequences. If disarmament reduces fears of general war—if explosion or escalation into general war seems a less likely prospect, or less disastrous if it should occur—the result may be fewer inhibitions on limited war. There could also be new restraints. If it is perceived that the outbreak of local wars may destroy the agreement itself —either through a sudden breakdown or steady erosion—this may create a determination to preserve what has been achieved and a recognition that to abandon restraints would signal "open season" on military competition. Of course, the more all parties value the climate of disarmament, the more can be gained by threatening to disturb it.

As "limited war" is possible, so is "limited violation" of disarmament. Since limits on hostilities can evidently be observed during war itself, limits on rearmament might be arrived at in similar fashion, even in the course of limited hostilities. The responses of countries not participating in the war would be important—perhaps an important brake, possibly a stimulus, on the resumed armament.

In limited war as in general war under conditions of "total disarmament," timing would be important. Offensive strategy in a limited war is often designed to achieve a *fait accompli.* Defense against this strategy in a disarmed world would depend on the ability of the defender (or protector) to rearm in time to repel or to stalemate the aggression. If we reflect on the critical timing of the North Korean invasion and the shortage of ammunition that plagued us throughout the whole Korean campaign, or the problems of the preëmptive landing of Marines in Lebanon or the progress of the Suez campaign, it is evident that logistical considerations can be decisive. The likelihood that limited aggression

[2] The Chinese civil war of 1948–49 may illustrate how extensive a war can be fought with poor weaponry and primitive logistical support. Or the American Civil War.

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will be deterred by the threat of limited rearmament may therefore depend on the mobilization speed that can be achieved from a standing start.

V. THE DETERRENCE OF REARMAMENT IN A DISARMED WORLD

Many concepts that apply to the deterrence of war apply to deterrence of rearmament: "preventive" rearmament, "preëmptive" rearmament, "escalation" of rearmament, "catalytic" rearmament, and rearmament stimulated by misinformation, misinterpretation, accident, false alarm, unauthorized conspiracy and other processes analogous to those that might trigger "inadvertent war" in an armed world. In addition, there are the possibilities of rearmament bubbling up out of a crisis, occurring in the course of a limited war or being undertaken by cool premeditation.

But despite the parallel, rearmament is not war. The fears, motives and moral attitudes that make initiation of war an opprobrious act do not apply with the same force to rearmament. The question whether to remain disarmed or to initiate limited rearmament could become a legitimate political issue. If the disarmament is so delicately balanced that there is great advantage in being the first to rearm, the mere existence of a political party pledged to abandon the disarmament treaty might disturb the arrangement. And to the extent that the treaty explicitly allows certain weapons or a mobilization base, continuing developments in technology will make armament, as well as disarmament, a proper topic of discussion and continuing negotiation.

The essential requirement is for some stable situation of "rearmament parity." If disarmament is to be durable, it must be apparent that the disadvantages of being behind in case an arms race should resume are not too great and that, in the face of ambiguous evidence of clandestine rearmament or overt evidence of imminent rearmament, nations can react without haste. The straightforward elimination of so-called "military production facilities" might, by sheer coincidence, provide the stability; but stability is more likely if there is a deliberately designed system of "stable equal readiness for rearmament." It is impossible to eliminate the ability to rearm; one can only hope to stretch the time required to reach, from the word "go," any specified level of rearmament. The problem is not *whether* to leave a mobilization base for rearmament, but what kind.

It is not certain that maximizing the time required to rearm is

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a way to deter it. Lengthening the racecourse does not necessarily lessen the incentive to be first under the wire. But it may reduce the advantage of a small head-start; it may allow time to renegotiate before the race has too much momentum; and it may reduce the confidence of a fast starter that he could win if he called for a race.

If rearmament is undertaken to improve mutual deterrence, not to achieve offensive superiority, it may not matter whether some nations fall behind. The leader will not necessarily race as fast as he can; for if he does, other nations may have to regard his behavior as a declaration of war and to respond accordingly. If a low-grade war of nuclear reprisal is within the capability of some laggard in the rearmament race, he may feel obliged to initiate such a war to disrupt another's rearmament; thus rearmament could lead to preëmptive action and trigger a war. On the other hand, this prospect may help deter rearmament itself.

The likelihood of war, then, depends on the character of the disarmament. If mobilization potentials are such that a head-start is not decisive and the racecourse is long, preëmptive action may be delayed until motives are clear. This, however, presents a dilemma analogous to that of deterring limited war today: the smaller the fear that rearmament will precipitate general war, the smaller the inhibition on rearmament.

Important elements for stability in a disarmed world would be the dispersal and duplication of standby facilities for rearmament and of reserve personnel or cadres around which rearmament can be mobilized. Dispersal is important because of the interaction between rearmament and war itself. If a nation can achieve just enough production of weapons to disrupt its opponent's rearmament, it may gain a decisive advantage. Once the race is on, a few easily-located facilities for producing nuclear weapons might invite a "preventive" and very limited war. If instead there were, say, scores or hundreds of laboratories able to produce unconventional weapons and if their destruction would require substantial military capabilities, there might be less incentive on one side to acquire and exploit a small advantage and less fear on the other of falling a little behind and being taken advantage of.

Nations are now willing to threaten war; in a disarmed world they certainly might threaten rearmament. The agreement itself would certainly have to be renegotiated from time to time, or continuously; and, just as a threat of "no sale" hangs over the

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head of commercial traders, so will the threat of rearmament hang over the heads of negotiators. The main sanction on the negotiations will be that, in the absence of a satisfactory agreement, nations may take unilateral steps for their own security or take steps to put pressure on others.

VI. ATTITUDES TOWARD REARMAMENT

The terms of an agreement must take into account what the attitude toward rearmament would be in the disarmed world. One approach would be that any overt rearmament would be a mortal sin, a total failure of the disarmament process, a contingency that can neither be planned for nor discussed coolly within countries or between governments. Alternatively, rearmament might be viewed as we view war now—as a tragedy and a failure of policy, but a tragedy that can occur, that can even occur from motives of self-defense, that can perhaps be limited and contained, and that need not signal the termination of all efforts at settlement and reconciliation.

The first attitude, which would try to insulate rearmament from the cold war and deprecate any planning for the contingency of rearmament, might be preferable if it could promise to create sufficiently strong inhibitions. If, instead, we have to expect—as surely we do—lapses under even the most ideal disarmament scheme, it is better to plan for such contingencies and to create the expectation that occasional lapses need not trigger a real arms race or the full fury of war itself. We cannot have it both ways. For if we recognize "limited rearmament" as a possibility and prepare for "limited responses" against it, we take some of the curse off rearmament, just as plans for limited war seem to legitimize war. This is a genuine dilemma.

Rearmament has other dimensions than speed and volume. We should distinguish between rearmament aimed at stable deterrence and rearmament aimed at brinkmanship or war. In this country we would certainly want to have careful rearmament plans so that, in the event we found ourselves unavoidably drawn into a renewed arms race, our actions would be consistent with deterrence of war and with an effort to slow down the pace of rearmament. The further rearmament goes and the more unstable the environment which it creates, the harder it will be to get back to the business of disarmament if we wish to.

It will also make a difference whether military and strategic

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planning is permitted and expected or frowned on. The dilemma is that stability will require careful planning of a kind inconsistent with the philosophy that military planning is illegal, immoral and a sign of evil intent. If nations suddenly awoke to rearmament dangers of which they had not been aware, their response might be more undisciplined and more unstable in the absence of military planning than if vigilance had been deliberately maintained.

It should not be expected that reduced tensions will be the natural consequence of a disarmament agreement. Not everyone will be confident that disarmament provides a viable military environment or promises the political atmosphere most conducive to peace and good relations. It is hard to believe that any sober person under any conceivable world arrangement could come to believe with confidence that war had at last been banished from human affairs until there had been at the very least some decades of experience. There will be surprises, rumors and sharp misunderstandings. Even if something that looks like "general and complete disarmament" is achieved, it is not out of the question that responsible governments might decide that international apprehensions would be reduced if they possessed more secure, more diversified and more professionally organized mobilization bases or weapon systems, with more freedom to improve them, drill them and discuss the strategy of their use.

It is even conceivable that a "rearmament agreement" would be negotiated in the interest of reducing tensions, the likelihood of war, the scope for "rearmament blackmail," the Nth-country problem, and perhaps even the economic costs of preparedness. It might be that moderate though expensive modern weapon systems, professionally organized and segregated from the main population centers, would provide less—not more—military interference in everyday life than a "total" disarmament agreement under which every commercial pilot carried emergency mobilization instructions in his briefcase. In any event, a decision on total disarmament, taken jointly by the major powers, would not bring an end to arguments about arms control.

VII. AN INTERNATIONAL MILITARY AUTHORITY

Some kind of international authority is generally proposed as part of an agreement on total disarmament. If militarily superior to any combination of national forces, an international force implies (or is) some form of world government. To call such an ar-

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rangement "disarmament" is about as oblique as to call the Constitution of the United States "a Treaty for Uniform Currency and Interstate Commerce." The authors of the Federalist Papers were under no illusion as to the far-reaching character of the institution they were discussing, and we should not be either. Here, however, we can focus only on those aspects of an International Force that directly affect the military environment.

One concept deserves mention in passing: that the projected police force should aim to control persons rather than nations. Its weapons would be squad cars, tear gas and pistols; its intelligence system would be phone taps, lie detectors and detectives; its mission would be to arrest people, not to threaten war on governments. Here, however, we shall concentrate on the concept of an International Force to police nations—and all nations, not just small ones. The most intriguing questions are those that relate to the Force's technique or strategy for deterring and containing the former nuclear powers.

The mission of the Force would be to police the world against war and rearmament. It might be authorized only to stop war; but some kinds of rearmament would be clear signals of war, obliging the Force to take action. There might be, explicitly or implicitly, a distinction between the kinds of rearmament that call for intervention and the kinds that are not hostile.

The operations of the Force raise a number of questions. Should it try to contain aggression locally, or to invade the aggressor countries (or all parties to the conflict) and to disable them militarily? Should it use long-range strategic weapons to disable the country militarily? Should it rely on the threat of massive punitive retaliation? Should it use the threat or, if necessary, the practice of limited nuclear reprisal as a coercive technique? In the case of rearmament, the choices would include invasion or threats of invasion, strategic warfare, reprisal or the threat of reprisal; "containment" could not forestall rearmament unless the country were vulnerable to blockade.

Is the Force intended to do the job itself or to head a worldwide alliance against transgressors? In case of aggression, is the victim to participate in his own defense? If the Indians take Tibet, or the Chinese encourage armed homesteading in Siberia, the Force would have to possess great manpower unless it was prepared to rely on nuclear weapons. A Force could not be maintained on a scale sufficient to "contain" such excursions by a

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nation with a large population unless it relied on the sudden mobilization of the rest of the world or on superior weaponry—nuclear weapons if the defense is to be confined to the area of incursion. But the use of such weapons to defend, for example, South Viet Nam against Chinese infiltrators, Western Europe against the Soviet bloc, East Germany against West Germany or Cuba against the United States, would be subject to the ordinary difficulties of employing nuclear weapons in populated areas. A country threatened by invasion might rather capitulate than be defended in that fashion. Moreover, the Force might require logistical facilities, infrastructure and occasional large-scale manœuvres in areas where it expects to be called upon. Keeping large forces stationed permanently along the Iron Curtain is a possibility, but not one that brings with it all the psychological benefits hoped for from disarmament.

A sizeable intervention of the Force between major powers is not, of course, something to be expected often in a disarmed world. Nevertheless, if the Force is conceived of as superseding Soviet and American reliance on their own nuclear capabilities, it needs to have some plausible capability to meet large-scale aggression; if it hasn't, the major powers may still be deterred, but it is not the Force that deters them.

A capability for massive or measured nuclear punishment is probably the easiest attribute with which to equip the Force. But it is not evident that the Force could solve the problems of "credibility" or of collective decision any better than can the United States alone or NATO collectively at the present time. This does not mean that it could not solve them—just that they are not automatically solved when a treaty is signed. If the Force is itself stateless, it may have no "homeland" against which counter-reprisal could be threatened by a transgressor nation; but if it is at all civilized, it will not be wholly immune to the counter-deterrent threats of a transgressor to create civil damage in other countries. These could be either explicit threats of reprisal or implicit threats of civil destruction collateral to the bombardment of the Force's own mobilization base. (The Force presumably produces or procures its weaponry in the industrial nations, and cannot be entirely housed in Antarctica, on the high seas or in outer space.)

If it should appear technically impossible to police the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, then we should have to as-

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sume that at least minimal stockpiles had been retained by the major powers. In that case, the Force might not be a great deal more than one additional deterrent force; it would not enjoy the military monopoly generally envisaged.

One concept needs to be disposed of—that the Force should be strong enough to defeat a coalition of aggressors but not so strong as to impose its will against universal opposition. Even if the world had only the weapons of Napoleon, the attempt to calculate such a delicate power balance would seem impossible. With concepts like preëmption, retaliation and nuclear blackmail, any arithmetical solution is out of the question.

The knottiest strategic problem for an International Force would be to halt the unilateral rearmament of a major country. The credibility of its threat to employ nuclear weapons whenever some country renounces the agreement and begins to rearm itself would seem to be very low indeed.

The kind of rearmament would make a difference. If a major country openly arrived at a political decision to abandon the agreement and to recover the security it felt it had lost by starting to build a merely retaliatory capability and sizeable home-defense forces, it is hard to envisage a civilized International Force using weapons of mass destruction on a large scale to stop it. Limited nuclear reprisals might be undertaken in an effort to discourage the transgressor from his purpose. But unless the rearmament program is accompanied by some overt aggressive moves, perhaps in limited war, the cool and restrained introduction of nuclear or other unconventional weapons into the country's population centers does not seem plausible, unless non-lethal chemical or biological weapons could be used.

Invasion might offer a more plausible sanction, perhaps with paratroops armed with small nuclear weapons for their own defense; their objective would be to paralyze the transgressor's government and mobilization. But if this should be considered the most feasible technique for preventing rearmament, we have to consider two implications. We have provided the Force a bloodless way of taking over national governments. And a preëmptive invasion of this kind might require the Force to act with a speed and secrecy inconsistent with political safeguards.

There is also the question of what kinds of rearmament or political activity leading to rearmament should precipitate occupation by the Force. In our country, could the Republicans or Demo-

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crats campaign on a rearmament platform, go to the polls and win, wait to be inaugurated, denounce the agreement, and begin orderly rearmament? If the Force intervenes, should it do so after rearmament is begun, or after a party has introduced a rearmament resolution in Congress? The illustration suggests that one function of the Force, or the political body behind it, would be to attempt first to negotiate with a potential rearming country rather than to intervene abruptly at some point in these developments.

Again, the character of rearmament would make a difference. Suppose the President presented a well-designed plan to build an obviously second-strike retaliatory force of poor preëmptive capability against either the International Force or other countries, but relatively secure from attack. If he justified it on the grounds that the current military environment was susceptible to sudden overturn by technological developments, political upheavals, irrepressible international antagonisms, the impotence of the Force for decisive intervention, the corruption or subversion of the Force, or other such reasons, then the authorization of a drastic intervention by the Force in the United States would be less likely than if the President ordered a crash program to assemble nuclear weapons, trained crews and long-range aircraft. It would make a considerable difference, too, whether rearmament occurred at a time of crisis, perhaps with a war going on, or in calmer times.

The point of all this is simply that even an International Military Authority with an acknowledged sole right in the possession of major weapons will have strategic problems that are not easy. This is, of course, aside from the even more severe problems of political control of the "executive branch" and "military establishment" of the world governing body. If we hope to turn all our international disputes over to a formal procedure of adjudication and to rely on an international military bureaucracy to enforce decisions, we are simply longing for government without politics. We are hoping for the luxury, which most of us enjoy municipally, of turning over our dirtiest jobs—especially those that require strong nerves—to some specialized employees. That works fairly well for burglary, but not so well for school integration, general strikes or Algerian independence. We may achieve it if we create a sufficiently potent and despotic ruling force; but then some of us would have to turn around and start plotting civil war, and the Force's strategic problems would be only beginning.

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VIII. CONCLUSION

This is not an essay against disarmament, even "total disarmament." It is simply a warning against the notion that there is any once-for-all solution to the problems of world peace and government. It is against the notion that if only disarmament is "total" enough, we can forget about deterrence and all that. It is against the notion that under "total" disarmament there is no military potential to be controlled, balanced or stabilized.

There should be no divorce between deterrence and disarmament. If disarmament is to work, it has got to improve deterrence and to stabilize deterrence. Until a much greater community of interest exists in the world than is likely in this generation, war will have to be made unprofitable. It cannot be made impossible.

It is sometimes argued that to perpetuate military deterrence is to settle for a peace based on fear. But the implied contrast between arms control and total disarmament is not persuasive. What would deter rearmament in a disarmed world, or small wars that may escalate into large ones, must be the apprehension of a resumed arms race and war. The extent of the "fear" involved in any arrangement—total disarmament, negotiated mutual deterrence, or anything else—is a function of confidence. If the consequences of transgression are plainly bad—bad for all parties, and little dependent on who transgresses first—we can take the consequences for granted and call it a "balance of prudence." What keeps us from stepping off a train before it stops is not "fear"; we just know better.

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BRITAIN, THE SIX AND THE WORLD ECONOMY

By William Diebold, Jr.

WHEN France and Germany, with Italy and the three Benelux countries, made it clear that they were really going to form a customs union, they forced the British government to face a decision it had hoped to avoid. Now Britain's decision to join the Common Market, if reasonable terms can be agreed on, requires the United States to make some major decisions of its own. Our action—or the lack of it—will pose new choices for the rest of the world.

The British decision followed a long reëxamination of the courses open to the United Kingdom once the Six had left little doubt—especially by their decision of May 1960 to accelerate tariff reduction—that they would succeed in creating a common market. Conversations in Europe, including those following the Adenauer-Macmillan talks of August 1960, presumably gave the British a reasonably good idea of the terms they would have to meet if they chose to go in. On the assumption that the Europeans would concede some essential points, the Prime Minister worked at building popular support at home and a majority in the House of Commons of a size appropriate to so fundamental a decision. The explicit opposition that remains—strongest at opposite ends of the Tory and Labor parties but scattered throughout the country—will undoubtedly gain recruits as a result of some of the compromises the government will have to make as a condition of entry. Concern for the Commonwealth will also influence votes. Still, the decision to seek entry could hardly have been made except in the belief that in the end the fundamental conviction would prevail that in the future Britain will be better off in the new Europe now taking shape than outside it.

Of course it takes two—or in this case seven—to make an agreement. Though the major champions of European integration have always said they looked forward to the time when Britain, and others, would join the Six, there has been opposition to British entry on the Continent as well as in Britain. Many confirmed "Europeans" were long opposed because they believed the British would undermine the European Economic Community, either in pursuit of a traditional balance-of-power policy or, less deliber-

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ately, because their Commonwealth preoccupations would inhibit full acceptance of European solidarity. No doubt this suspicion still lingers, but the British turnabout has been drastic enough and the progress of the Community substantial enough to silence most doubts, at least until it is seen where the negotiations lead.

A second main source of opposition to British entry lies in France. There the economic rationale for keeping the British out has largely faded, but France still aspires to be the main spokesman for Europe and does not welcome competitors. It is unlikely, though, that Frenchmen of these views—or Germans who have similar ideas, for that matter—would in the end stand out against a Community majority favoring British entry. Both sets of views—"European" and more traditionally nationalist—are likely to make themselves felt in a stiffening of the conditions that Britain will be asked to accept.

The three main sets of problems to be dealt with in the negotiations that have begun in Brussels concern Britain itself, its fellow members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and, most important of all, the problems of the Commonwealth. How these problems are dealt with is crucial to the place of the enlarged European Community in the world economy.

II

During the years that Britain was in the wilderness so far as European integration was concerned, it was often advised that the way to set things right was to "accept the Treaty of Rome." That seemed an oversimplified view to those who were aware of the intricate set of compromises among national interests—and particularly between France and the others—with which the broad ideals of that document had been embroidered. Still, largely because Britain comes late and as a petitioner, it has virtually had to accept the existing rules so far as its own economy is concerned. ". . . We accept without qualification," Edward Heath, the Lord Privy Seal and chief British negotiator, told the Ministers of the Six, "the objectives laid down in Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty of Rome, including the elimination of internal tariffs, a common customs tariff, a common commercial policy and a common agricultural policy." Gone is the argument for tariff autonomy and the established British tariff structure with its low duties on raw materials and foodstuffs that played so great a part in the British proposals of 1956 for a free-trade area. Heath made it clear

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that the British would not question most of the rates already agreed on for the common external tariff but asked that duties be eliminated on aluminum, woodpulp, newsprint, lead and zinc, which the United Kingdom now imports free, largely from the Commonwealth. (Benelux and Germany already have the right to import substantial quantities of some of these materials duty-free in spite of the common tariff.) On such matters as social security laws, regulation of business practices, taxes, and rules covering the establishment of foreign business, the British have asked only for time to adjust their arrangements to those called for by the Treaty. They know that as members they will have a voice in determining how the broad principles of the Treaty are to be applied in these matters.

Agriculture once seemed a great hurdle. Although Mr. Heath spoke about it at length in presenting Britain's case, he was mostly asking for time to make adjustments. The British seem to have decided some time ago that they could afford to switch from their system of relatively low prices and subsidies for farmers to the continental one of price supports. Consumers will pay more; the treasury will pay less and gain some customs revenue; overseas sellers may get higher prices. Though the present disposition in Britain is to minimize the cost of the change, there is room for some concern about the effect of higher living costs on wages. What this part of Britain's entry price comes to will depend to an important degree, in the short run, on the arrangements made for the importation of Commonwealth foodstuffs and, in the long run, on the influence Britain will have on the common agricultural policy of the Community.

EFTA, conceived to a considerable extent as a collective bargaining device, has become something of a problem for Britain in its new posture. Denmark and Norway will probably follow Britain into the Common Market. Portugal's rather limited trade problems are not expected to be troublesome. The difficulty centers on Austria, Sweden and Switzerland which send a high proportion of their exports to the Common Market but are not prepared to join it because so many of its leaders stress its long-range political purposes. The Austrians say the Russians would forbid their joining. The Swiss say their neutrality would be compromised. The Swedes say much the same and put themselves forward as a necessary bridge to Finland; but there is a significant minority in Sweden that favors entry. What the three "neutrals"

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would like is a form of association that would give their exports easier access to the Common Market without involving them in commitments on other matters. They are meeting resistance from some of the leaders of European integration who see this as a dilution of the Community at a moment when British accession makes it particularly important to stress solidarity and the obligations of membership. The British are involved in the problem because they have virtually committed themselves—by an agreement that will sooner or later invite charges of bad faith—to delay joining the Common Market until the interests of the other EFTA members are satisfied.

The problems of Britain's relations with the rest of the Commonwealth are even harder and more numerous. In the first instance they concern trade—a large volume of trade. Most of Britain's imported food comes from the Commonwealth. The economies of Canada, Australia and New Zealand have been shaped to a significant degree by the importance to them of the United Kingdom's market for grain, meat, dairy products and fruit. If Britain were simply to step behind the common tariff of the European Community, long-established trade patterns would be disrupted. Dominion products that had previously entered the United Kingdom freely would encounter tariffs. The tariff preferences that now favor the Commonwealth would be replaced by others favoring European products. When the Community's common agricultural policy became fully operative (if it followed the lines now contemplated), Commonwealth foodstuffs, like those of the rest of the world, would be subjected to variable levies intended to limit imports to the amounts the Community could not produce for itself with an expanded agriculture.

Tropical Commonwealth producers have different problems. With the major exception of sugar, their competition is usually not in Europe, so the common agricultural policy is of little importance to them. Some of their products face no tariff barriers; taxes on coffee, tea and cocoa that hold down sales of these commodities to the Continent will not be affected by British accession. But some Common Market tariffs exist for the purpose of giving preferential treatment to the products of the African countries associated with the Community by virtue of their former colonial affiliations. If Britain entered with no special arrangements, it would levy a tariff on cocoa from Ghana but not the Ivory Coast, and on peanut oil from Nigeria but not Senegal.

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The advanced countries of the Commonwealth, and especially Canada, sell relatively small but growing quantities of manufactured goods to Britain. Tariff preferences, which are generally supposed to be particularly important for this trade, would be lost if Britain joined the Common Market, and replaced by a preferred position in the U.K. market for manufactured goods from the Six. Some underdeveloped Commonwealth countries send cheap manufactured goods to Britain, where they are treated far more liberally than in the continental countries (or the United States). There has been remarkably little public worry about what British entry into the Common Market might do to one of the most sensitive parts of this trade—the export of cotton textiles from India, Pakistan and Hong Kong. Perhaps there would be no great change since present tariff rates are less important to this trade than import quotas on the Continent and export restrictions which the Commonwealth countries apply on shipments to the United Kingdom. Also, negotiations are under way for a multilateral agreement on cotton textiles that might widen continental markets for Commonwealth producers. This is, however, only the first installment of what promises to be a major trading problem of the future as developing countries increase their exports of cheap manufactured goods.

There is little doubt that the Six will agree to arrangements which will protect some parts of the Commonwealth's trade structure. But other segments will inevitably be subjected to new barriers and some degree of discrimination as Britain eliminates tariffs on imports from the Continent and adopts the common external tariff. British participation in the Community's common agricultural policy is bound to affect Commonwealth trade, but how much depends on whether the prices set for Community producers lead them to expand output enough to displace Britain's imports from the Commonwealth and whether the preferences of British consumers will be strong enough to persuade them to keep buying such things as Canadian hard wheat at higher prices than they have been used to.

All these changes will be introduced in stages, over a period of years. If the British economy should respond to the stimulus of the Common Market by growing more rapidly than it has in recent years, imports of Commonwealth products might expand in spite of the new pattern of trade barriers. Moreover, the Community's external tariff is going to be subject to international

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negotiation during the years ahead. Commonwealth countries will have the same chance as the United States to bargain it down. The addition of Britain is likely to strengthen the low-tariff forces in the Community. Of course, trade is not the Commonwealth's only concern. An expanding British economy might be better able to provide capital for development. A paper prepared for the Third Afro-Asian Economic Conference in New Delhi suggested another point when asked, "Is not the stability of sterling a better cement than the maintenance of 'preferences'?"

Even if British entry into the Community brings substantial economic benefits to the Commonwealth in the long run, will it also strengthen the Commonwealth as a political system? Considering the imponderables by which the Commonwealth lives, and the ability it has shown in one decade to accept conditions that seemed impossible in another, one would be foolhardy to give a flat answer. Perhaps the course of the negotiations will give us an idea of what calculation Whitehall has made about the long-run future of the changing Commonwealth and Britain's chances of continuing to lead it while also joining Europe—a feat once held to be impossible. Clearly, one of the main tasks of British diplomacy must be to hold on to as much influence in the Commonwealth as it can. It would surely defeat that purpose for Britain to enter the European Community with no concessions for Commonwealth trade. But it is unlikely the Six will refuse some special measures, at a minimum to ease the transition but perhaps also with a view to establishing new trade relations between the Commonwealth and Europe.

III

There are a number of different ways in which the problems posed by Britain's entry into the Community might be handled. While it seems improbable that Canada, Australia or New Zealand will apply for membership, one or another of them might seek some form of association with the Community to improve its access to the European market, as the EFTA neutrals are doing. Britain has already agreed to let the Dominions negotiate away its preferential position in their markets and some have thought the thing to do was to extend these privileges to the Six in return for enlarged European purchases of foodstuffs. Tariff-free quotas or minimum-purchase guarantees of some sort are likely to be used as transitional devices and may also be proposed

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as lasting arrangements, not only for food but for some Commonwealth raw materials as well, if the Community rejects the British proposal to reduce these tariffs to zero.

One way of dealing with the problems of Africa would be to give the British dependencies and former British territories the same privileges as the former French, Belgian and Italian countries have in relation to the Community. An alternative would be to put all the underdeveloped countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America on an equal basis, providing their major exports with equal access to the markets of all the industrialized countries of the free world, as Alfred C. Neal proposed in *Foreign Affairs* in January 1961. In relation to the EFTA countries the question is whether to apply the same simple choice—in or out—that has been applied to Britain or to accept the view that a different political situation justifies a more limited kind of special agreement tailored to meet the problems of the European neutrals.

These "solutions" differ greatly in their economic and political implications. The concessions they would require by one side or the other vary widely. Quite a few of them are not compatible with GATT—the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Some of them clearly enlarge the area of free or liberal trade while others mostly give one nation a preferred position at the expense of another.

This spill-over of European economic integration creates great problems for outside countries and may do much to shape the whole free-world trading system. The pressures to get agreement without disturbing existing trade patterns too much are bound to encourage special deals and other arrangements that in substance if not in form give certain countries preferred positions in the European market. If the arrangements are only temporary, no one need worry too much, so long as he is sure they will in fact be terminated soon. Otherwise, integration in Europe may lead to fragmentation in the economy of the rest of the free world.

It is a little hard to believe that the long-run interests of the free world are advanced if Australian meat can be sold to Britain and the Continent on more favorable terms than meat from Argentina or if coffee growers in the Ivory Coast are given privileges denied to those in Uganda, while Brazilians and Colombians have to cope with entirely different marketing problems. The rule of equal trade treatment embodied in GATT is not just a relic of the nineteenth century or an idealistic premise nurtured

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in back rooms in Washington by postwar planners. The departures from it that could be sanctioned in good conscience in the postwar period have been justified, as in the case of European integration, by three criteria: the dollar shortage, the achievement of long-run political benefits or the ability of a few nations to go substantially further in breaking down barriers to trade among themselves than would have been possible for a larger group. The dollar shortage is over, so far as Europe is concerned, but the others remain rather good tests, whether the question is one of granting Austria special status, assuring a market for Canadian wheat, or either adding Ghana to the Common Market's associated states or subtracting Dahomey from them. It makes quite a lot of difference, too, whether the special problem is met by measures that discriminate between one country and another or by concessions directed toward the special needs of one but extended equally to others. To a considerable extent the application of GATT rules will meet these standards and GATT provides the best place for discussing hard cases and departures from the rules. But it will be largely up to the "outside" countries and particularly the United States to insist on this.

IV

The new critical phase in Europe is one to which American policy has contributed. We have encouraged European integration, tried to strengthen the Community, and hoped it would expand, at least to include Britain. To reverse that policy now would be nonsense inviting chaos. If the British decide to throw in their lot with the Community, we should welcome the result for what it will do for the political strength, balance and orientation of Europe. To cope with the resulting problems we have only a limited choice of policies.

Quiescence has not much to recommend it. If the United States were to stand by, waiting, the Six, Britain, the Commonwealth and the remaining countries of EFTA would probably work things out. The price in terms of American economic interests might be high and we would probably have missed the chance to use the period of flux in Europe to move decisively toward a better ordering of the free world.

An active policy does not mean a once-for-all action. If the United States sets out to play a major part in shaping the changes that have been set in motion, we shall have to be prepared for a

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long process of dealing with a large number of more or less discrete problems in as coherent and consistent a fashion as we can manage. Our power abroad will be limited; to use it we will often have to overcome domestic inhibitions of the sort that arise when pursuit of the general interest damages particular interests. This means we will be involved in struggle and compromise and will have to accept inadequate and unsatisfactory measures a good part of the time. This is nothing new, but it will make trouble if we do not have a clear idea of our direction and aims.

American policy should have three purposes: to encourage the success of the negotiations between Britain and the Six; to minimize the short-run economic costs to the United States of British entry into the Common Market while opening as many chances as possible of economic gain for ourselves over the long run; to take advantage of the processes of change being set in motion by Europe to improve the organization of the free-world economy. The last two purposes may sometimes conflict with the first since we shall be asked to put up with arrangements we dislike or disapprove of on the grounds that they are necessary to get an agreement in Europe. There is no general solution to that dilemma but it is worth remembering that fuzzy, temporizing arrangements sometimes offer the best chances of change later on.

The pursuit of the second and third aims will often run along a single course. It has been obvious for a long time that it is important to the United States to have the Community's tariff on our exports as low as possible; with Britain added, this will be all the more true. Regardless of one's views on the particular points of President Kennedy's trade-policy proposals, there can hardly be any serious doubt that only by a major step of this sort can the United States hope to be effective in furthering its export interests and preventing the negotiations for British entry into the Common Market from spawning a series of special arrangements that might do much to disintegrate the free-world economy.

We should have allies in this course. Japan, Latin America, the unaffiliated countries of Asia and Africa, European outsiders, and, on many occasions, the members of the Commonwealth have interests similar to our own. Canada, with its striking postwar record of pursuit of a multilateral trading system, has been tempted by the view that "lying low right now is our best tactic," as *The Financial Post* of Toronto put it. Fortunately, the mood seems to be changing as it becomes clear that Canada is unlikely

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to get very much of a free ride as a result of American and British bargaining with Europe, and that meanwhile things will be decided in which Canada will want to have a strong voice. It is important that the outsiders see their common interests, for if each country felt forced to come to whatever terms it could with the new Europe, each would be likely to seek arrangements partly at the expense of the remaining outsiders, and real disintegration would set in.

Some people have supposed that the best way out of a difficult position would be for the United States to "join the Common Market." This is hardly a meaningful statement. Addition of the United States would so transform the Common Market—in size, scope and character—as to make it something else. Hence the talk of an Atlantic free-trade area. There is a strong case for the view that free trade between Western Europe and North America would, after a period of adjustment, strengthen the whole area and make these countries better able to meet their triple need of providing for defense, satisfying the wants of their people and contributing to the economic development of the underdeveloped countries. But the United States is plainly not nearly ready for so drastic a step, and the Europeans are probably not ready for it either. Some would fear a check in the progress toward Western European integration. And if we were all ready, it would be most unwise to create an Atlantic free-trade area before Europe and the United States were substantially agreed on measures that would help the other countries outside the Soviet bloc meet their trade needs.

One of the great advantages of the Kennedy Administration's trade program is that it provides means of dealing with immediate problems without foreclosing the possibility of an eventual free-trade area between the United States and Europe. By concentrating on tariff bargains between the United States and the Community, the program would reduce the significance of our being outside the Common Market. By stressing adherence to most-favored-nation tariff treatment, by both the United States and Europe, the proposals make it possible to spread these benefits to other countries and, more importantly, maintain the essential principle that what is to be built is a trading system of benefit to the whole free world and not just to a rich white man's club.

This argument does not reject the idea of an "Atlantic Community." NATO, the Marshall Plan and the O.E.C.D. all show

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that the affinities and common interests of the countries around the North Atlantic provide a basis for fundamental coöperation on a large scale. That these countries need to find still more effective ways of concerting their policies seems obvious. For some purposes "Atlantic" is plainly a misnomer. Measures already taken to coördinate foreign aid include Japan; that country as well as Australia, New Zealand and others undoubtedly should have a place in other "Atlantic" activities as well. It is particularly important that they should not be excluded from trade coöperation since they have a major stake in the markets of Europe and North America.

If the time comes when Europe and North America are ready to create a real free-trade area, they should seek the broadest possible membership, tested by willingness to participate, not location around the shores of the Atlantic. Before then the industrialized countries can take steps to improve the trading position of the underdeveloped countries. One measure already under discussion would remove import barriers on a number of tropical products. Measures might follow to replace the preferences some African countries have in Europe with equal treatment for these and other countries in the markets of the industrialized countries. Measures to help offset the fluctuations in income of raw-material exporting countries would also be more effective if Europe, North America and Japan worked together with all the producing areas. A special effort will be needed to work out effective and acceptable arrangements to provide markets in the advanced countries for cheap manufactured goods from low-wage areas.

Combined with tariff concessions on a most-favored-nation basis and a strengthening of GATT—instead of the erosion that will come in the absence of a deliberate policy to support that body—steps of this sort will make it possible to move toward freer trading relations inside the "Atlantic Community" while at the same time improving the trading position of the rest of the world. This may also provide ways of meeting the problems of European countries that remain outside the Common Market. One thing it will do little to solve is the agricultural problem.

The agreement among the Six on the principles of a common agricultural policy was a major step in extending the scope of the Community. What its economic effect will be is not entirely clear and depends to a considerable extent on the support prices that are established and the way they are financed. The new policy

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will probably promote a greater degree of self-sufficiency in a number of farm products. It will certainly add to the difficulties of overseas countries that export food to Europe. Normal import liberalization, already very limited in agriculture, is made virtually impossible by the new policy. For some time to come the United States, the Commonwealth countries and others will probably be able to make specific arrangements for the sale of their products, but it is hard to see how they can have much assurance about the long-run future under the new system. The management of domestic agricultural economies in which almost all countries now engage is forcing increased management of international trade in farm products. But how this is to be done, and what the economics of it will be, remain obscure. The question is one more major addition to the agenda of international economic coöperation.

Quite apart from the agricultural problem, the United States will not find it easy to pursue the course called for by our new situation. We are unaccustomed to the requirements of a vigorous trade policy entailing adjustments at home. But if there is one lesson to be learned from Europe's recent experience it is that advanced economies can function remarkably well without their traditional tariff protection. The position of the United States is not the same as that of the European countries. Sluggishness in the economy, our new-found balance-of-payments difficulties, and the need to maintain an exceptionally large export surplus to meet overseas commitments all hamper us. A vigorous trade policy cannot stand by itself, but a reduction of import barriers should contribute something to the solution of all these problems, not least by its effect on costs of production.

If the United States takes this course we are not likely to pursue it simply and constantly, with no setbacks. If we do not move in that direction we are likely, in a very real sense, to be left behind. Europe's trade dynamism is coupled with economic strength. If the United States is inactive, Europe's needs, desires, preoccupations and compromises will do more to shape the free-world's trading system than will our own. Europe's decisions that created this situation were in an important degree made possible by the policies the United States followed after the war. Now they pose new policy choices for the United States.

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FREE AFRICA AND THE COMMON MARKET

By Barbara Ward Jackson

IT is already clear that the most serious obstacles to Britain's entry into the Common Market lie not so much in any direct clash of economic interest between Britain and Western Europe as in the difficulty of transforming and modifying the vast web of Britain's external trading commitments. A loose, world-wide, pragmatic association has to be shrunk, without too much damage, into a close, contractual relationship. For extra-European communities, the squeezing and pinching threaten economic disturbance and political resentment and nowhere perhaps do the problems seem more daunting than in independent Africa where, by a chance of history, the confrontation of Commonwealth and Common Market is physically most direct and potentially most disruptive.

A glance at the map of Africa shows the physical entanglements. Into the solid bulk of ex-French West Africa clutch the fingers of the English-speaking communities—Gambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Nigeria—and, one should add, Liberia. In the Cameroons, an ex-British and an ex-French territory have come together in an uneasy federal association. Down to Katanga, the French speakers prevail. But across from them, on the other side of the continental divide, independent Tanganyika may well be the first member of a new, wide, English-speaking association in East Africa.

These intermingled territories cannot ignore each other. However inchoate and undirected, the sense of African unity is already a strong political force. The new nations, most of them desperately weak, have come to independence in an age dominated by vast federal structures—by the United States, by the Soviet Union, by the ambition if not the fact of a United Europe. And even were the idea of common markets and political associations not fashionably in the air, African leaders would still feel the gap between the frailty of their fledgling and fragmented independence and the giant communities abroad. Their post-colonial status and the continuance of Western colonial control on their southern frontiers only increase their sensitiveness. Dr. Nkrumah may not be accepted as a leader of continental scope. But few African

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statesmen can ignore the influence of his passionate pan-Africanism, especially among the younger men.

There are solid economic reasons, too, for transcending the new state boundaries. Apart from the Union of South Africa, the African continent is still a system of essentially colonial economies. In spite of decisive differences between the colonizing policies of the different metropolitan powers—differences which go to the heart of the Common Market-Commonwealth controversy— the results of their work bear a family resemblance. In each economy, the core of the modern sector is primary production for export, either minerals or tropical foods and fruits. In each, the main infrastructure has been built to forward that trade. All lines of communication drain down to the ports which are—save in Western Nigeria—the only really big cities. Contact between territories is so slight that in some neighboring countries roads do not meet at frontiers and telephone conversations can be conducted only through Paris or London. Inter-African trade is minimal and the earnings from exports are spent largely on the import of manufactured goods, mainly from Europe and through foreign intermediaries, and on food which a static subsistence economy in the countryside no longer produces in sufficient quantity.

This colonial pattern cannot be changed simply by intensifying economic relations with the metropolitan powers. A world surplus of coffee and cocoa is already in prospect. If all the expansion plans of the separate African economies are successful, surpluses in palm products, peanuts, sugar, citrus, bananas and pineapples lie ahead. The aim of added agricultural output appears in every plan. Yet the Western stomach cannot be stretched to consume so much. Industrialization is the alternative adopted by every government, but industrialization will hardly succeed rapidly or adequately if it has to rely on export markets already choked by the West's sophisticated products or the cheap manufactures of Asia. Africa's most urgent need—like Latin America's—is thus an *internal* market large enough to absorb the products of industrialization, and this need points toward local coöperation and integration. Economic necessity reinforces the political arguments for greater unity.

Thus the aftermath of the colonial years makes closer association essential. Equally, it makes it remarkably difficult. Although French and British colonial policy helped to produce types of local economy which are recognizably of the same type—de-

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pendent economies, *economies de traite*—the relations between these economies and their metropolitan powers diverged sharply. France saw its territories in Africa as extensions of the mother country and as, in a sense, part of the French state. Citizenship and political representation on a basis of complete equality between Frenchmen and French Africans would be the ultimate political achievement. Meanwhile, as much assimilation as possible was the rule in economic policy. This approach led to a species of economic closed circuit between France and its dependent territories. All the colonies were part of a single monetary system—the franc zone, in which the local African franc was freely convertible into French francs and had behind it the entire resources of the French Treasury. No territory had to worry with the problem either of financing imports or of balancing local expenditure against local receipts. French grants provided much of the capital and when recurrent costs rose, France covered part of the local budgetary deficits as well. In addition, tropical products had guaranteed markets in France at prices which were often well above the world price level.

As a result, those engaged in the small modernized sectors of the economy—the export trades, the cities, the administration—acquired standards of living and expenditure often much above what the local economy could really support. In return, the colonies imported their manufactures almost wholly from France at prices often above the world level, and French officials and residents sent their savings and profits back to France. So, of course, did other "expatriates" in other colonies. The French were, however, twice as numerous as the British. Thus, in a sense, the franc zone functioned independently of world markets as a species of closed economic world of its own. The circuit would have been broken only if the dependent territories had succeeded in buying extensively from other countries and thus presenting the central monetary authorities in Paris with insistent demands for foreign exchange. But strict exchange control and a quota system prevented any leaks of this kind.

Since 1948, the French Union has totally abandoned, in a rapid series of concessions, the doctrine of political assimilation. Today, all its African colonies are politically independent. But some of the economic practices which once reflected integration still continue. In some ways, they are more powerful than ever. In the last decade, the amount of public capital which France has poured

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into Africa, south of the Sahara, has reached the startling sum of $300,000,000 a year. At the same time, the weakening of world demand for tropical products and the steady fall in their price has made even more valuable the quotas and agreed prices available in the French market. Moreover, France's entry into the Common Market has offered to its ex-colonies—now associated with the Market under the Treaty of Rome[1]—a further real strengthening and extension of their advantages. The joint Common Market Fund for Development (FEDOM) adds another $100,000,000 a year to the sums flowing into Africa. Tariff barriers against the territories' exports to Western Europe are coming down—although internal excise taxes mitigate the advantage in some degree. Ultimately, a common external tariff will give them a competitive advantage against tropical suppliers outside the Association. It is therefore not surprising that in the talks that are now being carried on to negotiate a new form of association, based this time upon the free political choice of the African territories, the Africans are tending to demand a further consolidation of their present very real advantages, and the extension of the new agreement to cover not five but seven years. Some participants even suggest tough quota systems designed to discriminate against outside competitors.

Meanwhile the evolution in British Africa has followed a different route. Since the ultimate aim of British colonial policy was to produce self-governing and finally independent territories, countries such as Ghana or Nigeria were not drawn into a centralized economic system directed by Britain. They had to balance their own books and cover their own expenditure. Membership in the sterling area gave no guarantee that internal overdrafts and external imbalances could be covered by London. Welfare and development funds remained small. Britain granted some imperial preference on tropical products—it varied from 2 to 10 percent—but received no preferences in return except in the two very small territories of Gambia and Sierra Leone. As a result, British Africa traded widely with the rest of the world. During the postwar boom in primary products, large capital reserves were built up by using the device of marketing boards. These boards bought the entire crop, paid the peasant producer

[1] The Associated States in Africa are Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the two Republics of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville and Congo-Leopoldville), Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Gabon, Upper Volta, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, Tchad and Togo.

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a fixed price for his cocoa or his peanuts and then siphoned off the balance between this and soaring world prices into reserves for development. In 1957, on independence, Ghana's reserves reached $700,000,000. But these reserves were not grants from the metropolitan power. They had been truly earned and, save for some restrictions on dollar purchases, could be spent anywhere for capital imports once the local governments began—after 1955—to attempt development in earnest. The system was thus open, geared to world prices, low-cost compared with the French system and connected only loosely with British policy and control. Equally, it received nothing equivalent to France's massive outpouring of capital assistance.

II

These, then, are the two major systems[2] which confront each other in Africa—profoundly alike in basic structure and problems, profoundly different in their external relationships. And at this point in history, it is the divergence in their relations with Europe that dominates and disturbs the African scene—and, through Africa, the prospects for unity in Europe as well. Britain seeks to enter the Common Market. Unless it can secure associate status for its African ex-colonies, they will, over the next ten years, lose their mild imperial preferences in the British market and face a rising tariff barrier excluding them not only from Europe but from Britain as well. In addition, they may find themselves more directly excluded by quota systems and price-fixing arrangements. Greater production of such export crops as cocoa and coffee may be stimulated in the associated countries by protection and by artificially high prices. The surpluses will grow and depress prices further in the world market. In political terms, the doubling of old colonial frontiers by new customs barriers will damage, perhaps fatally, any hopes of closer African union. These are the risks inherent in Britain's bid to unite with Europe. Unless they can be overcome, they may inhibit the bid itself.

For many observers, the simple and obvious solution is that Britain should secure associate status for its ex-African territories and eliminate at one stroke the difficulties and estrangements

[2] The future of the former Belgian Congo is still too confused to define, but its past economic history suggests a hybrid between the British and French systems. By treaty, it was committed to non-discriminatory trade and, as a very wealthy colony, it financed its own development. But Belgian assimilation and settlement resembled the more inclusive French pattern, and since 1958 the Congo has been associated with the Common Market.

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which threaten to arise between the English-speaking and French-speaking areas of Africa. But the issue is not so straightforward. Within every group concerned with the negotiations there are hesitations and objections—often opposite ones. In fact, a certain amount of schizophrenia reigns over the whole debate. Take the African associated states. Some of their leaders are pressing for even more exclusive advantages and some governments, notably the Ivory Coast, seem very reluctant to water down the very real gains they derive from trade discrimination by admitting other African competitors to the charmed circle. Nor do all relish the idea of FEDOM having more clients. Britain's record in aid-giving is not such as to suggest that it would fill the gap if the potential claimants of assistance were to increase threefold by the crowding in of the ex-British territories. Yet these same ex-French leaders go off to Monrovia and Lagos and there in solemn conference concur with the leaders of Liberia and Nigeria on the need for an African common market, an African development fund and the closest economic coöperation on a continental scale. They do not seem troubled by the fact that the policies they advocate in Brussels and Paris, on the one hand, and in West Africa, on the other, are diametrically opposed.

There are contradictions on the European side as well. The Germans are full partners in the current negotiations to revise the Treaty of Rome—negotiations which most observers expect to result in an extension and consolidation of the present preferential system. Yet Dr. Erhard has gone on record against discrimination and a quota system and the German Government is exceedingly anxious not to affront the interests of Latin American suppliers of tropical products whose markets are valuable outlets for German exports. In this concern for producers in *other* continents, the Germans share reservations that are felt by the Americans too. The United States Government is most unwilling to see Africa acquire in perpetuity preferential entry to one of the world's largest markets to the exclusion of other developing lands. Pressure from this more liberal side has influenced the Economic Commission of the Common Market to recommend that on all tropical products the eventual external tariff should be halved—a step which would bring the level down to an average of only about 4 percent. Yet in the actual negotiations, it is not yet clear whether this more liberal approach will help to modify and determine the outcome.

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But even France, the fount, origin and "onlie begetter" of the whole system, seems of two minds. The traditional approach prevails but it is not unchallenged. In part, the opposition is a sheer question of expense. No one can estimate what the maintenance of the association costs the French taxpayer. Price supports, subsidies, budgetary subventions—a particularly unpopular item in the Assembly—capital aid and technical assistance must, added together, far exceed the published sum of $300,000,000 a year. True, unspecified gains accrue from high salaries to seconded French officials and from the protection granted French exporters. Even so, the amounts are formidable, and it is not only the well-known journalist Raymond Cartier who is beginning to ask whether some of the money might not be better spent in France's own underdeveloped regions—in Brittany or Dordogne.

There are political objections too. Some criticize the whole idea of the closed association as an outdated attempt to extend French *présence* and influence to what is in effect a group of client states. Others argue that once the problem of Algeria is solved, any idea of an elaborate, intensive *vocation africaine* makes little sense. And among some younger officials one even finds the conviction that the whole concept of "Eurafrica," of Africa associated by close vertical relationships with Europe, undermines precisely what it is supposed to foster—friendship with emergent Africa. "The more we recall the old colonial ties," they argue, "the more rapidly will good will towards us and towards Europe be undermined. 'Eurafrica' still suggests the subordination of Africa to Europe, of poverty-stricken primary producers to developed industrial powers, and we lay ourselves open to attacks on our 'undercover economic imperialism' and our 'neo-colonialism.' The need now is to modify or abandon the vertical approach and to encourage instead a parallel movement of unity in Africa to match the growing unity of Europe. Then, perhaps, there can be a fruitful dialogue between the two groups."

At this point we reach the fundamental reason why the straightforward solution of association for all the new African states with the Common Market is, in fact, a pipe dream. At least three politically vital and strategically situated African states reject association and largely for the reasons put forward by the young French critics. Guinea on the ex-French side, Ghana on the ex-British side, oppose association on the ideological ground that the relationship is basically dependent and neo-colo-

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nialist, perpetuating unequal relationships, making economic mockery of new-found political independence and frustrating the great pan-African dream. Nor can this simply be dismissed as an extremist view. The moderate Nigerian Government has refused, so far, to consider association and "Eurafrica" has few more forceful and eloquent critics than Mr. Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria's Foreign Minister. In the East, the Tanganyikan Government has let it be known that if Britain joins the Common Market, Tanganyika will leave the Commonwealth.

These are overt official reactions. In addition, one must reckon with a strongly dissident current of opinion emerging everywhere in Africa—even in countries whose leaders support close association. The young Senegalese with pictures of Sékou Touré on their desks, the Action Group opposition in Nigeria, the party extremists who brought about Mr. Julius Nyerere's resignation from office, the supporters—in schools and ministries, in universities and party offices—of the Nkrumah brand of pan-Africanism, all these add up to a kind of second, submerged Africa just below the level of the present leadership, but one which a political earthquake at any time or any point might bring bursting to the surface. And this Africa has in common one thing—rejection of colonialism and "neo-colonialism" in all its forms, from the Portuguese presence to the image of "Eurafrica."

Faced with this apparent *impasse*, there are those in Britain who argue that it must simply be accepted. Ghana and Nigeria, they say, have decided to stay out of the new association, in spite of all its advantages. So be it. They have chosen. Let them go. Then Britain can enter the Common Market unencumbered by either their claims or their protests. In fact, such a course would lead almost certainly to a grave political deterioration. The politics of Africa are already dangerously polarized between the Casablanca grouping of Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Morocco and Egypt and the Monrovia group which contains almost all the others. So far, it has not been entirely easy to define the difference between them. The lines are still fluid. Both support African independence and unity. Both denounce colonialism. Both speak of African economic integration. The Casablanca group includes in Mali a member of the franc zone and a state associated with the Common Market. And constant efforts are being made by one or another member of the Monrovia grouping to end what is still a gap based on emotion, ambition and rival

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leadership. If, however, Britain's entry into the Common Market consolidated the economic advantages of the ex-French territories leaving Ghana, Nigeria and the rest of ex-British Africa outside, it seems virtually certain that all the not negligible forces of anti-colonialism and pan-Africanism that Dr. Nkrumah and Mr. Sékou Touré between them can mobilize would be directed fiercely against the whole concept of special links with Europe and the Association would become perhaps the principal target of violent pan-African and open anti-European propaganda. All hope of lessening the Monrovia-Casablanca split would be at an end. On the contrary, the dangerous polarization of politics between "moderates" with Western links and "extremists" with adventurous foreign policies would be fatally intensified.

Nor would the economic consequences be any more encouraging. Economic frontiers and customs barriers following the old colonial boundaries would check any genuine move towards regional integration. The states left outside the Association would be likely to sabotage any bold local schemes for better communications, more rational transport and power systems and for better coördinated planning. In addition, such small buffer states as Upper Volta or the slivers of Dahomey and Togo would come under fierce economic pressure from their neighbors. At the African end of the axis, the whole procedure looks unmistakably like a recipe for unsettled politics and economic frustration.

III

It is the bleakness of these prospects that has encouraged a growing discussion—both in Western Europe and in the United States—of possible alternatives. Underlying a wide variety of proposals and suggestions lie two principles—the first that the vertical lines of close political and economic association between Europe and Africa are not likely to last and that a sounder political aim would be to develop unity on two *parallel* lines, the absorption of Britain into Europe being matched by a steady rapprochement between the ex-British and ex-French and ex-Belgian territories in Africa. Then between the two regional groupings—European and African—there could be close and genuine ties of aid and interest but based on no more formal machinery than has proved necessary and workable in, say, the Colombo Plan.

The second principle is that a specific *general* alternative

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should be found for each preferential advantage now enjoyed by the associated states. Where, for instance, the robusta coffee production of Ivory Coast or the peanuts of Senegal are sustained by guaranteed French import quotas at fixed prices, agreement should be reached to tackle the world coffee surplus or the future peanut surplus in such a way that stable prices and orderly marketing become feasible. If, over the years, world prices are fixed at levels lower than those under the old system—a not unlikely outcome since French prices for robusta have on occasion risen to 50 percent above world prices—then special direct assistance would be given to tide the economy over its difficulties and to secure diversification of local output.

On the question of tariffs, the Common Market should move toward a species of "one-way free trade" in tropical products, removing all tariff barriers from tropical imports while demanding no quid pro quo in the shape of free entry for European manufactures since this would check Africa's infant industrialization at birth. In the matter of aid, general Western assistance, possibly coördinated through the Development Assistance Committee of the O.E.C.D., might supplement present contributions—and be ready against the day, perhaps not too distant, when "Cartierism" wins in France and capital aid is switched to the Dordogne. Thus the aim would be to see that no existing associated state was worse off as a result of losing its preferential position and at the same time to lay the foundations for a more integrated, yet more open, African system in the future.

What are the prospects for such a reorientation of Western policy toward Africa? The answer is as paradoxical as the problem—no prospects at all in 1962, reasonable prospects in 1967. The present generation of leaders in ex-French Africa are already signing up for a new period of preferential arrangements. Indeed, in the case of the Ivory Coast, the agreements reached with France last fall go even further than earlier undertakings. France guarantees an import quota of 100,000 tons of robusta coffee for five years—no previous agreements covered more than a year and the amounts were always smaller. In return, the Ivory Coast guarantees French industry a specific percentage of its imports of manufactures. Both countries agree to keep trade as much as possible flowing in the old channels and to mitigate the foreign exchange problem by keeping down trade with third parties. Clearly, on this analogy, the renegotiated Treaty of Rome

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is more likely at this stage to propose a closed association of the Ivoirien type than any retreat from the preferential system. Yet by the end of the five—or seven—years of the new Treaty, it is probable that all the political and economic pressures working against the closed system both in Africa and in the West will have gathered formidable momentum. Newer, younger African leaders will have arisen, proclaiming African unity, French taxpayers will have tired of the burden, the Germans will have refused to exclude other suppliers, steady American hostility to the arrangements will have had its effect. Meanwhile, however, it is 1962 and Britain has to reach its decision. Must one conclude that the impasse is unbreakable? Is there no way in which a sense of the likely mood of 1967 can modify the rigidities of the present stance and prevent the disaster—for disaster it would be—of Britain's inability to find its way round the African roadblock?

One possibility at least could be explored. It would be an extension of the temporary solution already reached in the Cameroons where the extreme difficulties of merging an ex-British territory with an ex-French state already associated with the Common Market were shelved by a species of standstill agreement under which, for a year, no change in existing tariff or trading arrangements was attempted. The situation was in a sense frozen to allow for fuller studies and further experience.

In this analogy, the path of wisdom might lie in accepting the next five or seven years as a period during which the economic arrangements with Africa both on the side of Britain and of the Common Market remain as they are today. The associated territories would not renounce their present preference. The ex-British territories would keep such advantages as they enjoy today. And nothing would be done on either side to increase the degree of discrimination exercised against the others. For instance, no steps would be taken to introduce a high uniform external tariff round the present associated states. This aspect of the Treaty of Rome would simply be postponed. At the same time, the Common Market powers would pledge themselves, during the five or seven years, to look for *general,* non-discriminatory solutions to Africa's particular economic problems and to put a steadily increasing emphasis on greater economic unity in Africa. In this way, Britain's immediate entry into the Common Market would not be blocked by the African obstacle, and time would be gained during which the potentially ephemeral concept

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of "Eurafrica" could be transcended and a more lasting pattern of coöperation evolved between two parallel movements of integration—in Europe on the one hand, in Africa on the other.

In the last analysis, the issue is one of political judgment. Is the present partially preferential solution of association with the Common Market likely to contribute to growing stability in both Europe and Africa? There are some strong reasons for doubting whether it will. The arrangements of today grew out of a particular colonial policy—the assimilationist policies of France—and conform to a type of solidarity which has been almost entirely eroded away in the political sphere. In the post-colonial phase, Africa's dominant political mood seems increasingly to be colored by pan-Africanism, by more or less explicit longings for greater unity, by an angry resentment at all forms of continued colonial control and an almost morbid ability to see them lurking under any aspect of Western policy. Given this mood, it is at least possible that policies of close "Eurafrican" economic assimilation may, for all their immediate advantage, become both the target and the irritant of a more vocal and violent nationalism in Africa and actually increase the instability of that disturbed continent. Meanwhile, they almost certainly present a daunting obstacle to Britain's entry into Europe. These are high prices to pay for discriminatory forms of economic assistance to a relatively small part of a large continent and an even larger world—especially since that assistance could, with a little patience and a little judgment, be equally well supplied by more general and less divisive means.

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CANADA'S ROLE IN WESTERN DEFENSE

By Melvin Conant

GEOGRAPHY gives Canada a strategic position unlike that of any other ally of the United States. Situated between two nuclear titans, the Soviet Union and the United States, it is certain to be automatically and totally involved in any general nuclear war. Furthermore, the vast Canadian land mass, stretching far into the north, has become a prime strategic asset in the protection of the only force capable of deterring a Soviet onslaught upon the West: it affords the strategic air forces of the United States the essential early warning which is vital to the protection of the whole Atlantic world.

The United States has become accustomed to a uniquely close and important defense relationship with Canada. Yet it is also aware that this military tie has produced serious and severe political strains for the Canadian government and people. These are in part the consequence of the mammoth intrusion of the United States into every aspect of Canadian life, in part the result of a rising sense of frustration felt by Canadians as they have found themselves inextricably bound up in security requirements which seem to limit their political initiative in world affairs and, above all, in cold war crises. Since these requirements are not likely to diminish but rather to increase, it is important that both sides understand more clearly what is involved. It is to be hoped that Canadians will realize more fully the essential part their country must play—essential not for Canada alone, nor even for all of North America, but for the safety of the whole free world. It is equally important that Americans appreciate more clearly than before the extent to which their own military and political policies affect Canadian thinking and action.

II

When the increased long-range bombing capabilities of the Soviet Union began to threaten the security of the U.S. strategic forces located on the periphery of the Soviet bloc, these advanced forces were recalled to the greater security of North America. It was possible to make this move without loss of strategic advantage because of a number of technical improvements—in operations, in airplane design and in jet engines. The most important

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was the perfection of in-flight refuelling, which by 1956 enabled the B-47 bomber to reach two-thirds of all key targets in the Soviet bloc from bases located in North America; and the B-52 bomber, similarly refuelled, could reach any place on earth.

Since this strategic nuclear force continued to be the West's ultimate military deterrent against a Soviet strike, it became a most urgent matter for the whole NATO community that it should receive proper protection on its home bases. The vast land mass of Canada played an essential role in this regard, for it lay between the polar area over which Soviet attackers would have to pass and the bases in the United States which would be the object of their attack.

One requirement for North American defense is, obviously, to obtain the earliest possible notice of a Soviet attack. Initial estimates of probable warning time ranged from three to six hours. A major problem arose when it was foreseen that some Soviet aircraft might fly in fast and high, while others could also come in fast but at very low altitude. It was therefore necessary to acquire and emplace on Canadian soil a variety of warning and tracking devices of great complexity and cost. As Soviet capabilities continued to increase, the warning time shrank. By 1961, under conditions of possible missile and aircraft attack, the alert had been telescoped to 15 minutes or even less. Every minute became precious in permitting additional strategic aircraft to get airborne and missiles to be released. A Soviet strike will probably never occur if Soviet leaders estimate that the warning time afforded by Canada will be such that enough U.S. forces will remain unscathed to wreak massive retaliation on Soviet military installations and territory.

The second defense requirement has been to develop, as rapidly as possible, interception systems which could blunt a Soviet attack if not destroy it. In the early fifties, air defense was still thought of in World War II terms. An air battle, for example, was to be largely directed by men at the scene. This concept changed drastically as a result of the developing Soviet threat. By the middle fifties, a nearly automatic electronic control of the air battle was foreseen; many weapon systems were to be coördinated by stations responsible for large geographic areas. Immensely complicated interceptors of great speed, armed with nuclear-tipped air-to-air missiles, were introduced, at least into the U.S. forces assigned to continental defense. At the same time,

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surface-to-air missiles were developed to give air defense added speed of response plus a new nuclear punch. The next need is for additional anti-missile weapons.

These requirements of early warning and interception have called for a mammoth research program. Only a nation with the financial and research resources of the United States could undertake to keep pace with the kaleidoscopic changes in weapons technology, especially those relating to the need to give strategic forces greater protection.

The Canadian contribution to North American security came first in meeting the cost of erecting, maintaining and operating the Mid-Canada (or McGill) radar warning line. This paralleled the more complex U.S. Pine Tree system which was planned to include warning, tracking and interception facilities. By the mid-fifties, the inadequacy of these lines was apparent and construction began on the Distant Early Warning Line (DEW) far into the Canadian north. The DEW Line, a spectacular technical, engineering and construction achievement, was the joint work of Canada and the United States. Though it was financed by the United States, the Canadian contribution was a great one; and its operation is now largely a Canadian responsibility. Many of the stations of the Pine Tree net are also manned by Canadians. Apart from these contributions to early warning, Canada provides communications facilities for elements of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning Systems located in Alaska, Greenland and Great Britain. Seaward extensions of early warning lines and antisubmarine watches off the Atlantic and Pacific coasts extend surveillance far to the west and east, linking North America with other warning nets of Western Europe. In addition, Canada contributes R.C.A.F. interceptor squadrons to help blunt a Soviet attack, and they are being supplemented by two surface-to-air missile squadrons. These forces, and their detection, tracking and battle control systems, are integrated into a joint Canadian-U.S. effort through the North American Air Defense Command.

III

It was not without misgivings that Canada took these measures to help meet the basic requirements for continental defense. And strains and stresses in Canadian-American relations have been produced by the endless changes in defense needs. Many of these shifts have been imperfectly understood in Canada; all of

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them have been costly; and each has called for some greater sacrifice of sovereignty as the operation of new weapons has meshed Canadian defense efforts closer into those of the United States. Moreover, each change in defense needs has been defined very largely by the United States and its judgment has not always been correct.

An outstanding instance of costly miscalculation was the exaggerated estimate, made by the U.S. Air Force in 1958–59, of Soviet intentions and capabilities for manufacturing intercontinental missiles. Partly as a result of this, no particular plan or weapon now appears to Canadians to be a wholly convincing answer to the Russian threat. They tend to feel that the defensive weapons currently available would have been adequate to meet the past danger; they question whether they offer reasonable protection in the present or, still more, will do so in the immediate future. Efforts on both sides of the border to pinpoint a time when the threat of manned aircraft will be superseded by that of missiles have contributed more confusion to the public discussion. Because the need is for large numbers of weapons designed to cope with many different threats, and because these threats change, it is most unlikely that the weapons requirements will be stabilized. The one thing sure is that the threats to North America will multiply rather than decrease, and will require ever greater defense efforts, not less.

This situation has placed the Canadian government and people under severe strains, both economic and political. Moreover, doubts about the extent and future of Canada's defense role came to the fore at the same time that the United States asked that nuclear weapons be introduced into the Canadian forces assigned to continental defense. A public debate on the necessity for and wisdom of accepting these weapons has swept across Canada and faced Ottawa with a major political problem. As a result of the opposition from a large part of the Canadian press and various influential groups the government hesitates to proceed with its decision, announced in 1959, to acquire nuclear weapons and locate them on Canadian soil.

Because Canada's role in protecting U.S. strategic forces is so vital it becomes particularly necessary to understand why many Canadians have misgivings about their involvement in a very close defense relationship with the United States. Almost all their doubts mirror some aspect of the predominant U.S. "pres-

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ence" in Canadian national life, be it military, political, economic or cultural. The Canadians have experienced the political tensions of the cold war and been faced with the requirements of collective defense at the very moment when they would have preferred to devote their total energies to building an industrial nation and exploiting vast natural resources. Their great undertakings were giving fresh meaning to the term "Canadianism" just when the demands of the cold war required that they submerge their particular interests to some extent in the greater interests of the free world. There also had been a hope after the last war that in a new, more peaceful world Canada would find a place more in harmony with its national achievements and political objectives, a place somewhere between the traditional pressures of London and Washington, somewhere between the West and the East, somewhere between the industrial nations of Europe and the underdeveloped areas of Africa and Asia. Instead, Canada found itself confronted by Soviet hostility and expansionism and the need to help create the NATO alliance and to accept unprecedented peacetime military commitments overseas. It contributed personnel and military forces to the United Nations or other international undertakings in Kashmir, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Central Africa.

At the same time that Canada was assuming these unfamiliar roles, British influence and power were diminishing and the United States had become the chief military, political and economic power of the free world. In its new capacity as a leader of a world-wide free alliance, the United States has often adopted policies and taken actions which Canadians regarded as ill-considered and sometimes as unnecessarily belligerent. Like many other peoples, they are apprehensive about the risks of accidental war and also fear that relatively minor military engagements may develop into catastrophic nuclear exchanges. Their geographic position makes them feel particularly liable to automatic involvement in U.S. decisions and actions; and because of this, the whole tenor of Canadian external policy has been to urge moderation, to seek adjustments and compromises in crises of the cold war.

However, Canadians have not been disturbed solely about the ominous Soviet threat on the one hand and possibly ill-considered American actions on the other; they have also been disturbed on a related issue closer home, the role of their own government—be it Liberal or Conservative—in the formulation of defense pol-

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icy. No Canadian government since the war has given the impression of being so thoroughly knowledgeable about defense issues as to be able to reach firm decisions about military requirements and to inform the Canadian public adequately about them. Public confusion in Canada over the course of defense policy became especially conspicuous with the creation of the North American Air Defense Command.

NORAD came into being as the result of long and intensive discussions, beginning in the mid-fifties, between officers of the Royal Canadian Air Force and of the U.S. Air Force concerning the most effective use of Canadian and U.S. forces in the event of Soviet attack. The increasing menace of Soviet strategic power seemed to require the closest integration of all defense forces under a single command. The discussions as to how to bring this about were held with the approval of the Liberal government then in power, and the conclusions reached by the military were known to it and apparently had its tentative approval.

The recommended command structure was of a radical nature, unlike anything previously existing except for a small integrated Canadian-U.S. Special Force in World War II. The proposal was that all Canadian and U.S. forces assigned to continental air defense be under a NORAD commander-in-chief, who would be a U.S. officer, and his deputy, who would be a Canadian. The integrated NORAD headquarters could issue orders for the instant use of all these forces; this meant that for all practical purposes the U.S. was to be responsible on the highest military level for the use of both Canadian and U.S. contingents. It was this proposed integration of command to which the Liberals are widely assumed to have given their informal agreement.

However, the national elections of 1957 and 1958 swept the Liberals from power, and the Conservatives, for decades in opposition, suddenly found themselves in office. One of the first decisions to be made concerned NORAD. Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker gave it his approval, but in retrospect it seems clear that neither he nor his principal cabinet members understood the full political import of placing integrated Canadian and U.S. forces under a U.S. commander-in-chief. Opposition to the decision appeared in the Canadian press immediately, and the government resorted to various stratagems in Parliament and elsewhere to explain away the agreement or interpret it in a more favorable light. The necessity of NORAD on military grounds

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was lost sight of in a fog of debate, which ended without any general public understanding of what was at stake. The Liberal opposition took full partisan advantage of the situation. There were many indications that confidence in the government's competence in matters of defense had been shaken.

Then hard on the heels of the NORAD affair came the question of surface-to-air missiles, armed with nuclear warheads, to replace conventional interceptors. It was the judgment of the U.S. Air Force that as Soviet strength grew the requirements of defense were again being altered. The assumption in 1958–59 had been that the threat of the manned bomber was changing. Now, long-range strategic aircraft might stand off and unleash nuclear-armed missiles with a high degree of accuracy at targets perhaps a thousand miles away. This was one of the reasons which prompted the U.S. Air Force to urge the Canadian government to accept the *Bomarc* anti-aircraft missile and to consider phasing out its interceptor force.

Despite grave uncertainties at that time about the reliability of *Bomarc*, the Canadian government agreed to accept it and to cancel its contract for the Avro Arrow fighter. Scarcely had it done so—despite public misgivings—than the U.S. Air Force changed enough of its estimate of the nature of the manned bomber threat to cause it to urge Ottawa to acquire U.S. interceptors, along with the two squadrons of missiles. Needless to say, there ensued charges of either bad faith or purblind judgment. Wherever the truth may lie, the essential point is that the Canadian public suffered a further loss of confidence in the judgment of both their own government and that of the United States.

It was into this disturbed atmosphere that the issue of nuclear weapons was injected by the United States. Why it aroused such public discussion and opposition is not entirely clear. In the mid-fifties, Canada had accepted a nuclear strategy for NATO. In the following years Canadian ground and air forces stationed in West Europe were being prepared to use nuclear weapons. Indeed, a very large proportion of Canadian armed forces (except perhaps in the Royal Canadian Navy) have been trained in nuclear weapons. Furthermore, since 1954, the Canadian government had been encouraged by its own people to use every opportunity to increase or at least maintain its sales of uranium ore to the United States. In the past seven years these sales have reached the value of about $1 billion; and no one believed this ore was for other than

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nuclear weapons. Yet there was an immediate outcry against the government's announcement in 1959 that it intended to acquire nuclear weapons from the United States for use in continental defense. The debate has continued down to the present.

Some Canadians believe that the acceptance of nuclear weapons is morally indefensible. They are also convinced that it would impair Canada's role in the United Nations, especially with reference to the new states. Others believe that what is acceptable under NATO is not acceptable under a continental defense arrangement controlled largely by the United States; they challenge the U.S. requirement that it retain custody of nuclear warheads and that these may be released only upon order of the President (even if the actual use of them might then be determined by the Canadian government). Also, many Canadians believe the threat today is from long-range missiles, and that against these no available weapon is effective; accordingly, Canada should cease buying inordinately expensive weapons, including nuclear weapons, and withdraw from an air defense relationship with the United States which has now become meaningless. Lastly, there are a few who simply seek some means—any means—to escape from the tensions of the cold war and the responsibilities of maintaining freedom; they favor flight into neutrality.

While listening to these conflicting views, the Canadian public has been further confused by the presence in the cabinet of a Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Howard Green, who has zealously and publicly denounced nuclear weapons for Canada, and a Minister of National Defense, Mr. Douglas S. Harkness, who has zealously and publicly declared the need for them. For over two years the Prime Minister has hesitated. But although recently he has raised questions of sovereignty and control, there has never been any real doubt about where his intentions pointed. Ottawa and Washington could at any time reach an understanding regarding nuclear weapons acceptable to both, comparable perhaps to that evolved between the United States and Great Britain; and it is widely assumed that Mr. Diefenbaker has simply been waiting for a politically propitious moment to announce again Canada's intention to obtain them.

The Opposition has also made its own contributions to public confusion. Prior to its defeat, the Liberal Party had been responsible for every Canadian defense commitment and agreement relating to NATO and continental defense. But since it has been

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in opposition, the party leadership has advocated a variety of courses, including a withdrawal from NORAD and a virtual disarmament of Canada in so far as its role in NATO is concerned. At one moment Mr. Lester Pearson has seemed to urge no nuclear weapons whatsoever for Canadian armed forces, and then, more recently, has suggested that if these weapons were necessary, the United States might be permitted to station them on Canadian soil, without any Canadian participation in their deployment or use.

IV

These discussions in the press and in Parliament have almost lost sight of the military requirements which prompted the United States to ask that nuclear weapons be incorporated into Canada's armed forces on duty in North America. Despite the fact that the U.S. request became a matter of public knowledge in 1959, no thorough explanation of the reasons for it had been given officially and publicly in Canada until September 1961 when General Laurence S. Kuter, U.S.A.F., Commander-in-Chief, NORAD, did so in a speech in Toronto. The principal requirements as outlined by him are to inflict the highest possible "kill-ratio" on Soviet aircraft and to help insure the destruction of the nuclear weapons they carry.

As for the first, given the high speed at which bombers approach, it is urgently necessary that anti-aircraft missiles have a nuclear warhead which will have a fatal effect on any aircraft throughout a larger area of space than can be caused by a conventional explosive. A conventional charge in a missile must be exploded in close proximity to the attacking aircraft, necessitating a missile of extreme accuracy, whereas a nuclear warhead does not require the same degree of perfection. When anti-missile delivery systems become available, the nuclear warhead will be doubly necessary, of course, for use against incoming missiles.

The second major requirement is to destroy not only the carrier vehicle but the enemy nuclear cargo, whether it comes in an aircraft or in a missile. A way of "defusing" such weapons may be found through releasing a nuclear warhead in the vicinity of the bomber or missile. The need to destroy both the carrier and the nuclear charge is important because of the possibility that Soviet nuclear missiles, particularly those carried in a bomber, may be so arranged as to explode in any case if the airplane crashes. The

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fallout coming from the nuclear warhead of an anti-aircraft missile would of course add to the general "rain" of radioactive débris; but this would be insignificant compared to what would be showered on Canada by the release of a high-yield nuclear bomb when a bomber crashed.

The debate over Canada's acceptance of nuclear weapons for its continental forces is largely limited to a consideration of their value against manned aircraft. However, a decision to accept them ought rightly to be regarded as a first step toward the acceptance of nuclear warheads in other weapons not yet under public discussion. Furthermore, once the principle has been accepted, priority must be given to the introduction of nuclear warheads into the Royal Canadian Navy, for of all the Canadian armed forces this is the one which, if it is armed with nuclear weapons, is most likely to have an opportunity to play a role of greatly increased importance. Its mission then would be to enhance the security of strategic forces, bases and communications centers against Soviet submarine missile attack.

In World War II, no navy gained greater experience in anti-submarine operations than the R.C.N. Today, it is a relatively small but expert force which concentrates largely on the World War II problem of defending shipping against submarine raiders. In a general nuclear war this mission would be likely to fade quickly away. Most military analysts do not believe that a general nuclear exchange would last long enough to permit convoy runs or involve the duty of protecting shipping. The problem being raised now is different—how to cope with a force of missile-launching submarines, probably nuclear-powered, which would have the ability to seep through inadequate surveillance screens to reach the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and, with very little warning, wreak catastrophic damage.

No sure defense against such a force exists today. Tactics, detection methods and tracking instruments now in use fall far short of giving even modest assurance that the presence of enemy submarines will be known, much less that they will be accurately located, watched and then destroyed if a hostile act is observed. There is need for greater forces (sea and air), improved and correlated tactics, more effective surveillance of immense ocean areas, more effective instruments to permit continuous and accurate tracking, and, with all this, nuclear weapons to ensure that the enemy submarines will be destroyed. Some of the necessary tools

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are now available. R.C.N. ships must have them all if they are to play a role of maximum usefulness.

Whether or not the Canadian government decides to introduce nuclear warheads into its present and future weapons systems will depend largely upon whether the public is convinced that Canadian defense policy is essentially valid, especially as it relates to the continuing importance of NORAD. An example of this importance was seen in November 1960 when the U.S. Defense Department assigned to NORAD Headquarters the operational control of a Space Detection and Tracking System, combining the space surveillance net for detecting and tracking satellites and the National Space Surveillance Control Center which receives, analyzes and catalogues data received from many world-wide sensors. The Ballistic Missile Early Warning System is also in NORAD's hands. The responsibilities of NORAD in these key fields will almost certainly increase as we move further into the missile era.

Whether proposals to secure new weapons will find favor with the Canadian public will depend also on its estimate of what Canada has gotten for its defense dollar over the past decade. Since 1954, Canada has spent approximately one and a half billion dollars for military purposes. She now has one brigade in NATO, along with an air division, and three brigades at home with the NORAD complement of interceptor squadrons. She has some fifty naval ships located on her two coasts. In addition, there are a number of personnel responsible for warning systems and battle communications. Small contingents are active in the Middle East, Southeast Asia and the Congo. There is a handful of officers in Kashmir. At present there is no airlift adequate for the transport of any significant number of troops and their equipment.

The total number of Canadians under arms is something over 120,000 (though a figure of 135,000 has recently been authorized). In relation to the total male labor force, the Canadian armed forces are small compared with those of most of the NATO allies, ranking below those of France, Turkey, Greece, the United States, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Italy, Denmark and the United Kingdom. In defense expenditure in relation to gross national product, Canada ranks below the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Turkey and Greece. Despite mounting costs of procuring new weapons and maintaining equipment, the government is spending far less today than it was after the Korean

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War; defense expenditures for 1960–61 were $300,000,000 less than they were in 1954.

To some Canadians there does not seem to have been an "adequate return" for the expenditures of the past decade, in terms of ready, sizeable forces. To others, it seems that Canada may not have been pulling its own weight. It seems probable that before the public will accept the need for new weapons and new commitments, they will have to be convinced that these are a really essential contribution to the defense of the West. If they were given a thorough and authoritative explanation of why Canada's military role is so vital, they would undoubtedly lend their support either to continuing their effort on the present scale or accepting the heavier defense burden which would be more commensurate with their national wealth and Canada's standing in the Atlantic alliance.

The defense of Canada per se is not in question. The only question is: What is the most effective contribution that Canada can make to the general security of the Atlantic world, Canada itself included? Since 1949 Canada has made its contribution in the various forms mentioned above. Of these, far and away the most important is the early warning system which gives notice of an approaching enemy to the only strategic air force which is capable of deterring a Soviet attack. In recent years, many Canadians have lost sight of this key function and of the fact that Canada alone can perform it. The Canadian contribution has been described too often in terms of U.S. security, simply because the strategic force which Canadians are asked to help protect is located very largely within the United States. One must hope that the current defense debate in Canada will lead to a redefinition of Canada's role in correct terms—the collective defense of the free world as a whole.

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SIX WAYS OF CONFUSING ISSUES

By Owen Harries

ANYONE wishing to master the art of confusing the issues, scoring effective but unfair debating points, and persuading others to miss the point, should make a study of what is widely accepted in the West today as enlightened, liberal discussion of international politics. Many politicians, some of whom perhaps agree with Wilde's proposition that to be understood is to be found out, make no sustained or imaginative effort at clarifying issues and explaining policies; and many intellectuals seem to consider marching, sitting, signing, visiting, going to jail and attending conferences (all activities which involve contributing prestige rather than intellectual talent) as more important political activities than attempting to raise the standard of public discussion. Debating devices which are manifestly unfair and which can do nothing but mislead are accepted as normal weapons of controversy, even by, and in fact especially by, those who make the highest moral claims for their case. Such techniques are not for the most part new, but it is interesting and perhaps important to see how they are applied to the facts of contemporary international politics.

Here, then, is a short list of techniques of confusion that seem to be meeting with considerable success. The list does not claim to be comprehensive; others will be able to add their own examples.

The first technique is to confuse ends and means by insisting on treating a disagreement about means as if it were a disagreement about ends. This involves the initial tactic of appropriating some widely accepted goal to the particular means being advocated. It is seen in operation in Britain at present in controversies about disarmament. Almost invariably, except when some lunatic fringe is involved, these are controversies about means. They arise because people give different answers to questions as to the best way of securing peace. Is it better to be well armed in the hope of securing peace? Or is it better to adopt one of the innumerable schemes for disarmament? These are serious questions and there is much to be said either way. But instead of saying it, some of the participants (and usually, though by no means always, it is the ones in favor of disarmament) are certain to convert the argument about means into one about ends. Oppo-

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sition to a particular means, *e.g.* unilateral disarmament, is treated as if it is opposition to the goal, *i.e.* peace—which is, in fact, held in common. Then all reason goes out through the window as phrases like "enemies of peace" and "warmongers" are bandied freely about.

Different countries provide different examples. In America this appropriation of common goals is attempted most frequently perhaps by the extreme right which tries to corner the market in anti-Communism. Anyone who does not accept its bludgeoning methods, who does not believe that sacrificing civil rights is a necessary part of an effective response to the Communist threat, who argues that complex and subtle attacks may require complex and subtle defenses, is in danger of being attacked as "soft on Communism."

This particular gambit stands first in my list because it not only creates confusion and misunderstanding, which is serious enough, but it also embitters and poisons public discussion to an extreme degree. It makes disagreements appear much more fundamental and irreconcilable than they really are because, in so far as it is successful, it converts intellectual differences into moral differences, into a disagreement about goals. It is one thing to tell a man that he has made an error of calculation; it is quite another thing to tell him that he is really against what he says he stands for.

The second technique is to dismiss good arguments on the grounds that they are capable of being abused, or, closely related to it, to regard the imputation of motive as a sufficient reply to such arguments. These methods are frequently encountered by someone who points out the difficulties and dangers attached to a course of action. Examples appear constantly in discussions about colonial issues. Thus some will argue that democratic self-government is not the sole alternative to colonial government, that in many cases civil war, anarchy, dictatorship or occupation by another and more oppressive foreign power may more likely result, and that in such instances there is a strong case—strong at least for those who believe in democracy—for supporting the continuation of colonial rule until such time as genuine self-government is a real possibility (simultaneously doing everything possible to hasten that time). This argument is likely to be met not with a refutation but with the reply that it is the classic excuse of the reactionary, that for him the time is never right, that he

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can always find reasons for perpetuating a régime which is in his own interest.

Now it is true that an argument of this sort can be abused, but it does not follow that the argument is invalid or should be abandoned. Any argument at all can be wrongly applied, and if one accepted this reasoning one would simply have to stop thinking and discussing. The conclusions that do follow are that great care must be taken in accepting such an argument, that one should be vigilant in distinguishing between proper and improper uses of it, and that everything possible should be done to expose misuses of it. These are, admittedly, more difficult and time-consuming tasks than simply shouting "Fraud!" and "Immediate self-government!" and pretending that this constitutes an adequate reply; but then an intellectual's lot was ever a hard one.

Probably one reason why liberals cannot take such arguments seriously, but dismiss them out of hand as being the excuses of interested parties, is that, despite recent experience, they find great difficulty in considering the possibility of a change as being anything but a change for the better. Not long ago Edmund Wilson remarked that men of his generation and background find it extraordinarily difficult to divest themselves of the assumption of inevitable progress. They were brought up on it, their whole picture of the universe was constructed around it and, however much events may seem to refute it, they still cling to it. To the extent that this is so it constitutes a very great handicap for anyone trying to appraise what is possible and what is not possible in the world today.

I do not want to suggest that this form of debate is peculiar to one country or one political group; on the contrary, it is very widespread. Just as liberals often dismiss what may be a sound argument as a dishonest attempt to justify vested interests, so their arguments are in turn often dismissed, unexamined, as selfish attempts to assuage guilty consciences or as symptoms of a destructive self-hate or as a manifestation of envy. This tendency to question motives as a substitute for genuine argument, to shift attention in debate from issues to persons, may be in part a consequence of the popularization and vulgarization of psychology. Carried far enough, it rules out discussion of any kind, even of motives themselves, since it denies the possibility of a disinterested view. Faced with it, one can only keep insisting that if an argument is a good one, it is good whatever the motive of the

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person putting it forward. Only when an argument has been shown to be unsound can an examination of motives serve some useful purpose in discovering the cause of error. Sidney Hook once expressed this as a rule of controversy: "*Before* impugning an opponent's motives, even when they may legitimately be impugned, answer his arguments."

Another way of causing confusion and creating a distorted picture of world politics which has a considerable vogue at present is to anticipate history by a process which may be described as the projecting of presumed characteristics of the future backward into the present. This intellectual device can frequently be seen in discussions involving China. It is true that China will, *if* the pace of development achieved in the last ten years is maintained, and *if* other countries do not substantially increase their rate of growth, be one of the two or three greatest powers in the world by the end of the century. But this is no reason for proceeding as if it had already achieved this status, which is what many commentators on international affairs do, contrasting what is usually called "this new giant" or, depending on style, "this looming, menacing colossus," with the older countries of the West, to the detriment of the latter. The fact is that, in 1961, China is not in terms of power a giant at all, whatever it may become by 1991; and while the possibility of a tremendously strong China should be borne in mind in formulating long-term policy, to pretend that it already exists is to distort reality and to add to our problems unnecessarily.

China is not an isolated instance. To a lesser degree, the same process takes place in discussions about the "emergent" nations of Asia and Africa, which are credited now with the power and sense of responsibility which it is predicted they will have in the future. This accounts partly at least for the exaggeration of their importance in current international affairs.

When a country like Britain is being discussed, on the other hand, the device is used to obtain the reverse effect. Because British power has been declining in recent years, it is taken for granted that the same downward curve will inevitably continue; the collapse of British power is then projected from an imagined future into the real present; and discussion proceeds on the basis that Britain is already washed up. From assuming certain things about the future relative power of China and Britain, many commentators go on to elaborate arguments based on the thesis that the

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former is a much more potent factor than the latter in the world today. Indeed, one would hardly guess that the announced target of the Chinese Communists is to catch up with the British economy by 1970—a target which, even if they achieve it, will still leave them with an income per head of less than one-twelfth that of the British; and, of course, the new "giant" will still be far, far behind the United States and the Soviet Union.

Now this sort of thing is not new. Orwell noted 15 years ago that it was the method habitually used by James Burnham, who simply predicted the continuation of whatever was happening at the time he was writing. As the situation changes, this of course leads to contradictory predictions. It also leads to a situation where "whoever is winning at the moment will always seem to be invincible." Orwell claimed that the tendency of some commentators to proceed in this way "is not simply a bad habit, like inaccuracy or exaggeration which can be corrected by taking thought. It is a major mental disease, and its roots lie partly in cowardice and partly in the worship of power, which is not fully separable from cowardice." He linked it with the defeatism of English intellectuals during those periods of the last war when things were not going well, remarking that "the quickest way of ending a war is to lose it, and if one finds the prospect of a long war intolerable, it is natural to disbelieve in the possibility of victory." What is true of a war is also true of a cold war.

A fourth device is the use of multi-meaning words or phrases. Many of the key words in discussions about the cold war have more than one meaning. By a judicious but unacknowledged switch from one meaning to another during the course of discussion it is often possible to get people to agree with something which they would strongly oppose if they understood clearly what was going on.

The classic multi-meaning concept is, of course, "coexistence." There are at least two quite distinct meanings of coexistence. In the first place there is coexistence in the military sense, that is, acceptance by both sides of the fact of military stalemate and agreement not to go to war. Secondly, there is what Irving Howe has conveniently called "moral coexistence" which involves not merely not going to war, but doing as much as possible to become more friendly with the other side, accepting the other system as politically and morally valid, not being critical of it, and relaxing military preparedness.

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The two meanings are, of course, quite distinct. One can consistently accept the fact of military stalemate and still reject "moral coexistence" completely. In practice, however, they are not kept distinct, and there tends to be a sliding back and forth from one meaning to another. When a commentator sets out to persuade people to accept coexistence as something desirable he usually gives it its narrower meaning, since the case for that is easier to make. In fact, the basic argument for coexistence, summed up in the phrase "coexistence or no-existence," will support only military coexistence; the case it sets forth derives its force from fear—it is a case for not initiating war and for nothing else. But this argument having been accepted, the advocates of coexistence then proceed as if the case for "moral coexistence" had been made also. This is clear from the fact that if all that was meant was military coexistence there would be no need to get passionate about advocating it—it already exists.

"Coexistence" is not the only concept which allows its advocates to move among several meanings and to choose the best of several worlds. Other important concepts like "disengagement," "free world" and "neutralism" share the same characteristic. "Disengagement" can mean anything from the creation of a demilitarized and neutral Germany to the complete withdrawal of all armed forces behind their own national boundaries. "Free world" sometimes refers to all those countries which are not under Communist control; sometimes it is restricted to the members of various alliances; and sometimes it is restricted even further and used to refer only to the dozen or so genuine democracies. "Neutralism" can mean old-fashioned neutrality in the Swiss sense, or it can mean membership in the Afro-Asian bloc and very active interference in the affairs of the world at large.

Number five is insisting on applying irrelevant tests. An example will best explain this technique. Western democracies, in the process of defending themselves against Communism, often ally themselves with countries which are not democratic; and these alliances provide a basis for much effective criticism by those who wish to discredit the West, and are a cause of much embarrassment to those who support it. A few years ago the best example of such an alliance was that with South Korea; currently it might be that with Portugal. The effectiveness of the criticism and the strength of the embarrassment stem from treating as relevant the question: "Is the régime in Portugal one of

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which genuine democrats can approve?" As the answer to this question is clearly "no," the way is then open for denouncing the alliance and for accusing the West in general of hypocrisy.

The error in this manner of proceeding is that what is at issue here is not approval or disapproval of a régime but approval or disapproval of an alliance with the régime, and these are two very different matters. The character of the régime is only one factor entering into a calculation of the wisdom or morality of such an alliance. If an alliance with a non-democratic régime strengthens genuinely democratic countries (by, for example, better enabling them to withstand attack from another more powerful and aggressive and immediately menacing non-democratic régime), then a democrat both can and should support such an alliance; and no sacrifice of principle is involved. This was seen clearly during the last war when it was not felt necessary to approve or condone Communism in order to support the alliance with the Soviet Union required to defeat Hitler. Similarly today, approval of an alliance with a state need not involve approval of the régime within that state. To think that it does is a mistake made not only by critics of the West but also by those of its defenders who spend much time and effort in futile attempts to show that countries like Portugal are not really dictatorships.[1]

Two additional points are worth making. First, to agree that Portugal, South Korea, South Viet Nam and others are not democracies is not to admit that "they are as bad as the Soviet Union." For what makes the Soviet Union "bad" in terms of international politics is not merely or even primarily its internal character but the fact that it is aggressive and expansionist. Because of its ideology *and* its power, it provides a threat to democracy and liberty throughout the world. Portugal, for example, does not. Secondly, I am concerned here not with justifying the Portuguese alliance but with showing the proper test by which to judge it. If this test is applied, I think that in fact there is very strong ground for concluding that it is, all things considered, an unwise alliance.

I have left until last the most widely used of the techniques under discussion, partly because it has already become notorious.

[1] I am aware that a moral absolutist would reject my argument here and would insist that a means is either good or bad in itself and that a bad means cannot be justified in terms of a good end. I believe, however, that among those who oppose these alliances the number of honest and consistent absolutists is negligible, and that this can be demonstrated by an examination of their general political position.

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This is the use of a double standard in judging the respective actions of Western countries and Communist countries. A minor but striking example occurred recently in what might be called the "winemanship" of international politics. Many intellectuals in Britain were active a year or two ago trying to organize a boycott of South African wines, as a protest against the injustice and tyranny perpetuated by the South African government. Recently, during an exhibition of Russian products in London, some of the same people were writing appreciative little paragraphs about the charm of Georgian wines and giving advice as to which were the best to buy. There was no suggestion anywhere that people should refuse to buy these wines as a gesture of protest against the denial of liberty in the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the general line was that an increase of trade with the Communist world, in the interest of "better relations," was highly desirable.

A more serious example is the way in which different attitudes are adopted toward the United Nations and its Charter on different occasions. Actions by Western governments are regularly condemned in some quarters as being "inconsistent with the United Nations Charter" or a "betrayal of our obligations under the Charter." On these occasions, political morality is equated with obedience to the Charter, and any defense of a certain action in terms of vital interests or political reality is brushed aside. But it is from the same quarters that the demand for the admission of Communist China to the United Nations comes. Now according to the Charter there is no room in the organization for a state which regards a military conflict with other states both as inevitable and desirable, as the Chinese Communist Government does. It can be argued, and it may well be true, that the United Nations would function better if China and other states not now members were admitted, that this would be politically more realistic. This is a valid line of argument; but it is not a line which can properly be taken by those who insist that the Charter stands above any consideration of interest or reality, and that consistency with it is the highest political obligation. Neither are they entitled to argue for China's admission because other states who do not fulfill the conditions laid down in the Charter are already in. This is a realistic argument and they have committed themselves to the view that realism must be subordinated to consistency with the Charter. Having committed themselves thus, the only consistent action for them is not to try to get China into the

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United Nations, but to try to get those countries which do not conform with the Charter out of it—however difficult that may seem.

There are various ways in which one can assess, compare or judge the two sides in the cold war. One way is to hold both of them alongside a Utopian ideal—the perfect democratic state or the perfect socialist state—and see how they measure up. Another way is to compare each with an earlier version of itself and to assess the progress it has or has not made. Now if the first of these methods is applied to one side—if, that is, Western countries are always judged by standards of perfection—while the second method is applied to the other—if the Soviet régime of today is compared with the Stalinist régime of the thirties or with Tsarist Russia—the whole process is rigged in favor of the latter. Or again, if each is judged "in terms of its own moral values" the comparison is unfair and useless (the Nazi régime would have come out well from such a test).

Another way of applying a double standard is by ignoring magnitude. Thus a single fall from grace by one side is equated with systematic evil on the other. As Professor Seton-Watson once pointed out, in the minds of some Western intellectuals a single lynching in the Southern states of America is treated as if it were the equivalent of the murder by starvation of a hundred thousand Ukrainians by the Soviet Union.

Perhaps the commonest, simplest and safest way of all of applying a double standard is merely to be silent about the sins of one side while commenting on and condemning the sins of the other. After all, what you do not say cannot be quoted against you.

Some of the worst offenders in applying a double standard are the spokesmen of the non-aligned states, who employ it not only when commenting on the cold war (see Nehru's reactions to Suez and Hungary respectively) but also when comparing their own actions with those of Western powers (see Nehru's different attitudes when the U.N. interferes in any Western colonial dispute and when it interferes in Kashmir or seeks to interfere in Goa). It might be said that this is perfectly understandable in view of the historical background of these countries; but to understand something is not to justify it, and all this amounts to saying is that there are good reasons to explain why the non-aligned nations do not have the moral superiority they claim.

Sometimes, under pressure, those who employ double standards seek to justify what they are doing by saying that of course

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they expect a higher standard of behavior from the West than from the Soviet Union; or that they make more of Western sins because they can hope to influence Western behavior while no such hope exists in the case of the Soviet Union. But as in most cases the whole tenor of their argument is that one side is as bad as the other, and as they frequently claim that Western democracy is a sham, it is difficult to take these justifications seriously.

It is not only left-wing critics of the West who employ double standards; they also appear regularly in the arguments of its defenders. But this latter habit, however deplorable and however much it deserves exposure, is hardly surprising, for people have always tended to give their own side the benefit in this way. We are automatically on our guard against it and make allowances for it. What is novel in the present situation is that people who insist that they are loyal to the West and what it stands for persist in operating the double standard in favor of its enemies.

The foregoing list makes no claim to being exhaustive; neither is it a balanced list, for it takes most of its examples from British political discussion, this article having been written in Britain and under the stimulus of things read and heard there. No doubt someone writing in another country would have placed the emphasis differently. However, I think the methods described are in common use in all the Western democracies. In so far as this is the case, the ability of people to see things as they are is impaired and the quality of the public debate in those democracies (and there is little public debate elsewhere) is lowered. Whether these techniques are employed consciously or unconsciously is an important question if one is concerned about the psychology of those who use them; but it is not of consequence in assessing their effect—which is to encourage muddled thinking, the assumption of irrational guilt, contempt for politics and politicians, and the perpetuation of illusions about how international politics really work. If, as we are often told, the battle is for men's minds, these fraudulent techniques amount collectively to a formidable fifth column.

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MISCONCEPTIONS OF BRAZIL

By Gilberto Freyre

WHEN some foreign observers of Latin American affairs see the recent Brazilian crisis as a conflict between "feudals" and "reactionaries" on one side and "liberals" and "far-seeing leaders" on the other, a Brazilian may be inclined to think that they fail to understand that Brazil is a nation somewhat apart from neighboring Spanish American Republics. They insist on thinking of the Brazilian armed forces as if they were of the conventional Spanish American type and of Brazilian military leaders as if they were potential military dictators, eager for the first opportunity to enjoy the delights of absolute power. They write of a country which is going through a rapid—indeed, too rapid—process of industrialization and urbanization as if it were still dominated by feudal agrarian barons. Hence their use and abuse of expressions like "feudal," "reactionary," *"caudillismo"* in regard to modern Brazil.

It would be idiotic to deny that there are "feudal" survivals in Brazil or that there are "reactionaries" among Brazilians, just as there are some who are prominent in the United States, in France and even in Britain. Or, indeed, in Soviet Russia. But in present-day Brazil, as elsewhere, certain realities are so dynamic as to be far above conventional divisions between left and right, liberals and reactionaries. The conflict is too complicated to be described by such clichés. And it would entirely misinterpret the role of the armed forces in this as in previous conflicts in Brazilian life to call it "militaristic" or "rightist." For the political history of Brazil is almost as free of militarism, as well as of clericalism, as the history of the United States. There have been three or four Presidents of the Republic who were military leaders; but with only one exception they were not militaristic *caudillos* of the well-known Central American type, and one was so dominantly civilian in his behavior as to be a model in this regard. More than once the Brazilian Army has played—and may play again—the role of a super-partisan force; but without Bonapartism. Not to know this is to be ignorant of something essential in the character of the Brazilian people and in their political traditions.

Why is it so? Why have the Brazilians been so remarkably free from a plague that has been widespread in practically all Spanish

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America? Does it mean that Portuguese Americans are superior in virtue to their Spanish American neighbors? Not at all. The Portuguese who colonized Brazil were not so different psychologically, socially and culturally from the Spaniards who colonized Mexico, Peru, Venezuela and other parts of South and Central America; it was not this different descent which set Brazil apart from its sister nations. Some of Brazil's characteristics developed through its unique historical experience of having had a monarchical parliamentary form of government at the time when it became politically independent from Portugal. This contributed powerfully to the development of Brazilian national unity (in contrast to what happened in republican Spanish America); it also helped create a civilian political conscience, based on a regard for law and the constitution, not only among the Brazilian élites but among average Brazilian citizens.

It was the monarchy, established in 1822 at the same time as the nation, that worked together with a patriarchal system of family, economy and social organization to make the Brazilian society something unique on the American continent; and some of its characteristics were preserved when a Republic was established in 1889, doing away with what some republicans rhetorically described as "an exotic plant in the New World." Juridically and even politically the exotic plant disappeared; but sociologically it was preserved. When Brazil became a presidential Republic, some of the traits of a parliamentary monarchical system passed from a crowned monarch to a president with a top hat; indeed, he inherited the mystical prestige of his royal predecessors at the same time that he acquired a considerable addition of effective executive power. It was so because in a republic it was normally and legally so. Paradoxically, from a democratic point of view, the republican National Congress became more powerful than the crowned monarch had been; and some presidents abused the executive power in ways that Dom Pedro II had not. With these compensations, the new form of government went on doing essentially the same things the monarchy had done: preserving national unity; avoiding any contamination from militarism and *caudillismo;* avoiding, also, clericalism.

In this connection, another paradox should be noted. One of the first initiatives taken by the new leaders of the country was to separate church and state. Thereupon the church—not necessarily all the clergy—became more active, more dynamic and

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more influential in ethical and religious matters and in social service than it had been during the monarchical régime. The clergy ceased to be a bureaucracy depending upon the state as well as upon the ecclesiastical authorities and became a really religious group, dependent upon the Roman Catholic community—practically the entire nation.

Actually, some of the most liberal and democratic leaders or agitators in Brazilian history have been priests and military men. Priests and liberal-minded army officers took an active part in the movement for the abolition of slaves as well as in that for the establishment of the Republic. One of the local revolutions in Brazil prior to the establishment of the Republic in 1889 was that of 1817, which broke out in the Northeast region. It was a movement noted for its idealism and its fair methods, and most of its leaders were priests, some of whom became martyrs to the cause of liberalism and republicanism. It is no surprise, then, that at the present time priests and even bishops are among the champions of social reform in Brazil, including reforms of a quasi-socialistic character.

From 1808 to 1822 Brazil was the seat of the Portuguese monarchy; its King, John VI, was also King of Portugal and of the African and Eastern Portuguese Provinces. As King of Brazil he was the opposite of despotic—liberal, humane, progressive. His son, who became the first Emperor of Brazil with the name of Pedro I, was the romantic champion of Brazilian independence. The second and last Emperor of Brazil, Pedro II, was on the throne from 1840 to 1889; he became known as the head of a "crowned democracy." Some of his biographers and not a few historians have criticized Pedro II for his lack of martial enthusiasm. He very rarely wore a military uniform, usually going about in a long black coat and a black top hat. One of his preoccupations was to maintain legal order and political peace—peace at home and peaceful relations with neighboring republics. He also sought to avoid such rapid material progress that economic stability would be damaged, and to bring about a gradual transition from an agrarian, semi-feudal community to an agrarian-industrial one. He neglected to develop military activities in even a moderate degree; indeed, he was an almost Tolstoyan pacifist. This explains why Brazil was caught unprepared when it had to fight against *caudillos* of an aggressive Indo-Spanish American type such as Francisco Solano Lopez of Paraguay.

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It is paradoxical once again that in this regard the Republic corrected the Empire's deficiency; republican governments have paid more attention to armed forces and military preparations than the Empire did, though not to the point of becoming too preoccupied with such matters. Nor have the military leaders of Brazil taken advantage of this to become rivals of the civilian political leaders. There has been an occasional military leader with an urge of that sort, but he was always too isolated to become the founder or center of a military caste. As a result, the army in Brazil has been a distinctly democratic organization, interested in maintaining order and national unity, but always noted for its tendency to follow the great national goals whenever they are a clear expression of the popular will.

II

Crises such as the one that Brazil has just gone through should be understood and interpreted in the light of these and other paradoxes in its political and social history rather than on the basis of conventional notions about "Latin America." A supranational Latin American complex does exist, but inside it there are too many and too deep differences to be overlooked. The idea of using "right" and "left" as a valid antithesis to explain the conflicts in the national development of a people like the Brazilians is becoming increasingly archaic. It is as uncritical to do so as it is for extreme patriots to idealize events and depict Brazil as already an almost perfect political democracy.

Brazil is far from being a perfect political democracy. But, with all its imperfections, a political democracy it is. Its typical citizen is a democrat who has reached a high enough degree of political maturity to react as he did to crises like the one following Getulio Vargas' suicide and more recently that following Senhor Jânio Quadros' resignation. This reaction has made clear that Brazil's political development has far surpassed that of, for instance, Cuba. A large part of the Brazilian population is Negroid and another part is Indianoid, while a larger part is of European extraction—Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, German, Polish—with some persons of Japanese origin also. Brazil nevertheless seems in no danger of reacting to crises only emotionally or hysterically—*à la* Congo or *à la* Bolivia. Why? The answer seems to be found in its historical and sociological experience: it is an ethnic democracy that is developing into a stable political democracy, and it

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is able to do this thanks to its political training under a monarchical parliamentary régime.

Brazilian sociologists, anthropologists and historians do not have to respect the "odor of sanctity" that absolute patriots think should surround national institutions. But they recognize that, in some respects, Brazil, for a still young nation, has achieved important victories of self-control. It is not yet a Switzerland; far from it. But it does not behave as so many crudely immature national societies are doing in our day.

The fact that some newspaper critics are now writing about Brazil with the superiority assumed by sophisticated persons observing a large-sized banana republic seems to indicate that journalists might well receive a sort of sociological introduction to the history and modern condition of such exotic peoples as Brazilians: a nation which while being Latin American yet does not correspond in every point to accepted generalizations about Spanish American nations; a nation with its own ways of being national, of making its own mark in political sociology as well as in music, painting, architecture, literature and cooking. For the way in which Brazilians have reached—and are reaching—solutions to problems that for other nations have often meant civil war, revolution and unrest, such as the achievement of political independence, the abolition of slavery, change from a monarchical to a republican structure, separation of church and state—these are significant achievements.

The fact is that Brazil, basing itself on its own achievements in the field of political sociology, is endeavoring to find its own type of democracy—political, economic, social, ethnic—instead of passively following foreign models that, from a Brazilian point of view, are exotic, not natural, not in accord with Brazilian climate, traditions, customs. I include climate because tropical conditions seem to have much to do with Brazilian behavior, acting as a stimulant to tensions which are not just destructive in character but also are constructive. For Brazilians, there is no such thing as a "General Winter," either as an ally against foreign intrusion or as a trouble-maker in domestic matters. Instead, they have tropical sunshine as their regular collaborator; indeed, its presence is so constant in their lives, in all their contacts and activities—including political activities—that for some it comes to signify monotony instead of *joie de vivre*. For the most part, well adjusted Brazilians consider the constancy of sunshine, hence

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of informal contacts in the street and in cafés, of meeting in plazas, of open-air agitation, a part of their political way of being democratic, a defense of what is typically Brazilian.

Which type of government really corresponds most closely to Brazil's tropical climate and to predominantly Iberian traditions and customs—the presidential or the parliamentary? The answer has to do with the ethos of a people that loves good verbal debates about their political problems almost as much as good football. Republican parliamentarianism in Brazil is only an experiment; there is nothing definitive about it. Is it too optimistic to hope that perhaps with a parliamentary form of government similar to the one that the Brazilian people enjoyed during their monarchical period they will come to participate more, as active listeners, in the discussion of their national problems by their political representatives in Brasilia? Most of these discussions will be in the evenings, like the football games; and it may be that enthusiastic crowds will be attracted by competitive parliamentary debates in the modernistic buildings of the National Parliament.

It may also be that by following the parliamentary discussions certain publicists who write on Brazilian political and social subjects, sometimes systematically misinterpreting Brazilian behavior by trying to adapt it to their own conceptions of what all Latin American behavior should be, will acquire a better knowledge of those subjects. Parliaments have something of the sociological laboratory about them. To listen to parliamentary debates—especially in committees—is not always a waste of time: for journalists, interested only in news, it can give insight into the character of a people through an understanding of particular cases which concern them. Moreover, while it is true that under a presidential system the official documents emanating from the Executive are not always completely reliable, under a parliamentary system official documents do not come only from the Executive or from Congressional committees. There are numerous conflicting documents; not one truth only, but, *à la* Pirandello, several truths. Consequently there emerges, for those who seek the truth, a more complete perspective of the complex and somewhat contradictory Brazilian social and political reality.

At the basis of this reality lies a constant attachment to national unity and legal order, even, as it was with Goethe, a preference for injustice to disorder. An opposite attitude may be attributed to some Spanish Americans. This does not mean, however, that

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Brazilians dream of becoming a vast tropical Switzerland, so well ordered that every person and every thing, big and small, is exactly in its place. This is not their ideal. In common with other Iberian peoples they have an inclination to be anarchistic, utopian in their liberalism, excessively free from too strict obligations toward the state and toward political tradition. They are noted not only for their love of liberty but for their taste for novelty. At the same time they have a reasonable sense of order which some of their Spanish American neighbors lack. The Brazilian experiment in dictatorship with Vargas was curious, for all the time the dictator did his best not to behave as a dictator but as a constitutional president or constitutional monarch, a sort of Pedro the Third, who instead of being Braganza-Hapsburg was a somewhat timid *gaucho* from Rio Grande do Sul. His enthusiastic supporters never succeeded in making him a Brazilian replica of Napoleon.

One of the characteristics of Brazilians in their political sociology—as well as in their music, literature, cooking or foreign policy—is to be experimental while also remaining loyal to certain basic values of their past, a rare combination. One of those values is a mixture of legalism, pacifism and sense of order, a repudiation of illegal and violent solutions or situations. This explains why Vargas, while politically a dictator, did his best to remain sociologically a sort of constitutional monarch who accepted his position as a dictator less because of any desire for absolute power than for the sake of order and unity. For national unity—this should be repeated—is another value that Brazilians prize highly as an inheritance from the Portuguese and Catholic colonization and the monarchical experience.

Even today not a few Brazilians feel nostalgia for the period when Brazil was known as a "crowned democracy," and some of them seem to associate the political success of democracy in monarchical Brazil with parliamentary government. Personally I regard this as a mistake. I incline to think that Brazil was a political success as a monarchy not so much on account of its parliamentary form of government as in spite of it. Yet it is easy to understand, because of what this association of ideas represents to many Brazilians, why the recent change of their political régime from a presidential to a parliamentary republic is not so absurd as some foreign observers find it. For historical and psychological reasons many Brazilians accept the change as a sort of reintegration of Brazil into the genuinely Brazilian rhythm of political life.

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However, Brazil's present political leaders must take into consideration that neither at home nor in the world at large are conditions the same as they were in the nineteenth century when the country was a parliamentary monarchy. They have to keep in mind the failure of republican Spaniards to make Spain better as a political democracy than it had been as a constitutional monarchy; some of them expected too much from a mere change of political technique. Brazilians should not expect—and probably are not expecting—that the parliamentary form of government just introduced will present magical solutions for their most difficult problems. For instance, the parliamentary régime now will have to make a new foreign policy for Brazil; and both in regard to Africa and Asia and the Communist world it will necessarily be experimental and extremely difficult.

This policy is to be one of mediate action—or accommodation—between European and non-European cultures, between white and colored peoples or nations. Brazil is in an ideal position to accomplish this on account of the fact that it is, in spite of some imperfections, an advanced ethnic democracy; and though it is predominantly European in its main styles of civilization, its culture has also absorbed many African and some Asian values as well as considerable African Negro, Oriental and Amerindian blood in a large part of its population. If the present policy is to institute an effective system of closer relations between the new African and Asian nations and Brazil, it must be followed with tact and wisdom; for it implies both more independence for Brazil from older alliances and also her potential leadership of a new group of tropical nations with problems similar to the ones already on the way to solution among Brazilians.

At the same time, some Brazilians think that it would be idiotic for Brazil, as the potential leader of a possible confederacy of Portuguese-speaking peoples, located mainly in tropical regions similar in climate and ecology, and carrying through a similar process of social and ethnic amalgamation, to adopt the same indiscriminate policy of "anti-colonialism" in regard to Portuguese Africa as is now being followed by British and United States political leaders. Some Brazilians feel that there is a specifically Brazilian foreign policy to be followed. Most of the people of Portuguese Africa look to ethnically democratic Brazil as their natural leader—not to some sub-Nehru, of a darker skin than the Hindu liberator of Goa whose ideas often seem to Brazilians racist rather

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than democratic. Brazil is against not just one kind of racism—the European one—but the African and Asian kinds also.

Brazil's adoption of parliamentarianism was a happy way out of a dramatic crisis. When Senhor Jânio Quadros resigned the presidency after only seven months in office it was something so unexpected that he almost seemed to invite his fellow countrymen to venture into civil war. Never in the whole history of Brazil had a man so suddenly and so tragically revealed himself as inadequate to the responsibilities given him by the millions of Brazilians who had been impressed by his *charisma.* This *charisma* was destroyed in part by the charismatic individual himself. In 1954 Vargas was a suicide of the ordinary type (well studied from a sociological point of view by the Frenchman Durkheim). Senhor Quadros, in 1961, came close to destroying himself in a similar way, putting self-destruction on a psychological level, destroying his political soul. He disregarded the Brazilian preference for order, even when injustice to the weak is considered to conflict with order: order for the benefit of all, for justice, liberty and democracy.

A favorable interpretation of Senhor Quadros' dramatic resignation—and on this basis he may regain the confidence of some of his fellow-countrymen—is that he acted as an archaic follower of Don Quixote. He followed a Quixotic suggestion when he should have acted in the tradition of José Bonifacio, the sensible rather than flamboyant founder of the Brazilian nation, a scientist, not a demagogue, an idealist and also a realist.

Senhor Quadros apparently set the ideal of a utopian "defense of the weak" and an equally utopian and almost comical defense of "personal honor"—his own personal honor—against almost everybody—against Brazil, against Americans and against Democracy with a capital D. By doing this, and also by becoming too close an ally of the Cuban *caudillo,* Fidel Castro, he became a new type of politician in Brazil, in both a domestic and a foreign sense, and disappointed many of his fellow-countrymen. They had seen in him during his campaign for the presidency a sort of Brazilian Lincoln—the Brazilian Lincoln that he himself claimed to desire to be. But since conditions in Brazil are exceptionally bad at present from an economic as well as a political point of view, Senhor Quadros may be regaining some of his lost prestige. He may make himself again a sort of Don Quixote in circumstances that so far are not being dealt with in a satisfactory way by the conventionally realistic politicians now in power.

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Realistic politicians of a new and vigorous type may, however, be emerging in Brazil, and President Goulart may be one of them. They must become leaders in fact without much delay if they are to ward off in time somewhat mystical movements for the return of Senhor Quadros or the attraction of extremely radical solutions—demagogic or anti-demagogic—in foreign as well as in domestic policy. One feels the same about the announced Alliance for Progress as it relates to Brazil; in order to be effective against undesirable demagogic or anti-demagogic solutions, it has to become a visible reality without much delay. For instance, the Brazilian Northeast, the country's number one problem region, has recently been visited by so many official and semiofficial groups from the United States, without any significant positive results, that the matter is becoming the subject of humorous comments by some Brazilians.

If a well-planned agrarian reorganization of Northeast Brazil were to begin at once, on the basis of reliable studies already made, it is almost certain that the present Communist agitators there would be deprived of their arguments against democratic government and the inter-American system of coöperation. This reorganization should include a series of activities—such as irrigation and the directed migration of people from dry areas to humid ones—some of which the Northeast Development Agency (a special federal department) seems technically able to execute (provided the director refrains from choosing technical collaborators from Communists or quasi-Communists, who might use their technical activities for political purposes). At the same time, there would have to be direct American and European aid of a financial and technical nature toward the industrial development of the region—direct, that is, to regional public and private organizations and not through the slow federal bureaucracy of Brasilia and Rio. Because so little is being done at present, some industrialists of the Northeast who are in financial difficulties are being approached subtly by Soviet representatives offering the possibility of financial help directly to them and through them to the region as a whole. These representatives are using methods that should have been followed long ago by citizens of the United States. By dealing almost exclusively with the bureaucrats of Brasilia and Rio, the United States now seems to some observers to be repeating in Brazil the same mistakes it made in pre-Communist China.

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THE UNUSED POTENTIAL OF THE WORLD COURT

By George Cochran Doub

AS John Foster Dulles wrote in 1957, "There can never in the long run be real peace unless there is justice and law. Peace is a coin which has two sides: one is the renunciation of force, the other side is the according of justice."[1] World attention has too long been directed to one face of the coin at the expense of the other.

In attempting to build a structure for the organization of a peaceful world, the architects of the Charter of the United Nations put major emphasis upon peace-keeping and the renunciation of aggressive force in international relations. An animating principle of the Charter was that it pledged its members to forego the use of armed force save in the common interest or in self-defense, and to follow a policy of non-intervention in the affairs of other countries.

If that side of Mr. Dulles' coin does not shine brightly at present in the light of the aggressive tendencies of some nations, it cannot be said to have been because the Charter failed to lay explicit obligations upon its members to keep the peace. As we reflect upon the international instability that has been a feature of the sixteen years since the San Francisco Conference, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the lack of emphasis put on the duty to accord justice may have been a material contributing factor. Peace without justice is at best an uneasy truce. The price of peace without the means of obtaining justice may be excessive. If there is no reliable remedy for determining international disputes upon an objective and impartial basis, may it not be an illusion to suppose that a nation, suffering a serious wrong to its national interests, will forego the historic habit of using force?

Some might imagine that the members of the San Francisco Conference failed to appreciate that an effective means for achieving impartial judicial decisions was an essential component of the machinery for peace. Actually, they considered carefully the experience of the League of Nations in this regard; and in creating the International Court of Justice, they provided the needed instrument and assumed that nations would welcome and accept

[1] "War or Peace." New York: Macmillan, 1957.

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its jurisdiction. The Court was designated the "judicial organ of the United Nations," and the intention was that it should provide impartial justice as a substitute for political methods in resolving international disputes which are susceptible to judicial determination.

Unfortunately, membership in the United Nations did not involve compulsory acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction; each nation was left to decide this by its own voluntary action. All members of the United Nations are by Article 93, paragraph 1, of the Charter *ipso facto* parties to the statute of the Court. Article 36, paragraph 1, of the statute states that the jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it, and in practice this is generally done by a "special agreement" of reference filed with the Court. Its jurisdiction also includes all matters provided for in treaties or conventions in force. A state may recognize that the jurisdiction of the Court is compulsory in all legal disputes in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation.

In these circumstances, only 37 of the 104 members of the United Nations have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, and of these only 21 have adhered without significant reservations: Belgium, Cambodia, Republic of China, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, Haiti, Honduras, Japan, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand and Uruguay. Conspicuously absent from the roll of nations which have accepted the Court's jurisdiction are the states of the Communist bloc and most of the new nations of Africa. Some nations of the free world have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court subject to qualifications which demonstrate their reluctance to submit to its authority. Some of their reservations are not of major moment, such as the provision in the declaration of certain British Commonwealth states that jurisdiction shall not include disputes with other members of the Commonwealth. Others may exclude from the Court's authority disputes arising prior to the declaration. The reservations most prejudicial to the Court's authority are those of Mexico, Liberia, Portugal, Union of South Africa, Sudan and the United States of America, which reserve to each the right to decide for itself whether a dispute is subject to the Court's jurisdiction. Under the reciprocity clause of the Charter even the nations which have accepted the Court's com-

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pulsory jurisdiction without reservation may deny it in particular cases by asserting any reservation made by the other party to the dispute.

The failure of numerous nations to accept the Court's jurisdiction, the crippling reservations of others and a general disposition by diplomats not to seek a Court decision have left the community of nations with less than a reliable judicial remedy for the redress of actual or fancied wrongs to national interests. Many controversies have arisen which might have been susceptible of impartial jural determination. Yet in the course of the last 16 years nations have obtained only 19 decisions from the Court, and these have been insufficient to enable it to make conspicuous contributions to the development of international law.

An area of judicial authority of considerable significance is the Court's recognized power to render advisory opinions on legal questions to the United Nations itself. Too little has been said upon this subject. Article 96 of the Charter provides:

> 1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.
> 2. Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.

The exercise of this power to obtain an objective Court judgment upon an abstract legal question may be decided by member states which are not themselves parties to the dispute. Even if one or both of the contending parties wish by reason of self-interest or national policy to avoid a judicial determination, the other member nations are not subject to the same inhibitions. Thus the Charter opens up a broad avenue of approach to the judicial process where a legal issue may be resolved free of political interests or dialectics.

In spite of this, few requests for advisory opinions have been made. As of January 1961, the General Assembly had submitted to the Court only 9 questions and the Security Council had submitted none. UNESCO has requested the Court for one advisory opinion under Article 11, paragraph 2, of its Agreement with the United Nations, and this was rendered. All the other specialized agencies of the United Nations, with the exception of the Universal Postal Union, have been authorized by the General Assembly to request advisory opinions; but only the Inter-Govern-

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mental Maritime Consultative Organization has done so upon one occasion.

Each time a resolution to refer a case to the Court was being discussed, the objection was raised that such action would diminish the prestige of the General Assembly and that the issue in any event involved a political, not a legal, problem. Actually, any fear that the Court might attempt to resolve political problems should have been removed by the Court's own action. In each case where it has been contended that the question was political and not legal, the Court has declared that it is competent to answer legal inquiries only. Thus in its advisory opinion on the question of the admission of new members to the United Nations, it said:

> The Court cannot attribute a political character to a request which, framed in abstract terms, invites it to undertake an essentially judicial task, the interpretation of a treaty provision. It is not concerned with the motives which may have inspired this request, nor with the considerations which, in the concrete cases submitted for examination to the Security Council, formed the subject of the exchange of views which took place in that body. It is the duty of the Court to envisage the question submitted to it only in the abstract form which has been given to it; nothing which is said in the present opinion refers, either directly or indirectly, to concrete cases or to particular circumstances.

And in its opinion of July 11, 1950, as to the international status of South West Africa, the Court flatly declared that it was:

> . . . unable to deduce from [the general considerations drafted into the question submitted to it] any legal obligations for . . . states to conclude or to negotiate such agreements. It is not for the Court to pronounce on the political or moral duties which these considerations may involve.

The fact remains that nations have been reluctant to submit disputes to the Court by reason of their asserted belief that the disputes involved were political rather than justiciable. Even the mature nations of the Western world have often preferred to believe that an inherently jural issue, such as the interpretation of a treaty, represented in essence a political problem. In 1951, the General Assembly adopted a resolution against the United Arab Republic's interference with the use of the Suez Canal by Israeli ships. A preferable forum for decision would have been the Court, because even though its decision was not accepted (as happened in the case of the General Assembly resolution), it would have represented an objective authoritative judgment. In December 1960, the question was presented in the General Assembly whether certain member nations were obliged to participate in

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the cost of maintaining United Nations forces in the Congo. Although the question involved the interpretation of Article 43 of the Charter, no nation showed any disposition to refer the dispute to the Court. Just a year later, in December 1961, Acting Secretary General Thant announced that he would recommend to the General Assembly a resolution seeking such an opinion.

Now it is true that many controversies between nations do involve political issues not subject to judicial treatment (for example, the Kashmir boundary dispute between India and Pakistan), and that only those of a legal nature can be expected to be determined by the judicial process. Nevertheless, even disputes of a political character may include an underlying or pertinent legal issue, such as the interpretation of a treaty, which, if impartially and authoritatively resolved, may contribute to the settlement of the larger problems. If massive national interests are involved in a legal issue, political considerations, of course, become associated with the problem; but that identification would not appear to change the basic legal character of the issue.

It does not appear that nations have seriously objected to the Court's authority because of the fear that its decisions may not be impartial, as has sometimes been true in the arbitration process. Elihu Root pointed out half a century ago that the great obstacle to the general adoption of arbitration was not an unwillingness of civilized nations to submit their disputes to the decision of an impartial tribunal, but rather an apprehension that the tribunal selected would not be impartial or would produce an expedient diplomatic adjustment.

Assuming that this criticism of arbitration has been valid, it does not explain the reluctance of nations of the free world to submit their justiciable disputes for consideration by the International Court of Justice. That Court, as well as its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, has had a consistent record of impartiality. Its opinions have been of such a high order as to compare favorably with those of distinguished appellate courts of the most mature judicial systems, and under the stringent tests of legal criticism its judgments have received the widespread approval of lawyers and legal scholars. Accordingly, any inherent weakness of the arbitration process may not be deemed applicable to the International Court of Justice and does not adequately explain the reluctance of nations to submit their disputes for determination by it.

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The discouraging fact is that it is the just, not the unjust, decision, which is feared. Nations do not dread that the judicial process will produce an arbitrary or unsound decision but that it will develop the right one. If a nation believes that it has a sound, valid, legal position, it tends to welcome submission of a problem to the Court (unless its political implications seem too far-reaching). But if a nation deems its legal or equitable position to be weak, its leaders shrink from the risk of an adverse decision. They prefer to keep the dispute alive, to write *aide mémoires* demanding redress, with the idea in mind that perhaps years later the unresolved controversy may have value as a bargaining factor in the settlement of some other dispute. As a consequence, cases which are voluntarily submitted to the Court are generally limited to those where both nations are reasonably confident of the validity of their respective legal positions; and these necessarily are few.

A dramatic illustration of the fear of a judicial decision is found in the failure of Great Britain and France to seek a decision of the International Court of Justice as to the legal right of the United Arab Republic to seize the Suez Canal. They insisted and doubtless believed that the seizure was unlawful because it violated treaty commitments; yet in spite of Nasser's formal acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court they preferred not to risk a Court decision.

Historically, a principal reason why nations felt compelled to fulfill their treaty commitments or comply with established principles of international law has been the fear of armed retaliation. The effort to establish by treaty the doctrine of non-intervention and the denial by treaty of the use of force may now allow treaty obligations and accepted moral standards of conduct to be violated with impunity. As Sir Reginald Manningham-Buller wrote: "So one sees this very curious paradox: the very reluctance to employ force may lead to some nations which formerly would have feared to tear up treaties and repudiate obligations seeking now to do so. This in turn may lead to the conclusion that, if the rule of law is to be maintained throughout the world, such breaches of it cannot be permitted."[2] Obviously it is not enough to restrain the use of force and intervention, for, without further action, the consequence can be a further deterioration in the acceptance and development of basic principles of international law.

By itself, the renunciation of force may uphold peace but per-

[2] *American Bar Association Journal*, 1956, p. 1091.

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petuate wrongs, may exalt self-restraint but sanction lawlessness and disorder. Merely to ban the only available sanction for wrongs and oppression tends to compound them. So the effort to restrain the use of force seems quixotic when not accompanied by effective provision for an alternative, peaceful remedy assuring redress for wrongs inflicted or obligations violated. If there is no peaceful remedy for a serious violation of national interests, the use of force by those possessing the power to exercise it may become compulsive regardless of treaty commitments. It may be suggested that nations possessed of conspicuous military power are not as free to exercise it as in the past because of the possibility that its use may lead to catastrophic nuclear war. If this be true, it merely emphasizes that strong nations have as much need as weak ones for the peaceful alternative of a judicial remedy for one category of claimed wrongs.

Article 33, Sec. 1, of the Charter of the United Nations provides: "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice." Unfortunately, the qualification that the dispute must be one that endangers international peace and security has opened a wide door to evasion. Even in cases when the commitment has been plain, members of the United Nations have often seemed undisturbed by its violation.

It has been proposed as a principle of international law that a state should not be the sole judge of the lawfulness of its own conduct in disputes concerning the interpretation of a treaty or a question of international law. The negative statement that a nation may not unilaterally determine the lawfulness of its own acts necessarily implies an obligation to submit those acts to judicial or arbitral determination. It is a challenging task for the free world to continue developing this concept until it has become firmly established as a principle of international law. One method would be to continue the negotiation of bilateral and multilateral treaties providing that international disputes of a juridical nature shall be submitted for decision to the International Court of Justice or a comparable tribunal. The most natural and obvious method is for nations to accept the Court's obligatory jurisdiction.

In the United States, Presidents Eisenhower and Truman and

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Secretaries of State Acheson, Dulles and Herter have urged this course; they urged repeal of the crippling Connally reservation attached to the act of adherence to the jurisdiction of the Court. In 1959, France abandoned a substantial reservation after the Court had ruled in the *Norwegian Loan* case that, under the reciprocity provision of the statute, Norway was entitled to invoke the French reservation, and that accordingly the Court had no jurisdiction of the controversy. In Great Britain sentiment seems to be changing in favor of repealing its reservations. If these nations should now decide to assert leadership in an area in which they have been conspicuous laggards, others in the free world who have been hesitating might follow suit. The United States has been so intensely preoccupied with the recurrent problems of the cold war that its policy-makers may have failed to show sufficient interest in developing institutions which will strengthen the organization of the free world. Their very concentration on countering Soviet political, economic and military aggression seems to have led them to neglect problems and controversies within the free world and to make only half-hearted efforts to develop more effective procedures for settling them peacefully and justly.

The International Court of Justice may be unable to solve massive international disputes because of their domestic or political features; but it does provide one element which is essential in a well-rounded community—a means for peacefully deciding questions of fact and law. And even though the judicial process cannot cure the major ills of the world, it can deal with contributing causes of those ills and, in the process, develop higher standards of justice among nations. Those countries which have participated in the development over the centuries of the traditions of the civil and common law should particularly comprehend the significance of that process and give it support.

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ALBANIA AND THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT

By Stavro Skendi

THE conflict between little Albania and the Soviet Union is today at the center of the Soviet-Chinese rift. This first became apparent at the Bucharest Congress of June 1960, when of all the heads of Communist Parties of Eastern Europe only Enver Hoxha was absent. However, the clash between the two countries had been proceeding undercover for a long time. To understand its roots, let us first turn to Albanian-Jugoslav relations.

Contrary to what has recently been published in some American newspapers, the Albanian Communist Party was founded and organized in November 1941 by the Jugoslav Communist Party. It was brought under the control of the latter during the war, and there it remained until the Tito-Cominform break in 1948. When the Albanian Communist Party was freed from the Jugoslav grip, it began attacking Tito and the Jugoslav leaders as "deviationists" and "traitors." This continued up to Khrushchev's visit to Belgrade in June 1955. The Soviet leader's efforts to reëstablish friendly relations with Jugoslavia acutely disturbed the Albanian Communists. They feared that this might lead to a restoration of Jugoslav control in Albania, endangering not only their positions but perhaps also their lives. They moderated their attacks, but were cautious in expressing satisfaction at the reconciliation.

Then in February 1956 came Khrushchev's de-Stalinization speech. It was a great blow to the Albanian Communists, for it had been through Stalin's action that they had won independence from Jugoslavia and it was through Stalinist methods that they ruled the country. Soon they began to feel Khrushchev's pressure. In April–May 1956, according to Hoxha's later testimony, the Soviet leadership, through important persons like M. A. Suslov, principal theoretician of the Soviet Communist Party, and P. Pospelov, a member of its Central Committee, tried to persuade the Albanians to rehabilitate Koci Xoxe, who had been executed in 1949 as a Titoist. But Xoxe's case was not the same as that of the Hungarian Rajik or the Bulgarian Kostov. Xoxe, Hoxha's powerful rival, had in reality been a man of the Jugoslavs. To

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rehabilitate him would mean opening the door to Jugoslavia again and would involve the Albanian leaders in a degree of self-criticism which would jeopardize their positions. Tirana refused to rehabilitate Xoxe, and in May 1956 Hoxha accused him of having prepared "the political and physical extermination" of the leaders. "The accusation against Xoxe and his partisans," he concluded, "was well founded and the verdict of our Party and government totally just."

The Hungarian revolt of October 1956 brought bitter exchanges between Tito and Hoxha. Hoxha made no secret of the fact that he considered the Jugoslav leader responsible for Albania's domestic difficulties, as well as for those of the satellite countries. In an article in *Pravda* (November 8, 1956), he guardedly accused the Jugoslavs of being at the root of the Hungarian revolt. A few days later Tito, knowing well who at the Kremlin stood behind that article, attacked Hoxha personally in his now famous speech at Pula, describing him contemptuously as a person who "knows only how to say 'Marxism-Leninism' and not a word more." He struck at what he called "obdurate Stalinist elements" in various Communist Parties, and, in a pointed allusion to the Albanian régime, added that these elements believed that "people of the Stalinist cast would be found in the Soviet Union to assist them to maintain themselves on the back of the people."

To make matters worse for the Albanians, Khrushchev let them know what he had replied to Tito on November 9, 1956. As reported by Hoxha only last fall, the Soviet leader agreed with Tito that "now no particular importance should be given to the question whether the Jugoslav Embassy in Budapest acted rightly or not in giving asylum to Imre Nagy and his companions." He also expressed gratification that Tito agreed with him that Janos Kadar was the most suitable person to be the First Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party. This letter convinced the Albanian rulers that Khrushchev was on Tito's side.

At this juncture, collaboration was apparently established between the Tirana leadership and the Stalinists in the Kremlin, for on February 13, 1957, in the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party, Hoxha took up the defense of Stalin in the most laudatory terms—a unique instance in the Soviet bloc. Having admitted certain errors—the cult of personality and "violations of Soviet law"—he added: "In spite of all these mistakes, Stalin remains a great Marxist-Leninist. Stalin

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was never mistaken in such questions as the protection of the interests of the working class and of Marxist-Leninist theory, the fight against imperialism and other enemies of socialism. He was and remains an exemplary figure. Stalin's tragedy was that when he made these serious mistakes he thought that they were necessary for protection of the revolution." Hoxha's apologia was not directed against Tito alone; it was more an answer to Khrushchev.

II

The Albanian leader's speech in defense of Stalin not only involved his country in the struggle for power in the Kremlin but also injected an ideological content into the conflict with Khrushchev and Tito; and with time this was to be intensified.

It is not known whether the Albanians were the first to approach the Red Chinese, or vice versa. In any case, Jugoslav "revisionism" brought them into the open hand in hand. Since May 1958, the press of the two countries has never stopped denouncing Jugoslav revisionism, linking it often to the principle of peaceful coexistence. In the course of the strife, the ties between Tirana and Peking grew closer; the staff of the Chinese Embassy in Tirana was enlarged; frequent visits were exchanged; the Albanian press stopped reproducing articles of *Pravda,* and replaced them with those of *Jenmin Jih Pao,* the Communist Chinese organ.

The reason given for Hoxha's absence from the Bucharest Congress of 1960 was Khrushchev's decision to force the Parties of the Soviet bloc to accept his policy of peaceful coexistence. The Chinese were on hand, however, and held their own in opposition to the Soviet Premier. Since that time, the Tirana-Moscow rift has become steadily wider. Hoxha did not attend the General Assembly of the United Nations in the fall of 1960, where Khrushchev was escorted by the First Secretaries of the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe. Like Khrushchev, they all virtually ostracized Premier Mehmet Shehu, head of the Albanian delegation; on the other hand, Khrushchev had two talks with Tito. The conflict culminated in the meeting of the 81 Communist Parties in November 1960 in Moscow, when Hoxha, according to reports, denounced Khrushchev as "a traitor to the Communist idea, a weakling and a revisionist," and the Soviet leader retorted that Hoxha was going to pay for the offense. Thus the personal element in the antagonism was reinforced.

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III

In the Communist world, conflicts have to take an ideological form even when the real motives may be the interests of individuals or groups or the power politics of countries. The February 1961 Congress of the Albanian Communist Party reflected this fact clearly.

Although he inclined toward the Chinese viewpoint, Hoxha made efforts in his address—a good example of Communist double-talk—to show that he abided by the Moscow Resolution of November 1960, which was a compromise solution. The Marxist-Leninists did not deny the possibility of the peaceful road to socialism, he said; they simply did not understand it at all as a negation of class struggle. He then attacked Jugoslav revisionism.

P. Pospelov, the director of the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow, was the chief of the Soviet delegation. Taking the Moscow Resolution of November 1960 as a clear Marxist-Leninist program of action of the international Communist movement, he advocated the principle of peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems, stressing that life itself had demonstrated that this "Leninist principle" was the only just and reasonable principle in international relations. He then came to the point: "Now the question is posed thus—either peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war. There is no other way." The war against revisionism, he said, remained an actual and important task of the Communist Party, but he called also for a tireless war on the other dangers—dogmatism and sectarianism.

Li Hsien-nien, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of China, who headed the Chinese delegation, praised Albania as the vanguard of the war against the enemies of socialism and a strong support for the preservation of Marxist-Leninist purity. He said that the Albanian Communist Party, basing itself on the principle of close connection between the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism and its own practice in the country, had applied and developed Marxism-Leninism in a creative manner. Red China, he continued, regarded the successes of the Albanian Party and people as her own. He then added: "As long as imperialism exists, there exists also the foundation for aggressive wars. The danger is not yet over, and imperialism, with the United States at the head, may give rise to a new world war. . ." He acknowledged the superiority of the Soviet Communist Party,

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but he also declared that the Communist Parties of all countries are independent and equal, although responsible to the interests of the international proletariat. This unequivocal ideological support of the Albanian leadership on the part of Red China was accompanied by substantial material aid—a considerable quantity of wheat and a credit of 112.5 million new rubles—at a time when China itself was in great economic need.

IV

What, then, compelled Khrushchev to make a frontal attack on the leaders of the Albanian Communist Party at the 22nd Congress in Moscow? Did he hope that an open offensive would succeed where internal and external pressures had failed?

It appears that in 1960 the Soviet Party was earnestly concerned about the situation in Albania. The Albanian leaders, tied more and more closely to China, were growing more and more aggressive. There have been reports that the Soviet Ambassador in Tirana, Ivanov, endeavored to create a pro-Soviet faction, or at least a pro-Soviet current in the Albanian Communist Party, which could exercise pressure on Hoxha and Shehu. The leaders of this movement were Koço Tashko, president of the Auditing Commission of the Party and a former envoy to U.S.S.R., and Liri Belishova, an old Communist and a member of the Central Committee of the Party. In September 1960 they were dismissed from their responsible positions and arrested. Their fate is not known; Belishova was mentioned as an enemy of the Party in Hoxha's speech of November 8, 1961, but Tashko's name has been completely ignored. The fact that the Congress of the Albanian Communist Party was twice postponed (it finally took place in February 1961) was almost certainly due to domestic troubles. If it is true that Rear Admiral Temo Sejko and his companions, executed in May 1961, were also involved in the movement—Tirana's accusation that he was conspiring with Greece, Jugoslavia and the American Sixth Fleet to overthrow the régime is unconvincing—the Soviet attempt must have utterly failed. In any event, in January 1961 a new Soviet Ambassador, J. V. Shikin, arrived at Tirana, welcomed only by the Chief of Protocol of the Foreign Ministry, and four months later the Soviet submarines left their base on the island of Sazan (Saseno), opposite Vlorë.

Then came pressure from outside. The Soviet Union stopped abruptly all material and technical help to Albania and withdrew

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its experts and advisers. The satellites followed suit. Albania was ignored in the press of the Soviet bloc, and Khrushchev, in an interview, pointedly refrained from mentioning Albania as an ally, despite its continued membership in the Warsaw Pact.

Obviously, in attacking the Albanian leadership, Khrushchev had more in mind than the expulsion of Albania from the Communist bloc. He wanted also to strike at its ally China and other potential dissidents. But how could he expect China to recant? Although it was in economic straits and needed Soviet assistance, China was also a great power and could not allow itself to be humiliated. Chou En-lai, quickly and firmly, contested Khrushchev's right to make a one-sided public denunciation of a member of the Communist bloc. He also insisted on the observance of the principle of consultation and complete equality among members, thus questioning Moscow's leadership of the international Communist movement.

The Albanians, too, were swift to pass to the counter-offensive. Explaining why they had not been invited to the 22nd Congress in Moscow, Hoxha declared that the Albanian Party's words "would bring into the open the truth about Albanian-Soviet relations, would unmask his [Khrushchev's] anti-Marxist viewpoints and actions, would reject all his slanders and entirely unfounded accusations." It is possible that the Soviet Premier's personal hatred for Hoxha and Shehu was a factor in his miscalculation.

V

It is puzzling to see insignificant little Albania challenging the mighty Soviet Union. What is the secret of its strength? Is the régime capable of continued resistance?

The two strong men in Albania today are Hoxha and Shehu. Hoxha, who is in his mid-fifties, stems from a petty bourgeois family of southern Albania. He did graduate work in the natural sciences and later law in France and Belgium, but completed neither course. He is intelligent, pleasant in company, and good at telling stories, to which a slight stutter adds a certain charm. Molotov once described him to Stalin as "quite cultured, but you feel Western influence in his upbringing." Although flexible, he does not lack courage, which he showed early in the wartime resistance movement. Until then, he was unknown abroad and in Albania was a second-rank leader in Korçë's Communist group. It was the Party that built him up and popularized his name.

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Shehu, who is five years younger than Hoxha, comes from a religious family background; his father was a sheikh. Educated in military schools in Albania and Italy, he left for Spain while still an officer in the Albanian army. There he became commander of one of the battalions of the international Garibaldi Brigade. Upon his return to Albania in 1942, he joined the Communist underground and became known as the bravest and most feared guerrilla leader. In 1945–46 he attended the "Voroshilov Military Academy" in Moscow and soon after was appointed Chief of Staff of the Albanian army. Dismissed from that position in February 1948, reportedly because of his opposition to a demand by Tito for the stationing of two Jugoslav divisions on Albanian territory, he came under Xoxe's eye. Shehu, who favors radical solutions, is a capable but ruthless person.

Between Hoxha and Shehu there was a sharp rivalry in the early 1950s, but common danger forced them to patch up their differences and join forces. By gradual purges in the Party and army, facilitated by the developing conflict with the Soviet Union, they succeeded in acquiring a strong grip over both.

The territory of Albania has been coveted by its neighbors for so long that the Albanian people have grown suspicious of all of them. The present régime has often exploited this popular feeling in order to strengthen its position. For example, in the spring of 1960, when Sophocles Venizelos wrote in the Athens papers that Khrushchev was going to speak to Hoxha about improving conditions of the Greek minority in southern Albania, he gave Hoxha another reason for not attending the Bucharest Conference that year. Before World War II this Greek minority amounted to approximately 35,000 and Greece has always used it as a reason to claim the southern part of Albania, which it calls Northern Epirus.

Albania's geographic isolation from the Soviet bloc, which in the past was a drawback, has now become an advantage. As none of the satellite countries borders on Albania, the U.S.S.R. is at a disadvantage in undertaking direct or indirect action against it. But Albania's greatest strength, of course, lies in her alliance with China, since the Soviet Union has to take into account China's reaction to any contemplated step.

On the other hand, the Tirana régime is confronted with serious dangers. Albania has never been a self-sufficient country, and for years was sustained by the economic aid of the Soviet Union and

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its satellites. True, China has come to its assistance but, so far, not on the scale to which it had become accustomed. There are unfinished projects which the Chinese cannot complete because of lack of specialized personnel. Unemployment is likely to ensue. Moreover, Albania's trade was almost entirely with the Soviet bloc; now it must look for new markets. Some may be found in Italy, with which a trade agreement for approximately $8,000,000 was signed December 6, 1961, about two months after Khrushchev's attack on the Albanian leadership.

For the moment there appears to be no fear of a direct attack by neighbors. Much as Tito detests the Albanian leaders, it is doubtful that he could be induced by Khrushchev to invade Albania, under any pretext—even a "war of liberation." However, Jugoslavia might find a more subtle way of overthrowing Hoxha's régime: by infiltrating Albanian bands formed in Jugoslavia. The Jugoslav autonomous region of Kosmet (Kosovo and Metohija), bordering on Albania, is preponderantly inhabited by Albanians. The Secretary of the Communist Party in that region has been for many years Dusan Mugosa, a Jugoslav who was one of the founders of the Albanian Communist Party and the military boss of the Albanian Communist guerrilla bands during the whole period of the war. He has been continuously gathering intelligence on the situation in Albania and has not lost touch with Albanian fugitives in Jugoslavia. As a collaborator he can call on General Panajot Plaku, a former Under-Secretary of Defense, who fled Albania in 1956.

Yet if the plan to infiltrate Albania were carried out, it might have serious consequences. Albania, if not yet expelled from the Warsaw Treaty, would certainly appeal to the other members to respect their obligations, thus putting the treaty to a test. What would Red China's reaction be? Would it send military support to Albania? Would it appeal to the world Communist movement?

To expect that a way out of the Albanian impasse might be found by an understanding between the Soviet Union and China for a "reformed leadership" (according to Khrushchev's wishes) is unrealistic. In fact, the main defect of the Moscow Resolution of 81 Communist Parties is that it is not so much a compromise as only the semblance of a compromise. A general Sino-Soviet compromise on Albania would presuppose a closeness of views between the two powers; but what we witness today is a deepening of the split.

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SINGAPORE: PROBLEM CHILD

By William P. Maddox

FLANKING the sea artery connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and virtually linking the Asian mainland with the Indonesian archipelago, the island of Singapore occupies a strategic position in southeastern Asia. Toward its 220 square miles of territory have converged races from all the Orient, but especially the southern Chinese in their ubiquitous quest for commercial opportunities. When Sir Stamford Raffles established a trading post near the Singapore River on February 6, 1819, the island's only inhabitants were a few hundred Malays. Four months later, however, he wrote: "From the number of Chinese already settled, and the peculiar attraction of the place for that industrious race, it may be presumed that they will always form the largest part of the community." Today, some 75 percent of Singapore's million and three-quarters inhabitants are Chinese—the largest urban concentration anywhere of overseas Chinese.

Undisturbed by British colonial authorities in respect to language, schooling and customs, the Singapore Chinese established an exclusive cultural community and readily absorbed new hordes of immigrants over the years. Their ancestral ties and affections have habitually pulled them toward the homeland. Like most Chinese, they adjudge their culture to be of a superior order (especially vis-à-vis the Malay); moreover, since the advent of the Communist régime, they are proud of the great strides Mainland China has made and of its new stature as a world power. During the past three years, the English-educated Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, has made energetic propagandist efforts to create a Malay image and to infuse elements of a Malayan culture; but the majority of Singapore Chinese—those schooled in the Chinese medium, plus the illiterate—have shown little evidence of modifying their basic emotional orientation. Indeed, they receive daily nourishment in that direction from the two main Chinese newspapers (with circulations larger than any others outside the Chinese Mainland), as well as from Radio Peking, whose programs come in more clearly than any other foreign broadcast.

The Mainland's wide attraction for the Chinese masses in Singapore causes understandable anxiety in the West. The island is

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strategically important, for it is the seat of British Defense Headquarters for the Far East, and of the only British naval base east of Aden. The United States Forces in the Pacific maintain close liaison with this Headquarters, and vessels of the Seventh Fleet visit the base periodically. South Viet Nam, just 500 miles to the north, is under heavy pressure from Communist guerrilla forces actively supported by North Viet Nam and, at least morally, by Peking. A few miles south of Singapore begins the outermost fringe of a myriad of islands comprising Indonesia, where the Communists remain a constant threat. Should the Communists win out in South Viet Nam or Indonesia, the elements in Singapore which urge the Chinese to activate their sympathies for the Mainland would be emboldened to move more vigorously, and they might achieve results. For quite apart from the sentimental predilections of the Chinese for the Mainland, they are a practical-minded people, quick to adapt themselves to new political permutations, and the expediency of accepting control from Peking might appeal to them.

II

Other factors besides the cultural proclivities of the Chinese population make the Singapore problem important for the West. Like other Asiatic areas, Singapore has been caught up in the revolutionary currents which have accelerated the collapse of colonial empires and shaken the foundations of feudal and capitalistic economies everywhere. The emerging Malayan nationalism of the region failed to take root in Singapore because it lacked an ethnic and cultural basis, but anti-colonialism and socialism did actively appear there and gave a powerful impulse to demands for far-reaching social and political change. Socialism, ranging from vague sentimentalism to doctrinaire Marxism, found strong favor especially among students in the Chinese-medium schools and among trade unionists. When, emboldened by Mao Tse-tung's successes, the Communists made a direct bid for power in the Malayan peninsula and plunged it into a decade of bitter guerrilla warfare, Singapore Reds developed their own terrorist campaign. Exploiting Chinese chauvinism in the Middle Schools and labor movement, they instigated an activist propaganda drive which manifested itself in strikes, intimidation, sabotage, arson, riots and murder. A series of turbulent episodes culminated in 1956 in student strikes in which 13 were killed and 140 injured.

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In consequence, the Lim Yew Hock government jailed a number of ringleaders and the Singapore "hotbed" temporarily cooled off.

Meanwhile, the pro-Communist elements had found sympathetic support within the leftist-opposition People's Action Party (P.A.P.) under Lee Kuan Yew, an intellectual socialist who dubs himself a non-Communist but not an anti-Communist. The P.A.P. seized on the issue of imprisonment without trial (as permitted under security legislation) and clamored for the release of the trouble-makers. As a vote-getting device, this was soon to be put to the test. For the decision had been taken in London in 1958 to authorize a new constitution to establish an internally self-governing State of Singapore; and elections for the first Legislative Assembly were held May 30, 1959.[1] The P.A.P. obtained 54 percent of the popular vote, but thanks to the fragmentation of the opposition it converted this into 43 of the 51 Assembly seats. As a condition to becoming Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew demanded, and secured, the last British Governor's acquiescence in the immediate release of eight of the detainees, including the arch-leaders Lim Chin Siong and Fong Swee Suan. After Lee assumed office on June 5 he named Lim, Fong and others to sinecures as "political secretaries" under cabinet ministers. Thus the two key extreme leftist and chauvinist leaders in Singapore were not only physically free but also (despite vague pledges to the Prime Minister of good behavior) strategically positioned to resume their political activities.

Lee Kuan Yew apparently did not view the appointments in that light: he had no intention of giving Communists a free hand. He believed that Lim Chin Siong had been chastened by his imprisonment and could, with due precautions, be given an opportunity to prove himself under the surveillance of a trusted minister. It was not until a year later that the Prime Minister became convinced (as he admitted on September 22, 1961) that Lim was only "playing a game for the Communist cause" and that, indeed, he was "the most important open front leader of the Malayan Communist Party."

The confidence of business elements in Singapore had nevertheless been shaken, and they precipitated certain capital movements northward to the Malayan Federation. But during 1960,

[1] The independent State of Singapore came into being on June 3, 1959. The United Kingdom retains responsibility for foreign affairs and defense, and the right to suspend the constitution. Internal security is controlled by a joint Council composed of three British representatives, three from Singapore, and one from Malaya.

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the P.A.P. on the whole gained respect as it showed an increasing sense of responsibility. True, Chinese chauvinism was not being appreciably affected by the "Malayanization" program, and its educational citadel, Nanyang University, stubbornly resisted the Government's efforts to institute controls. Moreover, Communist elements were steadily infiltrating into influential positions in key trade unions and becoming increasingly militant. But faced with the hard facts of Singapore's economic life, the Government somewhat belatedly suspended legislation favorable to extremist union elements and set up industrial arbitration procedures along Australian lines. Work was started on an Economic Development Plan, grants and loans were obtained from the United Kingdom, and a program to attract new industries was speeded up. At the end of 1960, Lee Kuan Yew impressed many observers as having turned out to be a reasonably moderate statesman. This, of course, considerably lessened his popularity with the leftist-inclined Chinese masses. But he was secure in his overwhelming legislative majority and seemed determined to promote Singapore's economic growth and maintain political stability.

III

The cautious optimism of 1960 faded in the mounting political tension of 1961. As a result of a bitter personal clash between the Prime Minister and Ong Eng Guan, an ousted P.A.P. Minister, Ong resigned from the Assembly; and in a by-election in April he defeated the Government by such a majority that it seemed as though Lim Chin Siong and his pro-Communist associates must have committed political sabotage. The facade of P.A.P. solidarity—in reality, an uneasy coalition between English-educated socialists and Chinese chauvinists and extreme leftists—had begun to crack. The fissure was finally burst completely asunder in a second by-election in July, made necessary by the death of a P.A.P. member. The Government lost to David Marshall, once Chief Minister and now a political lone wolf, who was openly supported by 13 P.A.P. Assemblymen, abetted by Lim Chin Siong, who together with a number of P.A.P. district workers proceeded to form a new party, called Barisan Socialis (Socialist Front), with Lim in a key position of Secretary-General. Within the space of a few months, the P.A.P. had lost two seats in by-elections and 15 through defections (two Assemblymen had left the Party with Ong); its supporters in the Assembly had dwin-

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dled from 43 to 26, or a majority of one in a body of 51. Seven moderates in the Opposition were deemed likely either to abstain or to support the Government in any crucial contest. Whatever comfort Lee Kuan Yew might obtain from such parliamentary computations, it seemed possible that in any general election at this moment Lim Chin Siong and his Barisan Socialis might emerge with the largest number of votes.

The cardinal issue which had provoked the P.A.P. schism was precipitated by the Prime Minister of the Malayan Federation, Tunku Abdul Rahmin, when in a speech on May 27, 1961, he expressed the hope that Singapore, Malaya and the British territories in Borneo would find a basis for "closer understanding" and "political and economic coöperation." Despite the nebulous phraseology, it was recognized that for the first time the Tunku had publicly endorsed the idea of a Singapore-Malayan "merger" which for years had been accepted by all parties in Singapore as a long-range goal. No one had any doubts as to what Prime Minister Lee's reaction would be: on June 3, in a speech celebrating National Day, he gave his enthusiastic approval. On the other hand, Lim Chin Siong and his associates began a political intrigue which a month later led to the P.A.P. open rebellion. For although they also had been advocates of merger, they had not looked for it to occur while the Tunku was Prime Minister, but only after extreme left-wing régimes had emerged both in Singapore and Malaya. Given the tough, energetic policies which the Tunku had pursued against Communists and subversives, Lim and his friends suspected that the transfer of security powers to the Malayan Federation might amount to their political death-warrant. They decided to resist with all the resources at their command.

IV

The issue thus raised has produced Singapore's stormiest political controversy in years; in addition it could, under certain conditions, lead to outbreaks of violence. Before following it further, however, we must inquire into the background of the Tunku's unexpected action.

The Tunku had always adamantly opposed the absorption of Singapore into the Malayan Federation for realistic ethnographic, cultural, political and economic reasons. Himself a Malay and Moslem, and head of a Malay-dominated political party, his atti-

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tude was understandable. The combined Chinese population of the two states would total nearly 4,000,000 as against a slightly smaller number of Malay; thus the whole structure of Malay-Moslem culture and control in the peninsula could be jeopardized. Moreover, having only recently ended a long struggle against Communist guerrilla activity, the Tunku was in no mood to assume responsibility for the Singapore "hotbed" of left-wing agitators, subversives and militant trade unionists—or for its endemic and increasingly severe unemployment problem. As he tersely put it to press correspondents on November 16, Singapore is a "problem child;" clearly, he had no wish to become its foster parent.

At the same time, the Tunku had to recognize that it was impossible to ignore the "problem child" or to stand by while the conditions which helped create its problems progressively deteriorated. However inviting a policy of mutual "insulation" might seem, it was unthinkable for two societies so closely bound together. As a separate, autonomous state, Singapore cannot, except under substantially changed conditions, maintain its economic viability indefinitely. Depending as it does on its position as an entrepot for Southeast Asia, notably Malaya and Indonesia, Singapore is adversely affected by the surging economic nationalism of new states eager to establish their own direct trading facilities. So far the port has held its own, but the future is gloomy. Also, with a high birth rate and the lowest death rate in Asia, the population is increasing at a rate of 3½ percent annually. Unemployment is something over 50,000, while if the underemployed were considered, the figure would come close to 100,000, one-fifth of the island's potential work force. Obviously, Singapore must develop an expanding economy to provide employment not only for the current jobless but for the thousands entering the labor market each year. And the peak of this annual increase will not be reached for another year or so, when children born during the population explosion just following the war attain maturity. In these circumstances, no wonder leftist politicians vie with one another in "promising the moon."

The gravity of the situation has led the Government to undertake an industrialization program in the hope of enlarging employment opportunities. Legislative and other inducements have been offered prospective foreign investors, and some new enterprises have been established. But the relatively (for Asia) high

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wage levels, the militant trade union movement, the uncertain political climate and the lack of a hinterland market have not offered much encouragement. Clearly, there is no easy solution. But if—as the Tunku doubtless came to feel—Singapore were absorbed into the Federation, some of the difficulties retarding industrialization might be relieved. At the very least, joint economic planning, with sacrifices on both sides, might help to stimulate a more wholesome development in Singapore, benefiting the Federation as well.

It was not easy for the Tunku to reach his decision in respect to a merger. His distrust of the radical P.A.P. and of Lee Kuan Yew was only slowly dissipated (partly, it may be noted, through the medium of the golf course!). And then in April 1961, after the by-election rout at the hands of Ong Eng Guan, the P.A.P. appeared to be crumbling under extreme left-wing pressures. In face of the Communist threat, Prime Minister Lee became more resolutely convinced that merger with the Federation was the only solution for Singapore; while on his part, the Tunku, doubtless concluding that only his intervention could save Singapore from the extremists, moved closer to a decision.

Still of paramount importance, however, was the Tunku's fear that an enlarged Federation would fall under Chinese control. He found a solution in the scheme of federation with the British dependencies in Borneo—Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo. In those areas, out of a total population of a million and a quarter, the Chinese outnumber the Malay and other Moslems some 350,000 to 275,000; but the balance would be redressed, the Tunku figured, by the remaining indigenous peoples. True, the level of political sophistication was low, and burdens of existing socio-economic developmental programs would have to be assumed. But, on the positive side, the region's natural resources included oil in Brunei (second to Canada in Commonwealth production) and vast tracts of virgin timber in North Borneo; while an expanding market in Borneo would await Malaya's rapidly growing industrial production.

If Britain agreed to the transfer of the dependencies to the Federation as member states, the Singapore merger idea would be enlarged into the more glamorous concept of "Greater Malaysia." In such a configuration, the Malay and indigenous peoples combined would outnumber the Chinese. Moreover, a Greater Malaysia would increase the stature and strength of a free Ma-

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layan society in Southeast Asia. The Tunku made his fateful decision, and Singapore was soon thereafter embroiled in political battle.

V

Since the Legislative Assembly was not due to meet until the autumn, Prime Minister Lee could ignore the Barisan Socialis rebels for the time being and concentrate his attention on discussing the merger. On August 23 the two Prime Ministers agreed on general principles and named working parties to develop them more explicitly. The next step was for the Tunku to consult with the British Government. In November, he met with Prime Minister Macmillan and reached agreement to set up a commission of inquiry on the proposals affecting Sarawak and North Borneo and to apply their existing defense arrangement to Britain's naval base at Singapore, so that Britain could make such use of the base as it considered "necessary . . . for the preservation of peace in Southeast Asia."

Meanwhile, the Singapore Assembly had convened and been presented with the Government's "Memorandum Setting Out Heads of Agreement for a Merger between the Federation of Malaya and Singapore."[2] Although some of the provisions had been known before, this was the first time they had been published in full. Briefly, they called for the admission of Singapore into the Federation as a State "but on special conditions and with a larger measure of autonomy than the other States." Defense, external affairs and security would be the responsibility of the Federation, education and labor that of Singapore. The island-State would be represented in the Federation Parliament by two senators and "on a fair balance of interest," by 15 members in the lower House. This figure was a compromise between the 19 initially demanded by Premier Lee and the 12 proposed by the Tunku.

During the debate, which lasted several weeks, the Barisan Socialis vigorously assailed the Memorandum, chiefly on the issue of unequal representation (making the Chinese what they called second-class citizens) and the transfer of the internal security power to the Federation. For tactical reasons it did not oppose merger in principle, but called for "complete" merger and the full equality of Singapore with the other member states. The P.A.P.

[2] Cmd. 33 of 1961, Government Printer, Singapore.

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replied that complete merger would not accord with political realities and would deny Singapore the contemplated special privileges, including those in regard to the control of education and labor, and citizenship. As to the latter, it pointed out that under complete merger hundreds of thousands of Singaporeans would be deprived by Federation law of Malayan citizenship on grounds either of alien birth or of inability to speak Malay; whereas, under the "special status," all Singapore citizens would automatically become nationals of the Federation.

The Assembly debate ended on December 8 with a vote of 33 to 0 approving the Government's motion in support of the Memorandum. Not unexpectedly, Lim Yew Hock and six other opposition moderates voted affirmatively. All the members of the Barisan Socialis and the remaining opposition walked out before the vote was taken.

This did not signify that the merger issue had been settled. The Prime Minister has repeatedly asserted that, as a final step, he would submit it for approval in a popular referendum. Should he proceed with his plan, the outcome would be uncertain and the results either way might be serious. A P.A.P. victory might well be greeted with a wave of strikes and other forms of direct action; a defeat might precipitate a general election and relegate the merger issue to the dustbin indefinitely.

Meanwhile, the Malaysian Solidarity Consultative Committee, composed of legislative delegates from all five constituent units of the proposed "Greater Malaysia," has met and reached agreement on constitutional arrangements. In addition, the joint British-Malayan commission of inquiry, established in November "to ascertain the views of the peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak" towards merger, has entered upon its task. Consultations will also be held with the Sultan of the Brunei Protectorate. Regardless of the referendum verdict in Singapore, the Tunku is hopeful that his proposal to incorporate the three Borneo territories into the Federation will be accepted. Whatever advantages might accrue from this merger, however, the "Grand Design" would fail of its principal purpose if Singapore remained aloof.

VI

If Singapore had not had such an overwhelming characteristic of "Chinese-ness" the natural course of events since the war would doubtless have led to its being identified with the Malayan penin-

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sula. The question of its economic viability as a separate entity would not have arisen; the militancy and radicalism of its population would have been subjected to the stricter discipline of Federation authorities. As it is, the growing strength and belligerence of the Peking régime have made Singapore's "Chinese-ness" into a problem of international dimensions. Lim Chin Siong, the glamor boy of China-oriented left-wingers, is not simply a contender in domestic politics; he is also a potential instrument of Peking's foreign policy. He may or may not be a card-carrying Communist, but it is generally agreed that his utterances and record stamp him as one who follows the Communist line. Many believe that his accession to the Prime Ministership would cast one more chip into the scales against the West in the cold war.

True, the United Kingdom controls foreign relations and defense, participates in the Internal Security Council, and retains the right to suspend the Constitution. But it has played a cautious role and would be reluctant to exercise authority in opposition to the Singapore Government's wishes, knowing that any action susceptible of being construed as interference would stir up inflammable "anti-colonialist" protests. It might feel compelled to invoke its ultimate power, but in light of the experience in British Guiana and of the certain Afro-Asiatic clamor that would arise in the United Nations, nothing short of the gravest extremity would impel such British action.

Should the merger be accomplished, the residual British authority in regard to defense and security would be transferred to the Federation of Malaya, which would be less vulnerable to attacks by the anti-colonialists. However, with Singapore retaining jurisdiction over education and labor, the prospect would be dim for breaking down Chinese chauvinism or for controlling the militant trade unions. Clearly, in inheriting Singapore's political volatility and economic difficulties the Federation would not be taking on an enviable task.

The basic purpose facing a "Greater Malaysia" must be to achieve a reasonable degree of harmony between Malayans and Chinese, which would include acceptance by the latter of their destiny within a traditional Malay-Moslem culture. Singapore itself would benefit substantially from the realization of this purpose. Moreover, the enlarged Malaysian Federation thus created would constitute a valuable counterpoise against an advance of Communism in Southeast Asia.

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THE NEW SWISS MILITARY CAPABILITY

By George A. Codding, Jr.

AT a time when the NATO nations are having serious trouble in pulling their forces together to meet the Soviet threat in Berlin, the possibility that three new, well-equipped, well-manned divisions might act in concert with them in case of an attack on Western Europe opens up an attractive prospect. Three such divisions are already in process of being formed; they are not being formed by one of the 15 nations in the NATO alliance, but by little, neutral Switzerland on its own initiative and at its own expense.

Switzerland is not a signatory to the NATO treaties, nor is it likely that it will become one, at any rate in the foreseeable future. Devotion to a long and fruitful policy of neutrality is too strong among the Swiss for such a drastic break in tradition. The Swiss authorities would certainly deprecate references to Switzerland even as a potential ally. That, nevertheless, is what recent developments imply. An awareness of the changes since World War II in the art of warfare and in the international political situation led the government of Switzerland in 1960 to a decision which will make its forces more of a factor in the general defenses of Western Europe than they ever have been in the past.

The virtues of neutrality were discovered by the Swiss almost 500 years ago when their previously invincible troops were seriously defeated by a French army equipped with what was then the newest military technique, accurate artillery. Realizing that more harm than good would come from further participation in the continuous wars of that epoch, the old Swiss Confederation renounced all political or military alliances and proclaimed that henceforth it would remain aloof from the power struggle.

The decision was a good one for Switzerland. She continued to supply mercenaries to any army that could afford them, but she was spared the wholesale destruction which marked most of the succeeding conflicts, including the bloody Thirty Years War. At one point she received subsidies for her neutral army from both Austria and France. The only major exception occurred when she was invaded by French revolutionary forces, and with Napoleon's rise was forced to become his ally in his attempt to conquer all of Europe. At the Congress of Vienna, where Napoleon's fate was sealed, all the major powers "recognized" Switzerland's neutrality as being in the best interests of Europe and pledged themselves to respect it.

Since 1815, Switzerland has remained outside all military conflicts, including both World War I and World War II. She had to shoulder the costs of mobilizing her troops, and at times she encountered great difficulties in finding raw materials for her factories and markets for the finished products, but the price she paid on this score was nothing compared to that paid by the participants. It is easy to understand, therefore, why the Swiss have been extremely reluctant to abandon such a fruitful foreign policy and why, in addition, her neighbors have not considered her an especially necessary ally.

A second reason for this attitude by Switzerland's neighbors has been the

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nature of her military policy, which has been one of static defense based on two key elements, geography and manpower. The mountainous character of most of the Swiss frontiers was considered a natural barrier to the movement of enemy troops, and this was reinforced where necessary by underground fortifications and gun emplacements. Areas where the topography did not provide protection were to be defended by artificial fortifications backed up by large numbers of infantry units with supporting artillery. The primary objective was to be strong enough on the frontiers to discourage any possible enemy; the secondary was, if an attack should nevertheless occur, to defend every foot of Swiss soil with such tenacity as to make the cost of pursuing the attack prohibitive.

To provide the large number of troops necessary for this defensive policy, universal military training has been the usual rule. Customarily all young men who attain the age of 20 are called to the colors and put through a basic training course, 118 days for the infantry and 132 days for the cavalry; and afterwards they are recalled at stated intervals for refresher courses. The number of refresher courses decreases with age. Officers and non-commissioned officers, as well as those in special services, receive additional training or attend special schools as necessary. The sight of Swiss units on their summer manœuvres is familiar to tourists.

For a long time it has been the law that every Swiss male retains his army affiliation until the age of 60, and in principle no one is exempt from military service. Exceptions are made for those mentally or physically unfit and for those with essential duties, *e.g.* members of the federal executive body, clergymen who are not military chaplains, and directors and wardens of prisons. Additional groups such as customs officials, police and indispensable transportation employees are exempt only after completing basic training. Other exemptions are rare, and, if obtained, subject the recipient to a special annual tax. Even Swiss citizens who reside abroad are liable.

Soldiers in the oldest age group, 49 to 60, make up the *Landsturm;* their primary responsibility is guard duty and similar tasks. The *Landwehr,* men from 37 to 48, is used principally in the frontier brigades and in manning forts and fortresses. The remainder, classed as the *Elite,* are the real fighting forces.

It should be noted that Switzerland has never had a professional army. The only full-time professionals are officers above a certain rank and some 800 instructors whose task it is to organize the various military courses and to teach the civilian soldier the use of modern equipment and tactics.

Nevertheless, the Swiss civilian army has impressed many observers in the past, including Adolph Hitler. Although the government is reluctant to disclose exact figures, the Swiss army at full strength is estimated to include at least one-tenth of the population of the country, that is, more than 500,000 men. Speed of mobilization is aided by strategically placed stockpiles of war materials and foodstuffs. A provision of the constitution, for instance, provides that the government shall maintain a minimum reserve of 80,000 tons of food grains at all times. The actual amount of materials kept in readiness in vast man-made Alpine caverns is without doubt very great.

The individual Swiss soldier is responsible for the custody of his own

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personal equipment, including rifle and uniform, and there are regular inspections and heavy penalties for improper care. Proficiency with small arms is tested by periodic rifle practice as a supplement to the regular military service.

Despite the size of the Swiss army, its state of readiness, and the fact that its equipment has been modernized at fairly frequent intervals, its value in the defenses of the West as a whole has been limited in the past by the restricted concept on which it has been based. In case of an invasion of Europe from the East in which the aggressor declared (no matter if insincerely) that it would respect Switzerland's integrity, the traditional concept would dictate that the Swiss forces be held on the sidelines, mobilized only to prevent the conflict from spilling over into Swiss territory. To have a strong neutral nation guarding the Alpine passes and one of NATO's flanks was, most certainly, something of merit. But if an aggressor attacked Switzerland the Swiss "static defense" would be of limited value in a general sense. The Swiss strategy would be to use the troops massed on the frontiers, backed by independent infantry battalions with supporting artillery, to exact a heavy toll for every foot of Swiss soil taken. Eventually the Swiss army might be forced to withdraw into its Alpine redoubt, and in the last extreme disperse in a continuing resistance movement. This eventually would leave not only all the major Swiss cities and productive areas in enemy hands, but would open a perfect avenue for an attack on NATO's flank.

About seven years ago a group of high-ranking Swiss officers became concerned over the changes taking place in the art of war and their significance for traditional Swiss military policy. They quickly came to the conclusion that a system of static defense was no longer feasible. Troop concentrations, fortifications and airfields had become inviting targets for the new nuclear weapons. Only a high degree of mobility would permit the necessary dispersion of troops in case of such attack and at the same time permit a rapid concentration of forces to cut off enemy salients and destroy air drops behind Swiss lines. Furthermore, Switzerland should be in a position to carry the battle directly to enemy bases, using its own tactical nuclear weapons if necessary.

It was also apparent that the nature of the potential enemy had changed drastically. In the past, Switzerland had to prepare its defenses against possible aggression by one of its close neighbors. Cultural ties and the traditional respect for Swiss neutrality, as well as the advantages of having a centrally located neutral country available for communication with the enemy or as a trading post, diminished the likelihood that a neighbor would undertake such aggression. In addition, since the possible aggressor could probably be identified in advance, defenses could be planned and constructed on a selective basis.

Following World War II, the real danger was that Switzerland might become implicated in the East-West world conflict. Given the immense armaments of both sides, Switzerland could not hope to defend itself with its own military forces; only as a coöperating ally on one side or the other might it influence the outcome or even make a significant contribution. Although no responsible Swiss official has said so in as many words, the nature and

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philosophy of the Eastern bloc, alien to all Switzerland stands for, evidently makes it the only real danger.

The reorganization plan drawn up by the group of officers and submitted to the federal authorities aimed essentially at creating a modern mobile army, equipped with nuclear weapons and able to coördinate its activities with an ally in case of attack. Specifically, they proposed the creation of six strong mobile divisions to be deployed in the vulnerable Plateau area to destroy enemy attackers and if necessary, either alone or in conjunction with allied forces, to carry a counterattack to enemy bases. They also called for more self-propelled artillery, armor and aircraft and for better general equipment. They were ruthless as to concepts, units or personnel that did not fit into their plan.

The Swiss Federal Council, the seven-man national executive body, received the plan in January 1956 and took it under careful study. In December 1959, it made known its own reorganization plan which, in effect, approved the principal findings of the army officers: the Swiss system of static defense was indeed outmoded; Switzerland must reject the defensive methods of World War I; it must make the sacrifices necessary to create a mobile defense system, eventually including tactical nuclear weapons.

However, the Federal Council's plan as presented to the legislature in June 1960 contained some modifications. They were based primarily on the need for economy, since the original plan would have required an estimated additional 5 percent of the national income. Three mobile divisions were provided for instead of six. Other important economies were to be found by lowering the age limit of military service. Military duty would end, in general, at 50 rather than 60. In future the *Elite* would include those from 20 to 32, the *Landwehr* those from 33 to 42, and the *Landsturm* those from 43 to 50. The reduction in age would also ensure that the new army would be made up of the men best able to stand the strenuous activity of modern military life, while releasing more men for use in the proposed new civil defense organization.

The heart of the plan, the creation of three mobile divisions, also necessitated a certain amount of reorganization of units and formations. One of the most important of these turned out to be the elimination of 13 so-called "independent infantry battalions" (25 in the original plans), the isolated élite units which serve as reserves to the *Landwehr* frontier brigades. It would have been too expensive to reëquip them with modern weapons, and in any case most of their former tasks would now be taken over by the new mobile divisions. Finally, the general modernization of equipment and the emphasis on mobility suggested the elimination of all 24 squadrons of cavalry; reconnaissance and liaison could be better carried out by means of light aircraft, helicopters, small automobiles, or even motorcycles or bicycles.

Opposition to the Federal Council's plans was immediate.

On the ideological level, one of the heaviest attacks was made by the Swiss Socialist Party, which took issue with a statement by the Federal Council that Switzerland needed an army that could coöperate with allies in case of an attack on Swiss soil. To the Socialists this was "a serious deviation" from the traditional meaning of Swiss neutrality, which in their view meant that

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Switzerland must not enter into any military or political alliances in time of general peace. In time of war between third parties, Switzerland should remain aloof. At the beginning of World War II, it was pointed out, the high command of the Swiss army had made contacts with the French military to arrange for certain common measures in the eventuality that Hitler violated Swiss neutrality. In the case of attack on Swiss soil, however, the status of neutrality would automatically be cancelled; only then would Switzerland be free to ask for military assistance from other powers and to collaborate with them. Any other interpretation of neutrality was potentially disastrous, especially in light of the nature of the new potential enemy.

Although the Socialists continued to raise objections throughout the ensuing months of debate, they were unable to swing a substantial number of other legislators to their position. A similar fate befell the activities of the Swiss branch of the "anti-atomic-weapons movement." The majority of the legislators agreed with the Federal Council that since Switzerland could not afford tactical atomic weapons at the moment the question was academic; but when such weapons were available, and the Swiss budget would permit, they would be obtained.

The Swiss plans were the subject of a belligerent article in the Soviet military organ, the *Red Star,* in which frequent reference was made to Swiss "warmongering."

Of a more serious nature was the attack by the military conservatives, or "traditionalists," led by two colonels, men holding the highest rank permitted in the Swiss army in peacetime. These two, Max Wiebel, Chief of Infantry, and Alfred Ernst, Commander of the 8th Infantry Division, struck at the very heart of the Council's plan. The creation of mobile divisions, it was argued, was neither feasible nor practical. Only an infantry-oriented army clinging to each foot of Swiss soil could guarantee a successful resistance to enemy forces in either a traditional or nuclear war. Specifically, this group was in favor of retaining the existing organization of the army, including all independent infantry battalions. Rather than new mechanized divisions, small armored brigades should be created out of existing light brigades to be attached to the independent infantry battalions for support. Cantonal rights over certain elements of the independent units also was an important factor in their arguments. A general increase in firepower, which this group accepted, could be financed by a substantial reduction in the air force. About the only point where the traditionalists were willing to give way was in lowering age limits for military service from 60 to 50.

The attack became so vociferous that, in December 1960, the President of the Confederation, Max Petitpierre, was forced to denounce the activities of the "rebel colonels" as incompatible with discipline and their obligations under the law. The debate as to the proper attitude of officers toward executive plans for national defense still continues in Switzerland (as it does in the United States).

Allied to this group were the members of Switzerland's horse cavalry—the "dragoons," as they are usually referred to. They had always been a large and proud element in the old Swiss army, and as they came primarily from rural areas with heavy voting power, they were influential in the legislature.

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They naturally opposed the plan to eliminate horse transport, arguing that the Swiss terrain made many types of mechanized equipment completely useless. Further, they argued, mechanized transport would be a prey to an enemy blockade of petroleum supplies.

It was also pointed out that the proposed abolition of the horse cavalry would have a profound effect on Swiss agriculture. To a large extent the Swiss farmer still relies on horses for power, and this is encouraged by the government's practice of paying one-half of the purchase price of the cavalryman's horse. In the long intervals between training periods, most of these horses are used on Swiss farms. Indeed, the training periods for the cavalry are arranged so as not to interfere with the harvest.

The legislative battle ended in approval of the bulk of the innovations proposed by the Federal Council. Most important, it was agreed that the Council should proceed with the plan to create three mobile divisions for the defense of the Plateau area. Even before the approval of the new plans, the Council had authorized the use of unexpended funds to purchase 50 Centurion tanks from the Union of South Africa for the equipment of these divisions; and this armor is to be supplemented soon with new all-Swiss tanks of the medium variety (around 35 tons).

On two points, however, the "colonels' revolt" paid off. First, it was decided to maintain all of the independent infantry battalions. Secondly, 18 of the 24 cavalry squadrons were to be retained instead of being all eliminated. As to the Swiss air force, it was decided to maintain it at a strength of 400 aircraft until 1964, at which time its status would be reviewed. Consequently, the new army will be made up of the three new mobile divisions, alongside a traditional army of three infantry divisions, three mountain divisions and three frontier divisions.

Although many difficulties remain to be ironed out, such as how to find the élite troops to fill out the new mobile divisions in view of the retention of the infantry battalions and the cavalry, Switzerland seems to have definitely turned its back on the outmoded concept of static defense. And when the new reorganization plans come into effect fully in 1964, Switzerland will be in a better position to meet the demands of modern warfare and will be a stronger factor in West European defense.

Nor will the reorganization of the Swiss army stop at this point. The federal authorities will almost surely make a new plea for three more mobile divisions and will renew their demand to reduce the independent infantry battalions and eliminate the horse cavalry. It is also certain that the new Swiss army will be equipped with tactical nuclear weapons. Only about six months after the big debate, the Federal Council told the legislature that the army must have the most effective arms available, that is, nuclear arms; and it proposes to obtain them if and when it can do so without endangering Swiss neutrality. If the United States decides to make tactical nuclear arms available to its allies, the possibility of including neutral Switzerland should not be overlooked. There are neutrals and neutrals. From the point of view of the NATO nations, the Swiss type neutral is a good neutral.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

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General: Political and Legal

THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT, 1956–1961. By DONALD S. ZAGORIA. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962, 484 p. $8.50.

This is a very impressive analysis of the rift between the two leading Communist powers as it has developed since the Twentieth Party Congress of the C.P.S.U. Based for the most part on a close and continuing reading of open Communist materials—speeches, articles, resolutions—it provides a good example of the potentialities of this form of research. The author's note on methodology will be of particular interest to students of "esoteric communication."

AN END TO MAKE-BELIEVE. By EDGAR ANSEL MOWRER. New York: Duell, 1961, 241 p. $3.95.

Mr. Mowrer has obviously had his fill of what he takes to be public complacency and official inactivity vis-à-vis the Communist challenge over the years since 1941. His book is a quite abrasive but even-handed critique of our policies and attitudes in the cold war.

THE COLD WAR AND ITS ORIGINS, 1917–1960. By D. F. FLEMING. Garden City: Doubleday, 1961, 2 v. $15.00.

A massive and unremitting indictment of Western, and American, policy as carrying a heavy burden of responsibility for the origins and continuation of the cold war. The Munich Conference, Churchill's Fulton address and the Truman Doctrine are central villains of the piece. While the Soviet leaders are not always entirely innocent bystanders, they are given every benefit of the doubt.

DIVIDED BERLIN. By HANS SPEIER. New York: Praeger, 1961, 201 p. $4.95.

A study of the recent development of the Berlin crisis to the end of July 1961, by the Chairman of the Research Council of the RAND Corporation. The subtitle, "The Anatomy of Soviet Political Blackmail," suggests Speier's interpretation of Khrushchev's policy.

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE. DOCUMENTED AND ANALYZED BY G. F. HUDSON AND OTHERS. New York: Praeger, 1961, 227 p. $5.00. (Paper, $1.75.)

A useful collection of documents and analyses relating to the differences between Moscow and Peking, up to the beginning of 1961.

COMMUNISM. By ALFRED G. MEYER. New York: Random House, 1961, 217 p. $1.95.

An extensive introductory essay and interpretation by the author of previous studies on Marxism and Leninism.

RESEARCH FOR PUBLIC POLICY. By PENDLETON HERRING, PHILIP E. MOSELY AND CHARLES J. HITCH. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1961, 126 p. $2.50. (Paper, $1.50.)

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Lectures and discussions relating to present challenges and opportunities in research on foreign policy, public administration and economic policy.

FOUR STUDIES OF WAR AND PEACE IN THIS CENTURY. By W. K. Hancock. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1961, 129 p. $3.75.

Lectures reflecting on war, peace-making, non-violence and the international setting.

APPEASEMENT: A STUDY IN POLITICAL DECLINE, 1933–1939. By A. L. Rowse. New York: Norton, 1961, 123 p. $3.00.

A most interesting exploration of the attitudes and outlook that led to the policy of appeasement, principally as reflected in conversations at All Souls College, Oxford.

POLITIK IN WISSENSCHAFT UND BILDUNG. By Arnold Bergstraesser. Freiburg: Rombach, 1961, 291 p. DM. 28.

A collection of Professor Bergstraesser's studies on a variety of political and cultural themes.

THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY: AN INTRODUCTORY BIBLIOGRAPHY. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1961, 2 v. Florins 37.50.

An annotated bibliography of books and articles published since 1945 in the United Kingdom, United States, France, Germany, Austria and Italy.

THE ETERNAL TRIANGLE? By Sheldon Appleton. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1961, 274 p. $5.95.

A critical study of the history of U.S. policy on the Chinese representation question in the U.N. The author, a political scientist at Michigan State University, concludes that the American position has been ill-considered, tactically inflexible and probably not to be sustained indefinitely.

FINANCING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: THE UNITED NATIONS BUDGET PROCESS. By J. David Singer. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1961, 185 p. Guilders 14.50.

A useful study.

THE MIGHT OF NATIONS: WORLD POLITICS IN OUR TIME. By John G. Stoessinger. New York: Random House, 1961, 475 p. $8.95.

A very substantial guide to, and interpretation of, contemporary international relations. The author is a member of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, and an Associate Professor of Political Science at Hunter College.

JAHRBUCH FÜR AUSWÄRTIGE POLITIK, 1961. Frankfurt/Main: Keppler, 1961, 558 p. DM. 57.80.

In its new format the Jahrbuch presents a substantial body of statistical and other information about the nations of the world.

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD, 1962. Edited by Walter H. Mallory. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1962, 246 p. $4.95.

Brought up to date as of January 1, 1962, this standard annual reference work gives the composition of governments; sums up party programs and lists their leaders; lists newspapers, indicating their political affiliations and editors; and includes facts on the United Nations and associated international agencies.

POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE USE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE FOR POLITI-

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CAL ENDS. By Otto Kirchheimer. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, 452 p. $8.50.

A sober, scholarly and analytical study of one of the most sensitive areas of jurisprudence—the use of "the devices of justice to bolster or create new power positions."

OUTER SPACE: PROSPECTS FOR MAN AND SOCIETY. Edited by Lincoln P. Bloomfield. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall, 1962, 203 p. $3.95. (Paper, $1.95.)

A collection of essays, prepared for the American Assembly, Columbia University, dealing with the technical, military, political and legal implications of "The Space Revolution."

INTRODUCCION AL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL COSMICO. By Modesto Seara Vazquez. Mexico City: Escuela Nacional de Ciencias Politicas y Sociales, 1961, 348 p.

An introductory study of a new field of international law—that dealing with activities in space.

QUEST FOR SURVIVAL: THE ROLE OF LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY. By Julius Stone. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961, 104 p. $2.75.

Lectures by an eminent Australian student of international law on the role and potentialities of law in world politics.

PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW. By Herbert Wechsler. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961, 171 p. $4.25.

These essays by a leading professor of constitutional law include one on the issues of the Nuremberg Trial.

CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE. By Luke T. Lee. New York: Praeger (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1961, 431 p. $17.50.

A "systematic and analytical treatment of modern consular functions and position." For the serious student or consular officer.

THE INTENT OF TOYNBEE'S HISTORY. Edited by Edward T. Gargan. Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1961, 224 p. $5.00.

Nine scholars comment on various features of Toynbee's "A Study of History."

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

AROUND THE EDGE OF WAR. By John Forth Amory. New York: Potter, 1961, 185 p. $4.50.

Writing under a pen name, the author, described as "a strategically placed Washington expert," writes a warm critique of American policy in defense, intelligence, propaganda and foreign affairs. His central argument is that we have been unable to cope with the "folk war"—popular uprisings throughout the world; our actions and perspective reflect a failure to see what is going on.

THE IRREVERSIBLE DECISION: 1939–1950. By Robert C. Batchelder. Boston: Houghton, 1962, 306 p. $5.00.

An appraisal of the problem of ethics and nuclear weapons by way of a study of the decisions that led to the making and the dropping of the atomic bomb. The author is a student of Christian social ethics.

WHAT PRICE COEXISTENCE? By Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor. New York: Praeger, 1961, 153 p. $4.50.

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A distinguished soldier, author of several works on political and military affairs, here offers his views on the appropriate strategy for NATO over the next decade.

THE BALANCE OF TERROR. By Pierre Gallois. Boston: Houghton, 1961, 234 p. $4.00.
A translation of "Stratégie de l'âge nucléaire" (noted here in October 1960).

CONFLICT AND DEFENSE. By Kenneth E. Boulding. New York: Harper, 1962, 349 p. $7.00.
An ambitious effort to develop a general theoretical system to deal with problems of conflict.

THE CONDUCT OF WAR: 1789–1961. By Major-General J. F. C. Fuller. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1961, 352 p. $6.00.
A study of the pressures of political, social and economic developments on the conduct of war since the French Revolution.

L'AVENIR DE L'ALLIANCE ATLANTIQUE. By Claude Delmas and Others. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1961, 350 p. NF. 18.
French specialists discuss the military and non-military prospects for NATO.

ARMS REDUCTION: PROGRAM AND ISSUES. Edited by David H. Frisch. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961, 162 p. $1.25.
A series of brief papers discussing "specific plans and important components of arms control systems."

GUERRILLAS IN THE 1960's. By Peter Paret and John W. Shy. New York: Praeger, 1961, 82 p. $3.50.
A brief but stimulating analysis of a form of conflict that has recently, and belatedly, aroused much public interest and discussion.

BOR'BA SOVETSKOGO SOIUZA ZA RAZORUZHENIE 1946–1960 GODY. Edited by V. A. Zorin. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Instituta Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii, 1961, 566 p. Rubles 1.80.
A Soviet presentation, by a number of authors, of the Soviet position and policies on disarmament since 1946.

THE GUNS OF AUGUST. By Barbara W. Tuchman. New York: Macmillan, 1962, 511 p. $6.95.
The author of an able study of the Zimmermann Telegram here writes, with much style and perception, of the war plans of the Powers and the initial days of fighting in the First World War. The narrative concludes with the Battle of the Marne.

COMBAT MISSILEMAN. By James Baar and William E. Howard. New York: Harcourt, 1961, 244 p. $4.75.
A somewhat journalistically presented description of our missile program.

SCIENCE AND THE NEW NATIONS. Edited by Ruth Gruber. New York: Basic Books, 1961, 314 p. $6.50.
The proceedings of an international conference, held in Israel, on the role of science in the advancement of new states.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

THE COLD WAR ECONOMIC GAP. By John P. Hardt and Others. New York: Praeger, 1961, 114 p. $4.00.

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A brief summary of findings on U.S. and Soviet economic growth rates, presented to the Joint Economic Committee of Congress.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By Adamantios Pepelasis and Others. New York: Harper, 1961, 620 p. $8.50.

A general analysis of the determinants of economic development, followed by 12 country case studies from Africa, Latin America, southeast Europe and Asia.

THE STEEL INDUSTRY, 1939–1959. By Duncan Burn. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1961, 728 p. $14.50.

A major study, emphasizing the British steel industry but covering Western Europe and the United States as well. This "study in competition and planning" is the sequel to the author's earlier volume that told the story from 1867 to 1939.

ASPECTS JURIDIQUES DU COMMERCE AVEC LES PAYS D'ÉCONOMIE PLANIFIÉE. By H.-J. Berman and Others. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1961, 291 p. NF. 32.

A symposium of papers on various legal aspects relating to trade between the Communist states and the rest of the world.

POPULATION PERSPECTIVES. By Philip M. Hauser. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1961, 183 p. $3.50.

A brief but very informative exposition of population trends and their implications, by a sociologist who was for many years deputy director of the U.S. Bureau of the Census.

REASON AND FAITH IN MODERN SOCIETY: LIBERALISM, MARXISM, AND DEMOCRACY. By Eduard Heimann. Middletown (Conn.): Wesleyan University Press, 1961, 342 p. $6.50.

This work, by the Professor Emeritus of Economics and Sociology at the New School and lecturer in Christian ethics at Union Theological Seminary, develops the thesis that "society is constituted and held together by religion; the belief in reason splits society and is incapable of healing it."

CHILIASMUS UND NATIVISMUS. By Wilhelm E. Mühlmann. Berlin: Reimer, 1961, 472 p. DM. 45.

Comparative studies of chiliastic and eschatological movements in various cultures—part of a series of studies on the sociology of revolution.

The Second World War

ISTORIIA VELIKOI OTECHESTVENNOI VOINY SOVETSKOGO SOIUZA 1941–1945. Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Oborony Soiuza SSR, 1961, 3 v.

These first three volumes of a massive six-volume collaborative Soviet study of the Second World War deal with the immediate antecedents to the conflict and the progress of the war to December 1943. Tendentious but well prepared and illustrated.

THE WAR AT SEA, 1939–1945. VOLUME III: THE OFFENSIVE, PART II, 1st JUNE 1944–14th AUGUST 1945. By Captain S. W. Roskill. London: H.M.S.O., 1961, 502 p. (New York: British Information Services, $8.40.)

This volume is a distinguished contribution to the official British war history, covering the period from the assault on Normandy to the end of hostilities.

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THE CAMPAIGN IN ITALY, 1943–45. By Dharm Pal. New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, Combined Inter-Services Historical Section (India and Pakistan), 1960, 699 p. (Calcutta: Orient Longmans, distributors, Rs. 32.)

This tenth volume in the official history of the Indian Armed Forces in World War II deals with the considerable achievements of the three Indian divisions in the Italian peninsula.

KRIEGSTAGEBUCH DES OBERKOMMANDOS DER WEHRMACHT (WEHRMACHTFÜHRUNGSSTAB). BAND IV: 1. JANUAR 1944–22. MAI 1945. Edited by Percy Ernst Schramm. Frankfurt/Main: Bernard und Graefe, 1961, 2 v. DM. 118.

This is the fourth volume (in two parts) in a new series, but is the first to appear. It presents records and logs of the Oberkommando of the German Wehrmacht from January 1, 1944, to May 22, 1945.

The United States

AMERICA'S QUEST FOR PEACE. By Dexter Perkins. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962, 122 p. $3.00.

A leading historian reviews in these lectures the American quest for peace, through law, through collective security and through the reduction of armaments.

DE WILSON À ROOSEVELT. By Jean-Baptiste Duroselle. Paris: Colin, 1960, 494 p. NF. 25.

A scholarly interpretation of American foreign policy from 1913 to 1945, by a leading French diplomatic historian.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS. Edited by Francis O. Wilcox and H. Field Haviland, Jr. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961, 188 p. $4.50.

A symposium of seven papers dealing with various aspects of current and future U.S. policy with respect to the United Nations.

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A critical study of governmental controls over the flow of information to the public—especially in matters of defense and foreign affairs—and of the implication for the democratic process.

ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE UNITED STATES. By Sumner H. Slichter. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1961, 196 p. $5.00.

Professor Slichter, who died in 1959, initially presented the material for this volume in a series of lectures in 1954. The general theme is the growth and future prospects of the American economy.

TRENDS IN GOVERNMENT FINANCING. By Morris A. Copeland. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, 210 p. $5.00.

A monograph on long-term trends in capital formation and financing in the United States.

PROBLEMS OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH. By Bruce R. Morris. New York: Oxford University Press, 1961, 279 p. $2.50.

An introductory analysis designed for the non-specialist.

THE ST. LAWRENCE WATERWAY. By William R. Willoughby. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961, 381 p. $6.00.

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A historical review of plans and proposals concerning a waterway and their bearing on politics and diplomacy since the beginning of the nineteenth century.

TO TURN THE TIDE. By President John F. Kennedy. New York: Harper, 1962, 235 p. $3.95.

A selection of President Kennedy's public statements and writings on major national issues from the election through the 1961 adjournment of Congress.

PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: HARRY S. TRUMAN, 1945. Washington: G.P.O., 1961, 668 p. $5.50.

This volume in the series of Presidential public papers contains President Truman's public messages, speeches and statements from April 12 to December 31, 1945.

THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JAMES T. SHOTWELL. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961, 347 p. $6.00.

In these memoirs Professor Shotwell traces his incredibly long and active career in scholarship and public affairs.

NORMAN THOMAS, RESPECTABLE REBEL. By Murray B. Seidler. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1961, 368 p. $5.50.

An admiring but serious biography of an outstanding "successful failure" in American politics.

THE POLITICAL WORLD OF AMERICAN ZIONISM. By Samuel Halperin. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1961, 431 p. $8.00.

An intensive study of American Zionism, its organization, its place in the American scene and its achievements.

AMERICANS FROM YUGOSLAVIA. By Gerald Gilbert Govorchin. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1961, 352 p. $8.50.

A quite substantial account of the immigration of Jugoslavs to the United States and their subsequent adaptation and role in American society.

Western Europe

RAPPORTS ET CONFLITS ENTRE ORGANISATIONS EUROPÉENNES. By Roberto Socini. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1960, 168 p. Florins 13.50.

A study of the problem of coördinating the various European organizations that have been formed in recent years.

DER EUROPÄISCHE BEAMTE UND SEIN DISZIPLINARRECHT. By Adrian Clemens. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1962, 392 p. Florins 32.25.

An extended study of the rights and status of functionaries and public servants viewed in the setting of the growing number and importance of general European institutions.

EUROPEAN COAL MINING UNIONS: STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION. By Frederic Meyers. Los Angeles: University of California, Institute of Industrial Relations, 1961, 161 p. $2.75.

A monograph on the structure of trade unionism in the coal mining industries of France, Belgium, West Germany and Great Britain.

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A handbook on the French political spectrum, from right to left, in recent years.

DÉFENSE DE LA FRANCE: HISTOIRE D'UN MOUVEMENT DE RÉSISTANCE (1940–1944). By Marie Granet. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1960, 302 p. NF. 12.

A history of the resistance movement "Défense de la France"—formed initially in Paris and eventually coming to support de Gaulle in 1943.

L'ASSISTANCE DE LA FRANCE AUX PAYS INSUFFISAMMENT DÉVELOPPÉS. By Luc Durand-Reville. Paris: Médicis, 1961, 126 p. NF. 8.

A brief review and critical examination of the French experience.

LA VIE DES FRANÇAIS SOUS L'OCCUPATION. By Henri Amouroux. Paris: Fayard, 1961, 577 p. NF. 18.50.

Less a political history than a description of life in the various zones of France during the German occupation.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF SWITZERLAND. By George Arthur Codding, Jr. Boston: Houghton, 1961, 174 p. $1.95.

A concise survey of Swiss government, parties and politics.

HITLER'S SECRET BOOK. New York: Grove Press, 1962, 230 p. $5.00.

This is a 324-page manuscript written by Hitler in 1928 but never published, and dealing very substantially with his views on foreign policy. No startling revelations, but a useful source for the development of National Socialism. (German edition, "Hitlers Zweites Buch." Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1961, 227 p.)

GENERALFELDMARSCHALL KEITEL: VERBRECHER ODER OFFIZIER? Edited by Walter Görlitz. Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1961, 447 p. DM. 29.80.

Materials—memoirs, documents, letters—relating to the life and career of the Chief of the Wehrmacht, who was executed as a war criminal in 1946.

LICHT UND SCHATTEN DER SOZIALEN MARKTWIRTSCHAFT. By Carlo Mötteli. Erlenbach-Zurich: Rentsch, 1961, 279 p. Swiss Fr. 12.50.

A Swiss economist's appraisal of West Germany's postwar "Wirtschaftswunder"—its origins, dangers and achievements.

IN BONN SCHLÄGT'S 12. By Günther Scholz. Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1961, 299 p. DM. 19.80.

A review and appraisal of the 12 years of the German Federal Republic.

EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY IN WEST GERMANY. Edited by Walter Stahl. New York: Praeger (for Atlantik-Bruecke), 1961, 356 p. $4.50.

A substantial review, by a number of specialists on educational trends in West Germany since the war, with particular attention to political education.

WELTSAAT: ERLEBTES UND ERSTREBTES. By Ernst Jäckh. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1960, 339 p. DM. 19.80.

In this second volume of his autobiography, a well-known Middle Eastern scholar covers his career in the Weimar Republic and subsequently in the United States, where he died in 1959.

DIE VERSÄUMTE REFORM. By Otto Heinrich von der Gablentz. Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1960, 137 p. DM. 17.50.

Critical essays on postwar German policy, domestic and foreign.

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THE SOVIET UNION AND THE OCCUPATION OF AUSTRIA. By William Lloyd Stearman. Bonn: Siegler, 1961, 192 p. DM. 18.20.

An analysis of Soviet occupation policy in Austria from 1945 to the signing of the Austrian State Treaty in 1955.

MUSSOLINI E LA POLITICA ESTERA ITALIANA (1919–1933). By Ennio Di Nolfo. Padua: C.E.D.A.M., 1960, 315 p. L. 2500.

A substantial study of Mussolini's foreign policy from the March on Rome to Hitler's advent to power.

OLDEST ALLY: A PORTRAIT OF SALAZAR'S PORTUGAL. By Peter Fryer and Patricia McGowan Pinheiro. London: Dobson, 1961, 280 p. 25/.

A sympathetic picture of present-day Portugal, but sharply critical of the Salazar régime and its works.

LA RÉVOLUTION ET LA GUERRE D'ESPAGNE. By Pierre Broué and Émile Témime. Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1961, 542 p. NF. 30.

A history of the Spanish Civil War by two young historians sympathetic to the non-Stalinist extreme left.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

MOSCOW JOURNAL: THE END OF STALIN. By Harrison E. Salisbury. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961, 449 p. $6.95.

This book, covering Mr. Salisbury's years in Russia from 1949 to 1953, chiefly comprises extracts from his diary, plus dispatches to *The New York Times*, including those which were stopped or mutilated by the Soviet censor. A useful document for the late Stalin era and the period immediately following the dictator's death.

THE RUSSIAN PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, 1917: DOCUMENTS. Selected and Edited by Robert Paul Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961, 3 v. $30.00.

The purpose of these valuable volumes, sponsored by the Hoover Institution, is "to provide in English an extensive collection of documents and materials on the February revolution and the brief but momentous period of the Provisional Government in Russia during 1917."

LE PARTI COMMUNISTE AU POUVOIR. By N. Rutych. Paris: La Table Ronde, 1961, 522 p. NF. 17.

A survey of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union since its seizure of power in 1917. The author stresses the role of external factors in enabling the Bolsheviks to gain and maintain control and argues that the régime has failed either to legitimize itself or to rise above a "gangster" mentality.

LE GOUVERNEMENT DE L'U.R.S.S. By Michel Mouskhély and Zygmunt Jedryka. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1961, 429 p. NF. 24.

A substantial handbook on the political institutions of the Soviet Union—the evolution of the régime, the structure and operation of the state system and the formal federalism of the constitution. The authors are of Georgian and Polish background.

THE TAPROOT OF SOVIET SOCIETY. By Nicholas P. Vakar. New York: Harper, 1962, 204 p. $4.75.

This is an informal but quite perceptive essay on the Russian peasant and the Russian village and their impact on the nature and behavior of Soviet Communism.

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LA VIE RELIGIEUSE EN U.R.S.S. By Constantin de Grunwald. Paris: Plon, 1961, 246 p. NF. 9.25.

A Russian-born author's appraisal of the condition of the churches and religious life in Russia, based in part upon travels in 1960.

STORMY PASSAGE. By W. S. Woytinsky. New York: Vanguard, 1961, 550 p. $10.00.

These exceptionally interesting memoirs trace the career, or rather careers, of the late author, from his youthful participation in the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917, to his years of wandering in inter-war Europe, and on to his arrival in the United States where he became an internationally recognized economist. The core of the book, however, is revolutionary Russia and this will be of value to all students of the subject.

RUSSIAN BOLSHEVISM. Munich: Bong, 1961, 336 p.

Essays by three Ukrainian writers stressing the Russian nature and roots of Bolshevism.

THE REAL NATIONAL INCOME OF SOVIET RUSSIA SINCE 1928. By Abram Bergson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961, 472 p. $8.75.

This is a major contribution on which Professor Bergson has been working for many years. Based on an enormous amount of statistical and analytical study it undertakes to calculate, for the period 1928–1955, the "real" national income of the Soviet Union. The study includes a chapter contrasting Soviet with American trends.

THE SOVIET ECONOMY: AN INTRODUCTION. By Alec Nove. New York: Praeger, 1961, 328 p. $6.75.

A good introduction for the non-specialist by a prominent British student of the Soviet economy.

RUSSIA FORTY YEARS ON. By M. Philips Price. London: Allen and Unwin, 1961, 132 p. 18/.

A brief account of a visit to Russia and Germany in 1959.

P. E. SVINHUFVUD II. By Einar W. Juva. Helsinki: Söderström, 1961, 700 p. Fmk. 2300.

The second and concluding volume of a biography of Finland's third President, covering the years 1917–1944. It seems destined to secure for Svinhufvud a more respectable niche in Finnish history.

BARBAROSSA SUUNNITELMA JA SUOMI. By Arvi Korhonen. Helsinki: Söderström, 1961, 340 p. Fmk. 1100.

Written by the dean of Finland's historians, this is the best available study of Finnish diplomacy in the uneasy period between the Winter and Continuation Wars.

UNGARN NACH DEM VOLKSAUFSTAND. By Paul Darnoy. Cologne: Kiepenheuer, 1960, 196 p. DM. 14.80.

A study of the reëstablishment of Communist control and organization after the Hungarian revolt of 1956.

THE UNEXPECTED REVOLUTION. By Paul Kecskemeti. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961, 178 p. $4.75.

A concise but cogent analysis of the various currents, both among the "élite" and the "masses," that led to the Hungarian explosion in 1956.

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GENOCIDE IN SATELLITE CROATIA, 1941–1945. By Edmond Paris. Chicago: American Institute for Balkan Affairs, 1961, 306 p. $5.00.

While the author disclaims any desire "to stir up hard feelings," this strongly anti-Catholic account of Ustashi atrocities in Jugoslavia will do just that.

LAND IM OSTEN. By Hermann Schreiber. Düsseldorf: Econ-Verlag, 1961, 418 p. DM. 19.80.

A history of German settlements in Eastern Europe, from the Baltic to the Balkans. Well illustrated.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

THE BARGAINERS. By George Cyriax and Robert Oakeshott. New York: Praeger, 1961, 228 p. $5.00.

A survey, by two labor economists, of contemporary British Trade Unionism: organization, membership, political and economic roles.

THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM. By Alan T. Peacock and Jack Wiseman, assisted by Jindrich Veverka. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, 213 p. $5.00.

Both a statistical presentation and an interpretation of British government expenditures since 1890.

ENGLISH RADICALISM: THE END? By S. Maccoby. London: Allen and Unwin, 1961, 640 p. 70/.

This sixth volume of the author's important history of English radicalism from the time of John Wilkes covers the years since 1906.

PARLIAMENT AND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP. By A. H. Hanson. London: Cassell (for the Hansard Society), 1961, 248 p. 30/. (New York: Oxford University Press, $4.80.)

A discussion of parliamentary control over Britain's nationalized industries.

A HISTORY OF NEW ZEALAND. By Keith Sinclair. New York: Oxford University Press, 1961, 305 p. $4.00.

A brief general history from Maori times to the present.

The Middle East

POLITIKA SSHA NA BLIZHNEM I SREDNEM VOSTOKE. Edited by B. G. Gafurov and Others. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoi Literatury, 1960, 342 p. Rubles 1.40.

Soviet essays on U.S. policy in the Middle East, especially in Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.

THREE KINGS IN BAGHDAD, 1921–1958. By Gerald De Gaury. London: Hutchinson, 1961, 232 p. 25/.

An informal depiction of the three kings and regent of Iraq, by a British official with long experience in the Middle East.

THE CAMELS MUST GO: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY. By Sir Reader Bullard. London: Faber, 1961, 300 p. 25/.

Memoirs of an extended diplomatic career in the Middle East, from 1906 to the author's retirement as British Ambassador at Tehran in 1946.

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DUST IN THE LION'S PAW. By Freya Stark. New York: Harcourt, 1962, 296 p. $6.75.

A section of autobiography dealing chiefly with the author's experiences in the Middle East during the Second World War.

The Far East and South and Southeast Asia

LAND TENURE, INDUSTRIALIZATION AND SOCIAL STABILITY: EXPERIENCE AND PROSPECTS IN ASIA. Edited by Walter Froehlich. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1961, 301 p. $9.00.

A symposium of essays dealing chiefly and by country with the problem of land tenure and reform throughout Asia.

MONSOON ASIA. By E. H. G. Dobby. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961, 380 p. $5.95.

A physical and human geography of southern and eastern Asia, "the golden fringe to a beggar's mantle."

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU. By M. N. Das. New York: Day, 1961, 256 p. $5.00.

An able study and presentation of Nehru's political ideas.

THE VOICE OF FREEDOM: SELECTED SPEECHES OF PANDIT MOTILAL NEHRU. Edited by K. M. Panikkar and A. Pershad. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1961, 563 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $8.50.)

A selection of 44 speeches by the late Pandit Motilal Nehru, twice President of the Indian National Congress in the years following the First World War.

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION. VOLUME I: GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION. By Sirdar D. K. Sen. Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1961, 382 p. (New York: McKay, $7.75.)

A detailed study of the principles of the Indian Constitution. Quite critical of some of Sir Ivor Jennings' views on the subject.

NEXT STEP IN VILLAGE INDIA. By Baljit Singh. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1961, 135 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $4.00.)

A study of the effect of land reform on social relations in Uttar Pradesh.

PLANNING AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN INDIA. By D. R. Gadgil. New York: Asia Publishing House; Poona: Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, 1961, 199 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $4.50.)

Notes and memoranda concerning economic planning, by a prominent Indian economist.

INDIA'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (1920–1960). By Dukh Haran Nath Gurtoo. Delhi: Chand, 1961, 241 p. Rs. 15.

A statistical and analytic study by an Indian economist, a student of Jacob Viner.

PUNJABI CENTURY, 1857–1947. By Prakash Tandon. New York: Harcourt, 1961, 256 p. $5.75.

A sensitive and nicely written personal and family record of life in the Punjab.

COMMUNIST REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE: THE VIETMINH IN INDOCHINA. By George K. Tanham. New York: Praeger, 1961, 166 p. $5.00.

A useful analysis, by a member of the RAND Corporation, of Viet Minh military doctrine, tactics and organization in the fighting in the years 1945–1954.

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LE PHÉNOMÈNE NATIONAL VIÊTNAMIEN. By Paul Isoart. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1961, 437 p. NF. 45.

An extended study of the Vietnamese nation—from independence, to colonial dependence, and more recently to "l'indépendance fractionnée."

INDONESIA: A PROFILE. By Jeanne S. Mintz. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1961, 241 p. $4.25.

A brief introduction to the country, its history, politics and culture.

DIE AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT UND WIRTSCHAFTLICHE ENTWICKLUNG INDONESIENS. By Mohamad Arifin Siregar. Cologne: Brückenbauer-Verlag, 1961, 112 p. DM. 7.80.

A study of Indonesia's foreign trade, with considerable emphasis on the balance-of-payments problem.

MAGSAYSAY AND THE PHILIPPINE PEASANTRY. By Frances Lucille Starner. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961, 294 p. $6.00.

A monograph on the impact of the peasantry and the agrarian problem on Philippine politics in the mid-1950s.

JAPAN. By Sir Esler Dening. New York: Praeger, 1961, 263 p. $5.85. (Paper, $1.85.)

A brief but informative introduction to recent Japanese history, politics and culture, by the former British Ambassador to Japan.

FROM THE MARCO POLO BRIDGE TO PEARL HARBOR. By David J. Lu. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961, 274 p. $4.75.

A careful study, based on Japanese archives, of the course of Japanese policy from the attack on China in 1937 to the attack on the United States in 1941.

Africa

SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AFRICA. Edited by Aidan Southall. New York: Oxford University Press (for the International African Institute), 1961, 337 p. $6.40.

A symposium of studies relating to the general theme "Kinship, Status and Neighbourhood under Modern Economic Conditions in Tropical Africa."

ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. Compiled and Edited by Eric Rosenthal. New York: Warne, 1961, 600 p. $10.00.

An alphabetically organized reference covering the Republic of South Africa, the Central African Federation, South-West Africa, Mozambique, Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland.

DAS NACKTE ANTLITZ AFRIKAS. By Werner Holzer. Frankfurt/Main: Nest Verlag, 1961, 520 p. DM. 22.50.

An extensive survey of recent developments in the principal regions of Africa.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA. By T. Olawale Elias. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1961, 228 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $6.50.)

Lectures delivered in 1956 by the present Minister of Justice for the Federation of Nigeria.

NIGERIA: THE PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY. By Chief H. O. Davies. London: Weidenfeld, 1961, 135 p. 18/.

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A discussion by a Nigerian lawyer and political figure of the prospects for democracy both in Nigeria and in other recently independent states.

THE MEMOIRS OF C. L. SIMPSON: THE SYMBOL OF LIBERIA. London: Diplomatic Press, 1961, 293 p. 30/.

Personal and political memoirs of the former Liberian Ambassador to the United States and Great Britain.

THE ECONOMY OF BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA. By William J. Barber. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961, 271 p. $6.50.

A case study of economic development in an area with two quite distinct social and economic sectors.

THE CONGO: A BRIEF HISTORY AND APPRAISAL. By Maurice N. Hennessy. New York: Praeger, 1961, 148 p. $3.50.

A useful, compact introduction.

KATANGA. By Pierercole Musini. Parma: Società Editrice Emiliana, 1961, 357 p. L. 2000.

An informal but quite informative report on Katanga Province in the Congo.

LA COMMUNAUTÉ FRANCO-AFRO-MALGACHE. By Frédéric Dumon. Brussels: Institut de Sociologie Solvay, 1960, 294 p. Belgian Fr. 220.

On political and constitutional developments in Madagascar, 1958–60.

Latin America and the West Indies

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A symposium of informal papers dealing chiefly with economic problems.

PROPHETS OF THE REVOLUTION. By Robert J. Alexander. New York: Macmillan, 1962, 322 p. $4.95.

A gallery of 12 portraits of twentieth century leaders in Latin America, including Cardenas, Betancourt, Perón and Castro.

THE CONTINENTAL SHELF. By Barry B. L. Auguste. Geneva: Droz, 1960, 408 p. Swiss Fr. 40. (New York: Lounz, distributor, $13.00.)

A study of Latin American policy, with special attention to Chile, Ecuador and Peru.

TRATADO DE ECONOMIA AGRICOLA. By Edmundo Flores. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1961, 442 p.

A very substantial treatise on the organization, problems and possibilities of Mexican agriculture.

COLOMBIA: A CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL SURVEY. By John D. Martz. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962, 384 p. $7.50.

A study of politics and government in Colombia, by the author of several earlier works on Central America.

BRASIL E ÁFRICA: OUTRO HORIZONTE. By José Honório Rodrigues. Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Civilização Brasileira, 1961, 359 p.

A history of Brazil's relations with Africa from the sixteenth century to the present. About half the work deals with contemporary politics and international affairs.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D.C. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, 45 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. *United Nations,* United Nations, Sales Section, N. Y. *International Court of Justice, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office:* 1262 New Hampshire Ave., Washington 6, D.C. *European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community, Euratom:* 220 Southern Bldg., Washington 5, D.C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, and Congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 87th Congress, 1st Session. London imprints are Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

Africa

The World Bank in Africa; a summary of activities. Washington, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1961. 70 p.

Activities of private United States organizations in Africa. Hearings, Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, May 8–Je. 1, 1961. Washington, 1961. 280 p.

In Africa today: the truth that hurts. Facts African leaders sought to suppress and expunge from the record of the United Nations General Assembly. N.Y., Information Service of South Africa, 1961. 31 p.

Agriculture in Ethiopia, comp. by H. P. Huffnagel. Rome, FAO, 1961. 484 p. $5.00.

Report of the Gambia Constitutional Conference, 1961. London, 1961. 7 p. (Cmnd. 1469.) 6 d.

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Documentation in food and agriculture. Paris, OEEC, 1961.

36. Agricultural advisory services in Europe and North America. 246 p. $2.00. *38.* Professional training of teachers in vocational agricultural schools. 385 p. $2.50. *41.* Agricultural regions in the OEEC countries. 124 p. $1.25.

A History of land use in arid regions, ed. by L. D. Stamp. Paris, UNESCO, 1961. 388 p. (Arid Zone Research, XVII.)

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Commercial Policy and Trade

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A new look at foreign economic policy, by Christian Herter and William Clayton. 10 p. (Jt. Com. Print.) The task for 1962; a free world community, by H. S. Reuss. 8 p. (Jt. Com. Print.) Japan in U.S. foreign economic policy, by W. S. Hunsberger. 27 p. (Jt. Com. Print.) Trade adjustment in theory and practice, by O. R. Reischer. 98 p. (Jt. Com. Print.) The European Economic Community and the United States, by R. R. Bowie and T. Geiger. 59 p. (Jt. Com. Print.) United States Commercial policy, a program for the 1960's, by P. B. Kenen. 37 p. (Jt. Com. Print.)

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The United Kingdom and the European Economic Community. Text of the statement made by the Lord Privy Seal at the meeting with ministers of member states of the European Economic Community at Paris, Oct. 10, 1961. London, 1961. 17 p. (Cmnd. 1565.) 1s.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Washington, 1961. (Dept. of State. Commercial Policy Series, 178.) 27 p.

Tourism in Europe; a study prepared by the Tourism Committee in September, 1961. Paris, OEEC, 1961. 97 p. (Trends in Economic Sectors.) $1.25.

Problems of the domestic textile industry. Supplementary report, Committee on Commerce, Senate, Ap. 19, 1961. Washington, 1961. 22 p. (S. Rept. 173.)

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Statistics of world trade in steel, 1913–1959. Geneva, United Nations, 1961. 481 p. (61. XVII. 5.) $6.00.

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THE WORLD sugar economy in figures, 1880–1959. Rome, FAO, 1961. 137 p. (Commodity Reference Series, 1.) $1.50.

DISARMAMENT

GENEVA Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests; history and analysis of negotiations. Washington, 1961. 641 p. (Dept. of State, Disarmament Series, 4.)

U.S. security, arms control, and disarmament, 1960–1961. Prepared by the Research Analysts of the Army Library. Washington, Dept. of Defense, 1961. 144 p.

DISARMAMENT Agency. Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, on S. 2180, Sept. 6, 1961. Washington, 1961. 10 p. (S. Rept. 882.)

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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